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EPIGRAM 
Listen to me, little fetus. 
Precious homo incompletus, 
As you dream your dreams placental 
Don't grow nothing accidental! 
Budding off the primal egg 
Grow one tiny, bulbous leg. 
Swept along by nature's tide, 
Grow one on the other side— 
Swiveled in its proper hip. 
And, here's a useful baby tip: 
Though you may really think you oughtn't 
Grow lungs, which hardly seem important 
In your snug and sodden sac 
Later on you'll feel their lack. 
Heed me well, oh precious progeny! 
Recapitulate phylogeny 
In your amniotic lake 
Don't grow nothing by mistake. 
(Jerry Adler, 1987a) 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
The concept of genetic disease is not new. As early as 
the fifth century A.D., Hebrew law not only acknowledged the 
existence of hemophilia but also recognized it as a disorder 
that affected males but was transmitted by females (Hendin 
and Marks, 1978). Two millennia later, th@ groundwork for 
modern genetics was laid by Gregor Mendel, who studied 
inheritance patterns of recessive and dominant genes 
(Wagner, 1981). Subsequently, geneticists have identified 
over 2,800 single gene diseases caused by alterations in 
functions of the genetic code and hundreds of chromosomal 
disorders or other multifactorial congenital anomalies, 
which are associated with the interaction of environmental 
factors and genetic predispositions (McKusick, 1978). 
Finally, with the advent of modern medical technologies, a 
new and rapidly expanding field of prenatal diagnosis of 
birth defects became firmly established in the biological 
sciences. 
The medical, legal, and sociological consequences of 
these technological advances have not gone unnoticed. 
Concerns about ethical ambiguities alone have spawned heated 
debates about prenatal diagnosis and genetic counseling. 
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The focus of this study, however, is largely confined to 
examining the impact these new techniques exert on women at 
reproductive risk in the planning of their families. 
Specifically, this research proposes to identify social 
identity, normative, and reference group factors that 
influence women to accept or reject amniocentesis. 
Amniocentesis, an antenatal diagnostic test whereby 
fetal cells are obtained for biochemical and/or chromosomal 
analysis, is a medical procedure that was pioneered in the 
late 1960s (Nadler, 1968; Pernoll et al., 1974). The first 
intrauterine diagnosis of a chromosomal anomaly occurred in 
1967 (Jacobson and Barter, 1967). By 1978, a National. 
Institute of Health study confirmed that amniocentesis 
performed between the 15th and 18th week of pregnancy 
provided parents and health-care professionals with a 
relatively safe and accurate means of detecting prenatal 
chromosomal abnormalities, neural tube defects, disorders of 
enzyme production or functioning causing abnormal 
metabolism, and X-linked (transmitted through the female 
chromosomes) disorders (Lowe et al., 1978; Davies, 1983). 
Within 13 years of the first prenatal diagnostic test, 
Simpson et al. (1980) estimated that more than 100,000 
amniocenteses had been performed. 
The risk of spontaneous abortion as the result of 
amniocentesis ranges from only 0.2% to 1.5% (Golbus et al.. 
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1979; Cruikshank et al., 1983). In light of this, the 
procedure has become more widely accepted and advocated, 
particularly for women age 35 and older who are at higher 
genetic risk for conceiving infants with Down syndrome 
(trisomy 21). Older women thus represent about 
three-fourths of those most often referred for genetic 
testing (Marion et al., 1980; Davies and Doran, 1982). 
Negative results from amniocentesis testing do not 
guarantee the birth of a healthy baby. Although prenatal 
diagnosis can be 99.5% accurate given the availability of 
good laboratory facilities (Davies, 1983), a majority of 
congenital anomalies still cannot be detected prenatally 
(Council on Scientific Affairs, 1982). It has been 
estimated that 20% of the abnormal infants born each year, 
50% of the spontaneous abortions, 20% of the pediatric 
hospitalizations, and 40% of all childhood deaths are 
attributable to genetic abnormalities (Fraser, 1969; Day and 
Holmes, 1973). Nevertheless, amniocentesis has the 
potential for informing parents about the presence or 
absence of certain congenital diseases. In fact, the 
President's Commission on Mental Retardation (Adams et al., 
1981) predicted that by the turn of the century, the number 
of infants born with genetic disorders causing severe mental 
retardation could be reduced by half through the use of 
prenatal genetic diagnosis. Yet, estimates on the 
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percentage of women in groups with genetic risks who avail 
themselves of this service ranges from only 5% among rural, 
black, low socioeconomic status women to a high of 65% for 
highly educated white women with upper level incomes who 
live in urban areas; about 20-25% is the most likely 
appraisal for the eligible population (Sokol et al., 1980; 
Adams et al., 1981; Sepe et al., 1982). 
Discerning factors that influence patients to accept or 
reject antenatal genetic screening has been of considerable 
interest to social scientists and genetic counselors alike. 
Logically, it would seem that by fully utilizing the 
services available to them, prospective parents have the 
opportunity to maximize their chances of having a 
normally-functioning child. Anxieties relating to known 
hereditary problems or risks associated with advanced 
maternal age can be allayed by negative test results; for 
women who find they are carrying an affected fetus, the 
information offers them a choice of either terminating the 
pregnancy or becoming emotionally prepared in advance for 
the birth of a child with a genetic disease. In reality, 
however, empirical evidence reveals prenatal genetic 
diagnosis to be a potentially stressful procedure that often 
engenders anxiety (Beeson and Golbus, 1979; Phipps and Zinn, 
1986a), anticipatory grief (Brewster, 1984), anger (Phipps 
and Zinn, 1986b), hostility (Fava et al., 1983; Elkins et 
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al., 1986), depression (Antley, 1977), and significant 
marital distress (Blumberg et al., 1975). Avoidance of 
antenatal screening does not necessarily relieve these 
tensions, particularly if the parents are aware of their 
increased genetic risks. Reproductive uncertainty, 
resentment (Lippman-Hand and Fraser, 1979a,b), denial (Hsia, 
1979), or guilt (Kessler et al., 1984) are among some of the 
painful reactions experienced by individuals who refuse 
genetic prenatal diagnosis. 
This wide range of responses suggests the need for 
thoughtful research that takes into account social identity, 
attitudinal, and normative reference group factors that 
affect the decision-making processes and choices of women at 
genetic risk. The current study, then, is undertaken with 
the objective of reexamining factors previously identified 
in reproductive-choice research as well as investigating new 
or little-studied facets that relate to the ultimate 
rejection or acceptance of amniocentesis. 
Significance of the Study 
Factors influencing the acceptance or rejection of 
amniocentesis are not well understood. Prenatal diagnosis 
of genetic anomalies represents a major scientific 
achievement. It is responsible for reducing the number of 
children born with Down syndrome and has provided older 
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women the security of knowing delayed or postponed 
reproduction need not necessarily entail significantly 
higher risks of bearing a child with trisomy 21. However, 
there are still substantial segments of the eligible 
population that do not seek out the procedure because of 
fear or as a result of their beliefs, misinformation, or 
lark of knowledge. Geneticists and health educators can 
thus profit from the findings of this study relating to the 
acceptance or rejection of prenatal diagnosis. Such 
information could lead to the formulation of new approaches 
to genetic counseling and outreach programs. Results 
obtained from analysis of the data could be useful in 
educating the public in general about family planning 
options and the place of amniocentesis within the constructs 
of such planning. 
Current trends in marriage and fertility patterns are 
particularly relevant to the applicability of the research 
question at hand. The recent rise in age at marriage and 
the decline in first birth rates within marriage, while 
representing a return to earlier family formation patterns 
(Thorton and Freedman, 1983), increase the likelihood that 
first-time mothers will be at higher risk for conceiving a 
child with congenital anomalies. Down syndrome is of 
primary concern here, since its risk ratio increases from 
about 1:1,667 live births at maternal age 20 to 1:60 by age 
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40 and 1:9 for those 49 years of age (Hook, 1981). 
Moreover, as Hook (1981) demonstrated, there is a fairly 
linear progression of increased risks for several 
chromosomal abnormalities as maternal age rises, further 
underscoring the advisability of prenatal diagnostic 
screening among older pregnant women. 
A wide acceptance of amniocentesis could reduce or 
conceivably eliminate the birth of genetically-affected 
children to mothers at reproductive risk. This could 
significantly diminish both personal and public health-care 
expenses in a society already burdened with burgeoning 
health-care costs and shrinking fiscal resources. By . 
examining factors that influence acceptance or rejection of 
prenatal diagnosis, this study may likewise find methods of 
relieving the anxieties or reducing the reluctance of 
prospective mothers with respect to the procedure. 
Amniocentesis and genetic counseling both offer 
potentials for averting or mitigating the burden of raising 
a congenitally-affected child. Parents who are aware of 
their odds of reproductive risk may elect to avoid 
pregnancy, may become pregnant with the knowledge that the 
pregnancy can be terminated if the child is affected, or may 
be better prepared in advance to deal with the consequences 
of raising a child with chromosomal anomalies. However, if 
patients reject amniocentesis or genetic counseling, they 
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foreclose on these options of choice in reproductive 
decision-making. It is essential, then, to identify 
barriers, whether structural, social, or attitudinal, that 
prevent prospective clients from seeking genetic counseling 
services. 
Similarly, the present research has the utility of 
helping genetic counselors modify or tailor their 
consultations to the particular needs of the parents seeking 
their assistance. Factors that may actually complicate 
genetic counseling interactions and choices should be 
delineated to alert counselors to any changes that need to 
be made to facilitate the transfer of information to the 
counselees (subjects at genetic risk). Foreknowledge of how 
certain attitudinal, normative, or self-identity variables 
affect the reception of information may improve counselors' 
communications and their abilities to help prospective 
parents achieve a decision with which they will be 
satisfied. It is therefore vital that geneticists become 
familiar with these factors. 
The sociological implications of the study are also 
relevant. In determining the weight and extent of 
normative, social identity, and reference group variables, 
the potential exists for building sociological theories and 
models that can better explain consumer behavior in 
health-oriented settings. Very little applied theory has 
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evolved to explain the actions of clients in genetic 
counseling situations and what has been done is often too 
limited. For example, the preponderance of studies have 
been guided by rational decision-making and subjective 
utility models to explicate reproductive choices under 
conditions of uncertainty. However, by focusing on and 
expecting logical or rational explanations rather than 
exploring attitudinal and emotional factors that influence 
behaviors, the decision-making processes of real-world 
situations are obscured. 
The study has the singular advantage of examining both 
rejectors and acceptors of amniocentesis, affording a 
comparison group that will facilitate the identification of 
important differences between these two groups. Finally, 
this research is distinctive in that it proposes not only to 
investigate variables denoted in previous studies, but to 
explore more closely the impact and significance of social 
network and normative influences heretofore little examined 
in the genetic counseling literature. 
The Present Study 
An exploratory analysis of multiple factors suggested 
by previous research will be undertaken in the present study 
to achieve a better understanding of the correlates of 
rejection or acceptance of amniocentesis. Differences 
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between acceptors and rejectors of amniocentesis will be 
examined using baseline data compiled between July, 1981, 
and June, 1983, from 249 respondents. The University of 
Iowa Hospitals and Clinics is the main office for a 
five-region genetic consultation service covering the state 
of Iowa, which provides evaluation, diagnosis, and 
counseling for genetic diseases. From the clientele 
referred to this service, 199 acceptors and 29 rejectors of 
amniocentesis were solicited for participation in the study; 
an additional 21 cooperating rejectors were recruited 
statewide through obstetricians and gynecologists practicing 
in Iowa. The information is available from face-to-face 
interviews conducted with these individuals after they had 
decided to accept or reject amniocentesis but before the 
procedure (in the case of the acceptors) had been performed. 
The study is proposed with several objectives in mind. 
First, an attempt will be made to identify malleable factors 
that may increase a client's willingness to undergo 
amniocentesis. Second, sociostructural, nonmalleable 
factors that influence decisions and outcomes will be 
specified and explored, since a recognition of these factors 
is essential to better understand the influences that form 
counselees' decisions. Finally, implications for genetic 
counseling relating to decision-making and choices in 
prenatal testing will be addressed. 
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The format for the proposed study is as follows. 
Chapter Two presents the theoretical orientation guiding the 
dissertation and reviews empirical research investigating 
significant predictors of the acceptance or rejection of 
prenatal diagnostic procedures. The literature is 
summarized and theoretical hypotheses are derived. Chapter 
Three outlines the methods and procedures to be used in the 
study. The basic research design, sample characteristics, 
conceptual measures, and operationalized hypotheses will be 
reviewed and statistical procedures will be discussed. 
Chapter Four presents results of the analysis and Chapter 
Five summarizes and discusses these findings. In this 
chapter, too, implications for applied significance and 
utility as well as suggestions for future research will be 
delineated. Finally, in an Epilogue, the focus will move 
from a sociology in medicine approach to a sociology of 
medicine analysis. In this section, comparisons between 
medical and sociological perspectives, practices, methods, 
and interpretations will be made with the objective of 
contrasting the differences, denoting the similarities, and 
suggesting ways of extracting the best of both worlds to 
establish a fruitful, symbiotic research relationship 
between the two disciplines. 
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE ON GENETIC COUNSELING 
As medical technology and genetic knowledge progressed, 
the prevailing hope was that birth defects could eventually 
be eliminated or at least greatly reduced. As Carter 
(1979:1798) optimistically predicted, "There are good 
prospects of achieving a substantial reduction in the 
proportion of...handicapped children by genetic counseling 
supplemented with prenatal diagnosis." However, with time, 
it has become increasingly apparent that knowledge and 
technology have little to do with pregnancy planning because 
the people who ultimately make the decisions regarding the 
undertaking and/or outcome of pregnancy are potential 
parents, not emotionally removed geneticists or doctors. 
Thus, researchers from the fields of medicine, genetics, 
sociology, psychology, and anthropology have begun exploring 
factors relating to the decision-making processes of people 
seeking genetic counseling. 
The findings generated by these diverse fields of study 
and far-ranging theoretical perspectives are varied and 
sometimes contradictory. Within this chapter, previous 
guiding frameworks, assumptions, and research findings will 
be discussed. First, however, to better understand the 
development of genetic counseling, a brief synopsis of its 
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history will be included and the theoretical orientation 
proposed for the current study will be outlined. A 
comprehensive literature review of prior findings will 
provide guidance in generating hypotheses within which 
factors influencing the decisions of genetic counselees can 
be explored given the theoretical perspective of the current 
study. The chapter will conclude by combining the 
theoretical concepts to form the general hypotheses to be 
tested. General models diagramming these posited 
relationships will be developed. 
Theoretical Orientation 
Theoretical orientations used to study the decisions 
and behaviors of people eligible for genetic counseling have 
emanated from the diverse fields of medicine, psychology, 
economics, anthropology, and sociology. Some researchers 
have employed larger formal theories while others have 
tested middle-range theories or models in an attempt to gain 
a clearer understanding of the processes involved. Still, 
no predominant perspective has emerged. Part of the problem 
related to the shifting paradigms researchers and counselors 
have embraced in the practice and study of genetic 
counseling and its clientele. As Kuhn (1970) explained it, 
a paradigm leads researchers to identify the important 
questions, explanatory principles, models, and criteria for 
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acceptance or rejection of findings consistent with the 
school of thought or research tradition the paradigm 
represents. Kuhn noted that when a particular paradigm 
comes into "fashion," much of the research is conducted 
using that perspective. However, when a paradigm changes, 
usually when it has lost its explanatory power because new 
evidence suggests it is insufficient or incomplete, research 
perspectives also shift; findings or trends discovered under 
one paradigm are generally no longer applicable in the new 
paradigm. When a new paradigm gains supremacy in a field of 
study, the preponderance of research will take that 
perspective until the new paradigm has reached its limits 
and another one replaces it. 
The study and application of human genetics has 
undergone three major paradigmatic shifts in the past eighty 
years (Caplan, 1979; Kessler, 1980). Kessler suggested that 
a central core of beliefs has persisted through each shift 
(i.e., that the provision of genetic education is a primary 
objective of genetic counseling). However, implementation 
of this core of beliefs has varied considerably over time. 
The eugenics paradigm of the early-to-middle twentieth 
century was largely motivated by a social Darwinistic 
perspective. Legislation restricting immigration and 
sterilization of mentally-retarded individuals was the overt 
manifestation of this paradigm (Ludmerer, 1972; Allen, 
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1975), while individual, nonmedical counselors stressed 
defense of the human gene pool rather than individual needs 
(Lappe, 1973; Twiss, 1979). Humans were perceived as 
rational beings who were motivated by a sense of duty and 
obligation to the future to seek genetic counseling (Muller, 
1958) . 
By the 1940s, disillusionment with the excesses of the 
eugenics movement prompted scientists to turn to a 
preventive medicine paradigm. With its medicalization, 
genetic counseling was seen as legitimate only when provided 
by a physician and the traditional doctor-patient 
relationship was stressed. Here, the counselor was the 
advice-giver and counselees, motivated by fear of repetition 
of a genetic problem or the desire to comply with the 
doctor's referral, were passive recipients of the 
counselor's instructions. Counselors maintained control, 
authority, and power in the relationship while the patients 
assumed the compliant behavior associated with Parsons' 
(1951) newly-formulated "sick role." Over time, the style 
of communication advocated for the physician within a 
counseling relationship under this paradigm shifted away 
from directive to interactive. However, as Kessler (1980) 
noted, this meant that doctors had to relinquish their 
knowledge-based superior status and adopt a stance of 
neutrality. This shift created tensions not only for the 
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doctor but for those patients who expected their physicians 
to provide more guidance than the accepted position of 
neutrality would allow. 
By 1972, it became apparent that neither the eugenics 
nor preventive medicine paradigms were very successful 
(Hecht and Holmes, 1972). Both paradigms either tacitly or 
explicitly emphasized prevention, which placed the counselor 
in the position of "protecting the social good at the 
expense of individual prerogatives" (Kessler, 1980:169). 
Practical considerations also suggested that these 
perspectives were not highly successful. Given the 
limitations of technology, preventing genetic disease was 
not realistic; at-risk persons were not always willing to 
enter into genetic counseling (Beck et al., 1974); 
counselees often failed to understand or remember 
information disseminated in counseling sessions (Sorenson, 
1974); and their expressed intentions regarding reproduction 
were often at variance with what they actually did (Antley, 
1979b). Finally, and most importantly, practitioners in the 
field began to acknowledge that genetic counseling involves 
highly-charged emotional issues that require the counselor 
to deal with human thinking, feeling, and behavior. Thus, 
the psychologically-oriented paradigm emerged. Within this 
perspective counselors have recognized that individuals 
entering genetic counseling come with their own belief 
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systems, attitudes, values, and norms. Counselees are not 
passive recipients of information dispensed from a 
knowledgeable resource person. To the contrary, they 
actively process the information and rely on their own 
interpretations of the "objective" realities they encounter 
in a counseling situation. 
The psychologically-oriented paradigm is now in popular 
ascendancy in the study of genetic disease. It is 
appropriate, therefore, to undertake the investigation of 
factors influencing the decision-making process of subjects 
who choose or reject amniocentesis with the guidance of a 
theoretical perspective that acknowledges the necessity of 
examining the individual's sense of self, her values and 
attitudes, and the impact of social groups and societal 
norms if one hopes to understand human behavior. Symbolic 
interactionism offers such a framework. 
Symbolic interactionism draws on the writings of 
Scottish moral philosophers, who believed society was a 
network of interpersonal communications and who viewed 
humans as more than biological animals reacting to their 
environment (Stryker, 1981). From American pragmatists, 
symbolic interactionism adopted the premise that people 
develop a sense of self through interaction with others 
(James, 1890; Cooley, 1902) and with the pre-existing social 
order (Dewey, 1940), and that if individuals "define 
18 
situations as real, they are real in their consequences" 
(Thomas and Thomas, 1928:567). Mead (1934) is credited with 
establishing symbolic interactionism as one of sociology's 
primary theoretical frameworks. Blumer (1969), an 
enthusiastic student of Mead, wrote extensively about 
symbolic interactionism, taking Mead's rather vague ideas 
and making his own interpretations. Later, Kuhn (1964) 
developed another school of symbolic interactionism, one 
that, unlike Blumer's perspective, was more deterministic in 
nature and was inclined to use quantitative, traditional 
scientific research methods. Some other closely related 
perspectives emanating from symbolic interactionism included 
the study of normative or comparison reference groups 
(Shibutani, 1955; Festinger, 1954) and dramaturgy (Goffman, 
1959). 
Each of these branches represents somewhat different 
perspectives, so much so that the infighting and criticisms 
among the various schools of symbolic interactionism would 
suggest that there is little in common (e.g., Blumer, 1978; 
Brittan, 1973). Still, there are several basic tenets of 
symbolic interactionism that most advocates, to varying 
degrees, hold to be true. First, individuals act based upon 
meaning. Second, meaning is emergent, arising from 
interaction with others by taking on the role of others; 
therefore, society is not a static structure but a process 
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in which people are interacting, adjusting, redefining, and 
reconstructing reality. Third, at the same time, the 
meaning of human conduct reflects an overarching core of 
shared, common, consensual interpretations (i.e., 
significant symbols that emanate from and represent the 
cultural whole). Fourth, consciousness or thinking involves 
interaction with the self, where an individual dialogues 
between an impulsive self and a generalized other, which 
represents the perspective of the individual's reference 
group or larger society. And, fifth, humans are 
participants in creating their own destinies; human conduct 
influences and is influenced by antecedent events, 
significant others, and the cultural whole (Manis and 
Meltzer, 1978). 
From symbolic interactionism and its various offshoots, 
then, this study will draw on several concepts. Individuals 
define reality and interpret their situations by engaging in 
"minded" behavior in which they deliberately select the 
stimulus to which they respond (Mead, 1934). The world is 
objective and resistant to efforts to change it, but when 
attempting to understand human behavior, one must examine 
individuals' perceptions and their definitions of meaning 
(Wilson, 1983). Symbolic interactionism accepts that people 
are creators of their world, though not in circumstances of 
their choosing. Individuals are part of a sociocultural 
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complex and must cope with the constraints the situation 
imposes on them. 
An individual's perception of meaning arises from the 
processes of communication, negotiation, and interaction 
with others (Menzies, 1982). Certain primary groups more 
than others provide a frame of reference for individuals. 
These groups help individuals define norms, develop a 
perspective or reality, and validate their construction of 
the social world, which includes their values, beliefs, 
attitudes, or opinions (Cooley, 1902; Shibutani, 1955; 
Festinger, 1954). Reference groups also provide a resource 
for social comparison to help individuals validate their 
social construction of and sociostructural position in the 
world (Festinger, 1954; Maines, 1977; Rosenberg and Pearlin, 
1978; Rosenberg, 1981; Stryker, 1981; Wills, 1981, 1985; 
Boyce, 1985). 
Goffman (1963) developed the "sensitizing concept" that 
individuals with an attribute that is perceived as somehow 
discrediting are stigmatized and are thus affected and often 
limited in their interactions with others. This stigmatized 
perception of self may distort reality and interpretation of 
the situation. Stigmatized individuals may also deny their 
stigmatized status rather than incorporate the damaging 
perception of a discrediting status into their sense of 
self. 
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While symbolic interactionism offers a rich framework 
within which actions and interpretations of people 
interacting with significant others can be investigated, it 
has not been without its critics. For instance, symbolic 
interactionism has been faulted for failing to explore the 
emotional aspects of the social actors (Menzies, 1982; 
Stryker, 1981). However, the contention made in this study 
is that focusing on "minded" behavior does not, of 
necessity, eliminate considerations of the emotional realm 
of human reality. Some sociologists, such as Shott (1979) 
and Hochschild (1979), already have provided symbolic 
interactionist accounts of how the meaning of people's 
emotions is shaped by their situation. Within this study, 
too, the emotional aspects of the participants deciding 
whether to undergo genetic testing cannot be ignored, since 
decisions relating to childbearing are more often emotional 
than "rational." 
Further criticisms are directed at symbolic 
interactionism because it has not generally been perceived 
as a highly-testable or causal theory. Menzies (1982:25), 
for example, pointed out that irreconcilable tensions arise 
between competing schools or perspectives of symbolic 
interactionism because the Blumerian or Chicago school holds 
that symbolic interactionism provides a "volunteristic, 
interpretative description and as such has a significant 
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contribution to make to sociology." The methods advocated 
by those who wish to apply more conventional research 
techniques within a symbolic interactionism framework are, 
Menzies suggested, inappropriate and a source of 
considerable dispute among symbolic interactionists. Blumer 
(1956) railed against sociological analysis that relies on 
"generic" variables, which in his view are indistinct, 
abstract, and, for purposes of understanding participants' 
definitions and interpretive processes, very limited. 
Becker and Geer (1957) similarly noted that using interview 
instruments rather than participant observation tends to 
distort the findings; interviewers have only one point in 
time from which to draw conclusions and this can lead to 
errors of inference because the interview questions are not 
always able to elicit the subjects' true feelings, 
definitions, and interpretations. 
The position taken in this study, however, is that 
symbolic interactionism can in fact be operationalized and 
that the methods employed need not be confined solely to the 
observational techniques embraced by earlier notable 
symbolic interactionists (e.g., Becker, 1953; Emerson, 1970; 
Goffman, 1961; Whyte, 1943). Kuhn's University of Iowa 
school of symbolic interactionism advocated a scientific, 
positivistic stance. He believed the "key ideas of symbolic 
interactionism could be operationalized and utilized 
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successfully in empirical research" (Kuhn, 1964:72). It is 
contended that for this study, Kuhn's more empirical 
approach is in order for four primary reasons. First, 
because of the extensive research that has gone on before, 
much of it qualitative, some "sensitizing" concepts relating 
to genetic counseling clientele and their decision-making 
processes have already been delineated. Blumer (1956), 
perhaps, would maintain that no universal variables can be 
identified since persons distinctively define their own 
situations. However, the assumption guiding this study is 
that while individual reality is unique, persons facing the 
same situation—that of deciding about reproduction and 
prenatal diagnosis—have certain salient traits, 
characteristics, or responses in common. Thus, in selecting 
variables already shown to influence outcomes of 
reproductive decision-making, the processual and 
interpretive essence of the action is maintained but for 
purposes of research is operationalized into concepts that 
can be tapped using interview techniques. 
Second, by using a standardized instrument, this 
research will attempt to avoid some of the biases of 
interpretation and dissimilarities of interaction that might 
arise in open-ended or observational studies. Huber (1973), 
for example, insisted that there is a potential for bias any 
time a researcher follows the methodological teachings of 
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Blumer. A "blank mind," she suggested, affords fertile 
ground for the research largely to reflect the perspective 
of the researcher. To make things worse, because the study 
cannot be replicated, there are no safeguards. Each 
symbolic interactionist description stands on its own, with 
no check on individual researcher bias. It is true that by 
adopting interview methods, the interpretation of the data 
is limited to a single time frame. Although inferences may 
be made, the interpretation of respondents' answers will 
largely be confined to their expressed answers and behaviors 
given the context of the interview. This may limit the 
larger perspective. Yet it affords a more consistent 
reference point for comparison across participants who were 
studied during a two-year period. Using a standardized 
instrument also guards against the natural tendency for a 
researcher to vary or alter techniques, questions, or 
inquiries given the information already gathered from 
earlier interactions with respondents. 
Third, statistical analysis of data does not reveal 
ultimate truths. It tends to obscure individual 
idiosyncratic behaviors or definitions. Nevertheless, it 
affords a basis for comparison with other research 
undertaken in the same way. Rather than distinguishing 
individualistic and unique concepts, using statistical 
analysis allows for larger generalizations and the 
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accumulation of a knowledge base relating to participants• 
stable social identity elements, norms, attitudes, and 
beliefs to their reproductive behaviors and decisions. 
Thus, the claim of its devotees, that more than any other 
theory symbolic interactionism establishes the linkage 
between the individual and larger social and cultural 
structures, can more readily be reviewed employing 
statistical techniques to help discern these linkages. 
Finally, by virtue of the personnel, time, and 
financial constraints involved, it is necessary to rely on a 
standardized questionnaire format enabling the investigation 
of a somewhat larger sample than conventional observational 
techniques generally allow. As Lofland (1978) pointed out, 
the problem of "analytic interruptus" is common to symbolic 
interactionists; the time and effort required to do 
thorough, insightful analysis often lead to shallow, narrow 
case studies and little accumulated knowledge. By relying 
on more "conventional" positivistic, empirical methods, this 
study is undertaken with the prospect that somewhat larger, 
generalizable, and comparable results will be found, which 
may provide a useful springboard for future research in this 
area. 
While not an advocate of empirical analysis, Menzies 
(1982:36) concluded that "whatever methodology is used—from 
participant observation to surveys—it must be done with a 
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sensitivity to the integrity of the world that one is trying 
to describe." The current study will attempt to adhere to 
this premise. 
Review of the Literature 
Dependent variable; decision under reproductive uncertainty 
Acceptance or rejection of amniocentesis The 
dependent variable to be explored is acceptance or rejection 
of prenatal diagnostic testing. The preponderance of 
research over the past fifteen years has tried to determine 
which factors influence women in their reproductive 
decisions (Antley, 1976; Levine, 1979). The primary mission 
of genetic counseling research under the eugenics or 
preventive medicine paradigms had been to make sure women at 
reproductive risk were aware of their risks and that they 
would act "accordingly," which meant either foregoing 
reproduction or taking the necessary precautions (e.g., 
undergoing prenatal diagnosis) to avoid bearing children 
with genetic disorders. Within the psychologically-oriented 
paradigm, genetic counselors view their objective to be that 
of assisting prospective parents through the decisions they 
face given their at-risk status. The processes of 
interpretation a potential mother undertakes can be 
envisioned as a "decision tree" (Figure 1), where at each 
juncture the woman selects her course of action from among 
_Negative_ 
Results" 
Continue Potential for 
Accept 
Amniocentesis 
Decision to 
Reproduce 
Pregnancy Birth of Child 
Try Again 
Abort I 
Positive 
Results ' i Stop Trying 
Continue Potential for 
Pregnancy 
I 
Potential for Being 
Aware of Genetic Risk* 
Reject Amniocentesis Continue 
Birth of Child 
Potential for 
Firm Decision 
Decision not to 
Reproduce 
Pregnancy 
Sterilization 
Effective Birth 
Control 
Ineffective 
Birth of Child 
Uncertain or_ 
Postponement 
of Decision 
Potential for 
Birth Control Birth of Child 
.1 
I 
"Reproductive 
Roulette" 
Potential for 
Birth of Child 
Figure 1. Decisions made under conditions of reproductive uncertainty** 
*For illustrative purposes, awareness of one's genetic reproductive risk 
is assumed to be a given, although research indicates such knowledge in fact 
is highly variable. Within the current study, exposure to (but not necessarily 
acceptance or understanding of) information regarding at-risk status was only a 
given after the subjects had decided to reproduce and had become pregnant. 
Adapted from Pauker and Pauker (1979). 
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two or more alternatives (one of the options always being 
the decision not to decide). This conceptualization of the 
process is particularly relevant to a symbolic 
interactionist perspective, which holds that humans 
constantly define meaning and determine their actions based 
on interaction with significant others or with the self (the 
generalized other), While not specified within the decision 
tree, these significant others, the normative standards they 
convey, and the concept of self all undoubtedly influence 
the woman's definition of meaning and subsequent action at 
each stage of decision making. 
In the present study, 249 women who were eligible for 
amniocentesis either because of advanced maternal age or 
familial genetic disorders decided to accept or reject 
prenatal testing. Although, as the decision tree suggests, 
acceptance or rejection of amniocentesis is only at the 
beginning of the many options and alternatives pregnant, 
at-risk mothers must interpret and act upon, this will be 
the focus of the current research. Drawing on the vast body 
of research literature, an attempt will be made to identify 
factors that cause the pregnant women to achieve their 
resolutions regarding amniocentesis. It is with this 
exploration of decision outcome in mind that relevant 
research will be reviewed in this section. 
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Independent variables related to decision outcome 
Drawing on the interpretations of various symbolic 
interactionists, three major concepts that are predicted to 
relate to the acceptance or rejection of amniocentesis will 
be explored. From the perspective of Kuhn (1964), Stryker 
(1959, 1980), and Rosenberg (1981), literature relating to 
stable social identity elements as they represent the self 
will be examined. Research analyzing the importance of 
reference groups as providers of motivational, emotional, 
informational, or spiritual support (Boyce, 1985; Wills, 
1985) will be reviewed. Finally, studies examining the 
interpretation of meaning of genetic risk information as it 
applies to the women's definition of the situation and 
literature investigating the norms individuals use to guide 
their decisions will be discussed. 
Social identity elements: the self The social 
identity of patients in genetic counseling needs to be 
considered when determining outcomes and influences (Antley 
and Hartlage, 1976). Drawing on Kuhn's (1964) concept of a 
basic, stable sense of self, and from Stryker's (1959:114) 
explanation of actors' "positions," which "are socially 
recognized categories... serving to classify persons," 
several variables that influence the counselees' 
decision-making processes and interpretations will be 
reviewed. 
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Education One of the most consistent findings 
in genetic counseling research is that women who seek 
antenatal diagnosis are more highly educated than are those 
who refuse or are unaware of genetic testing services 
(Antley, 1977; Nielsen, 1981; Davies, 1983). Roghmann et 
al. (1983) noted that about one-fourth of the mothers 35 or 
older with less than high school education accepted genetic 
counseling and amniocentesis, as compared with more than 
half of those with graduate degrees. In Antley's (1977) 
sample, eight out of nine clients with above-high school 
education, as opposed to nine of nineteen individuals with 
high school or less education understood their diagnosis and 
correctly identified their recurrence risks after 
counseling. Kaback et al. (1974) explored reasons 
motivating individuals to seek genetic counseling and 
screening tests and found a positive correlation with 
educational level. 
Education appears to reflect several factors that may 
relate to the use of antenatal testing. Not only does 
higher education suggest the ability to receive and retain 
new information, it may also represent the faculty to seek 
out information or to know relevant resources. Emery et al. 
(1979) noted that self-referrals for genetic counseling in 
Britain increased from 20% in 1973 to 60% in 1976, often 
because the subjects had read an article on medical genetics 
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or had seen a television documentary program. Seidenfeld et 
al. (1980) speculated that formal education increases the 
likelihood that individuals would have been exposed to 
fundamental information necessary to grasp genetic concepts 
and probabilities (e.g., biology, Mendelian inheritance 
patterns); more importantly, higher education may train 
individuals to define a problem, explore possible 
alternative actions, and weigh the costs and benefits of 
each action. These skills would then assist them in 
deciding what information was necessary and where the 
information could be referenced. Meeker (1980) concurred, 
noting that people with higher levels of education are in a 
better position to acquire accurate information about the 
kinds of technical, medical, financial, or psychological 
consequences of childbearing than are persons with less 
education. Essentially, "people with higher levels of 
education have already invested in the tools with which to 
acquire information. For them, part of the costs of 
collecting information is already paid" (Meeker, 1980:29). 
Harper (1983) noted that the ideal time for initial genetic 
counseling establishing risk factors to occur would be 
before conception. He (1983:308) concluded, "Unfortunately, 
though, this applies only to the few informed and articulate 
couples who are aware of a genetic risk and are able to 
obtain advice regarding it." 
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Results offered by Sorenson et al. (1981) may suggest 
yet another facet of higher education that has not been 
discussed previously. They found that higher education 
alone didn't necessarily predict learning of genetic 
information. Their study demonstrated that clients with 
graduate or college level education who entered counseling 
without knowing their diagnosis or risk were no more likely 
than were clients with junior high or high school 
educational levels to retain the information disseminated 
during counseling. Similarly, Wertz et al. (1984) confirmed 
that learning of medical facts did not appear to reduce 
clients' uncertainty, nor did prior knowledge about genetic 
risks. Yet those with higher rates of education were more 
likely to accept genetic diagnostic procedures. Thus, 
education may actually be more indicative of a certain 
preference about lifestyle or management of issues than of a 
specific ability to understand and manipulate genetic risk 
knowledge as it applies to the individuals involved. 
Education is generally strongly correlated with higher 
socioeconomic status, which is also associated with higher 
use of genetic testing (Roghmann et al., 1983). None of 
this suggests that women of lower educational attainment 
and/or lower socioeconomic status cannot similarly be made 
aware of their risks, as research by Marion et al. (1980) 
revealed. In their study, 522 low-income and 
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little-educated obstetric patients received genetic 
counseling; 61% of the 157 who were eligible for and were 
offered amniocentesis accepted the procedure, a higher rate 
than is often seen even among the most educated eligible 
groups. Yet of the 120 who were at risk because of advanced 
maternal age, only 5% had reported any prior knowledge of 
this risk. Given this context, lower education and/or 
socioeconomic status may indicate lower access to and 
knowledge about genetic diagnostic services or genetic risk, 
but not necessarily more resistance to the procedure once 
the objective facts are known. Supporting this, 
Lippman-Hand and Piper (1981) and Sell et al. (1978) 
reported that prior familiarity with genetic risks and 
amniocentesis increased the likelihood that women would hold 
favorable opinions about prenatal diagnosis. 
Finally, drawing on health behavior literature, Kirscht 
(1977) found a strong socioeconomic status gradient in 
health-promoting behavior. He noted that income is 
important when cost is a barrier, but that education is the 
much more salient predictor of health-promoting behavior. 
But, he cautioned, there will always be "specific, 
situational, and normative aspects" that will shape 
individual behavior and interpretations (1977:161). 
Spouse's education In a related vein, much of 
the research that included information about the spouse's 
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education level has found it to be a significant predictor 
of recalling risk probabilities correctly and that the 
higher the education level of their husbands, the more 
likely were women to recollect their risks two years after 
counseling. Only 45% of those whose husbands had no high 
school as compared with 74% of those whose husbands held 
university degrees remembered the risk correctly. This 
finding is in keeping with Stryker's (1959) assertion that 
when an individual interprets the meaning of a situation and 
processes this information, more weight or priority is given 
to the perspectives of certain significant others. Hence, 
for a woman seeking prenatal genetic diagnosis, the 
"position" of and interaction with her husband may influence 
her understanding and retention of the information received. 
This, in turn, may lead to an easier processing of 
information and an acceptance of prenatal diagnosis in light 
of the objective risk estimates the husband is able to 
recall. Finally, it may be indicative of a style of 
communication or interaction existing between a 
highly-educated husband and his wife that influences the 
woman to remember the objective risk estimates given her in 
genetic counseling. 
Marital history Women in a second or third 
marriage may be older, yet still want to have a child with 
their current spouse. Advanced maternal age increases the 
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risk of having a child with Down syndrome, but there may 
also be a more pressing desire to have a child (Davies, 
1983). Thus, Davies suggested, individuals who have 
remarried may be more concerned about complications and more 
reluctant to undergo tests that are perceived to hold a 
potential for harming the fetus. At the same time, second 
and third marriages rather than long-standing first 
marriages may experience more of what Stryker (1959:116) 
termed "incongruities of definition" and "incongruities of 
expectations," resulting in personal disorganization. That 
is, "conflicts or lack of coordination between self concepts 
and the expectations of others" (Stryker, 1959:116) could 
cause women to have more difficulty in achieving a 
definition of the situation and to experience more 
uncertainty about what their appropriate action should be. 
This, in turn, could incline them towards the more 
conservative, passive stance of allowing their pregnancy to 
continue without taking an action that could potentially 
create more tension or personal disorganization. 
Parity Parity is the term used to describe the 
number of living children a woman has. Although there has 
not been uniform consensus on this, much of the research 
suggests that mothers with several children are less willing 
to undergo antenatal testing (Marion et al., 1980; Sell et 
al., 1978). The cause for this finding is not clear, but it 
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appears that since undergoing amniocentesis is implicitly 
tied to the possibility of having an abortion, women with 
several children seem to find this decision difficult. 
Beckman and Houser (1979) found that women with more 
children were significantly more likely than those with 
smaller families or no children to view the rewards of 
parenthood as being very high in terms of love, fun, 
companionship, activities, and watching the children grow. 
Hoffman and Manis (1979) explored reasons for higher 
fertility desires and found that individuals who wanted 
larger families felt children gave them a sense of identity 
and that children would make them a "better" person. 
Fletcher (1972) characterized the difficulty people 
experience when considering whether to seek amniocentesis as 
a struggle between the value of exercising responsible 
parenthood and the desire to have the child. If these 
pronatal values and expectations are perceived to be 
threatened by either the diagnostic procedure itself or by 
the potential for having an abortion, it can be speculated 
that multiparous women (those with more than one living 
child) would rather forego testing than risk injuring or 
losing an unborn child. Lending support to this analysis, 
Davies and Doran (1982) found that 59% of the multiparas, as 
compared with 35% of the nulliparas (women with no living 
children) considered the prospect of facing an abortion 
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decision to be very difficult. The primary reasons these 
mothers gave for their difficulty in reaching a decision 
about seeking prenatal diagnosis were the desire to have the 
child and that for them, abortion was morally aversive. 
Also in Davies and Doran's (1982) sample, 80% of the 
multiparous women who said they would not be able to abort 
even if a test proved the fetus to be affected decided 
against amniocentesis since abortion was not considered an 
option. Lippman-Hand and Fraser (1979a), Black (1979), 
Sissine et al. (1981), and Cote (1983) all reported that the 
overriding cause of reproduction under situations of 
uncertainty is the intensity of parents' desire for 
children, leading to decisions that may not necessarily be 
perceived as rational by an emotionally-uninvolved 
geneticist, but are in keeping with the individuals' 
interpretation of their situation. 
Insurance In an empirical trial of the health 
behavior model initially conceptualized by Anderson (1968), 
Cox and Roghmann (1984) found that having the ability to pay 
for the cost of prenatal diagnosis through insurance proved 
to be one of the strongest direct predictors of acceptance 
of the procedure, accounting for 18% of the variance between 
acceptance or rejection of amniocentesis. Insurance 
coverage of amniocentesis also proved to exert a significant 
indirect effect on discussing genetic testing with both 
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doctors and with family and friends. This suggests that a 
very pragmatic consideration in the definition of the 
situation may in fact influence the action an individual 
elects to take. Sanders (1982) noted that prohibitive 
financial costs may affect an individual's decision to seek 
or refuse medical procedures. For the women whose insurance 
covered the procedure, their choice between acceptance or 
rejection of amniocentesis would not be affected by 
financial constraints. 
Significant others Relatively little research has 
specifically investigated the influence of significant 
others or reference groups on the acceptance or rejection of 
prenatal diagnosis. However, from literature exploring 
health behavior and its relationship to the influence of and 
interaction with significant others, some derivative 
conclusions vis-a-vis genetic screening can be inferred. 
Suchman (1966) suggested that cultural values and 
social norms affect health behavior. He viewed 
health-related behavior—specifically, the use of medical 
care—as a function of the person's social group and its 
orientation toward care (scientific versus popular). 
Similarly, Green (1970) found a persistent relationship 
between medical prevention or detection and education 
levels, explaining this in terms of normative influences of 
the social milieu; people conform to the expectations of 
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their reference groups and higher status groups have 
preventive medical norms. Normative thus implies not only 
permitted, but expected and sanctioned behavior. 
Meeker (1980) likewise suggested that to predict the 
actions an individual will adopt, one must examine social 
influences. She noted that reference groups, which include 
extended kin, close personal friends, or members of one's 
religious and ethnic affiliations, serve as the standard an 
individual uses for assessing the situation. The influence 
of these reference groups can help explain changing 
normative patterns of behavior; once a certain proportion of 
the population adopts an action, it becomes more viable for 
others because its consequences are understood. Thus, a 
decision does not depend only on the interpretation of one 
individual, but includes such factors as role expectations, 
influence or conformity processes, and cultural values. As 
Meeker concluded, communication with others is particularly 
important in affecting an individual's definition of the 
situation where outcomes are ambiguous. This would seem to 
be particularly applicable in the instance of prenatal 
genetic screening, where diagnosis, prognosis, and outcome 
are impossible to predict with complete accuracy. 
Illustrative of this, Kelly (1986) noted that the 
results of prenatal testing are expected by some prospective 
parents to yield unequivocal answers, but the reality falls 
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short of this expectation. The possible outcomes include a 
result that is normal, which still doesn't exclude the 3% 
chance of having a child with significant birth defects not 
yet detectable with antenatal screening. Test results can 
be positive for the disorder under question, which suggests 
decisions on continuation of the pregnancy will be based on 
the parents' perceptions, of the severity of the disorder, 
the potential for therapy, and their perceived ability to 
cope with the child's disability. Test results may also 
establish a diagnosis other than that for which the 
screening was sought. In some instances, test results are 
equivocal because the complicated etiology of the disease 
makes predictions for outcome precarious at best. Finally, 
in some instances, no results are obtained due to technical 
problems (e.g., cell culture failure, difficulty in 
obtaining sufficient amniotic fluid). 
Given the uncertainty of the situation and the lack of 
long-standing normative guidance, findings from earlier 
process-oriented social research may be applicable. Kirscht 
(1977) suggested that interpersonal crises (e.g., pregnancy, 
screening tests, or a physician's advice to seek prenatal 
diagnosis) threaten interference with ordinary social 
activities and the perception of a threat to well-being may 
move the person to act. However, a primary aspect of an 
individual's evaluation of a health threat involves 
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comparison with other persons or with the learned standard 
social groups have imparted to the individual—a normative 
process. These appraisals of the situation and 
interpersonal comparisons serve as switches that lead the 
individual toward or away from a health action. Kirscht 
opined that most behavior—if not virtually all—is 
influenced by the practices, beliefs, or attitudes of 
significant others. In our social spheres there is constant 
change, particularly with regard to quickly advancing 
medical techniques. Even such practices as immunization 
move through the social fabric—requiring changes in 
beliefs, values, and practices. For genetic screening to be 
normatively accepted, there would have to be a concomitant 
shift in sociocultural standards related to sexual matters, 
contraception, and abortion. Yet, as Kirscht pointed out, 
norms and attitudes lag behind medical innovations, creating 
difficulty among those who must respond to and interpret 
their situations without normative reference group guidance. 
Modifications in beliefs and behavior can only emanate from 
changes within social units. Kirscht's delineation of 
decision-making processes is in keeping with a symbolic 
interactionistic perspective where people act and are acted 
upon in an ongoing social exchange. It is also suggestive 
of the difficulty individuals may encounter if their 
reference groups have not adopted more liberal perceptions 
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or normative standards about the advisability of accepting 
prenatal diagnosis. 
Wills (1985) explored the support functions of 
reference group relationships. He noted that people facing 
difficult situations search for information and guidance 
about the nature of and solution to their problems; social 
networks appear to play an important role in this problem 
definition. Wills believed significant others or reference 
groups potentially provide both informational and 
motivational support. Reference groups can facilitate 
problem solving by providing information, advice, and 
guidance. Further, significant others often serve as 
motivational supports. Wills pointed out that in times of 
stress, individuals may perceive their difficulty to be 
overwhelming; a sense of futility may so color their 
definition of the situation that they give up. Reference 
group support, however, has the potential for motivating 
individuals to seek ways of mitigating the difficulty, 
encouraging them to believe that things will get better, and 
helping them endure the difficulty by communicating the 
belief that the problem can be resolved. Similarly, House 
(1981) noted that reference groups often provide emotional 
support by bolstering an individual's sense of self by 
reassuring the person that the problems are not due to 
personal deficiencies. This may act as a buffering process 
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against the stigmatizing effect individuals perceive when 
told that they carry bad genes or are at risk of producing 
an abnormal child (Goffman, 1963). By expressing concern 
for and listening to the individual's problems, these 
significant others can help the person cope with the 
situation. Similar to Mead's (1934) perspective, Pilisuk 
and Parks (1986:40) viewed the emotional responses of 
significant others as most powerful in protection the 
self-image, allowing the individual to feel "cared for, 
needed, and worthy of the love of others." 
Kessler et al. (1984), Kenen and Schmidt (1978), and 
Tishler (1981) have all described the sense of failure, 
shame, guilt, and stigmatisation many individuals experience 
when advised of their at-risk status. Most people expect to 
be able to produce normal, healthy children. When informed 
that this may not be the case, a prospective parent is 
placed in a situation for which societal norms and an 
individual's sense of self are not prepared. However, Suis 
and Miller (1977) pointed out that others' opinions are 
sought in times of uncertainty. Reference groups and 
significant others, then, may provide the information, 
motivation, and emotional encouragement to help the 
individual define the situation and act accordingly. 
Sanders (1982) noted that if individuals have ambivalent 
feelings about a behavior, they can help clarify the 
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situation by comparing their views with the opinions of 
others. The responses of significant others may assist the 
individual in deciding whether to adopt the behavior or 
abandon it. As this relates to medical situations, Campbell 
(1975) posited reference groups to be helpful in that they 
may emphasize the negative consequences of a proposed 
medical intervention. He suggested that this perspective 
assists the individual in bringing covert fears into the 
open where they can be examined and potentially resolved. 
Findings from studies that explored the influence of 
others on an individual's health-promoting or seeking 
behavior, while not directly transferable to genetic 
screening situations, may suggest some trends. Ninety 
percent of Davis and Eichorn's (1963) sample reported having 
asked others' opinions about medical concerns. Heinzelmann 
and Bagley (1970) found that 80% of their subjects whose 
spouse was in favor of a treatment regimen, as opposed to 
only 40% of those whose spouse was neutral or negative, 
followed the advocated treatment. 
Having provided the theoretical relationship between 
reference groups and the self, relevant studies 
investigating this relationship in the context of genetic 
counseling will be reviewed. 
Relatives and Friends Achieving a decision 
about whether to accept or reject amniocentesis extends 
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beyond the prospective parents involved. Their behavior 
also reflects their relationships with family, community, 
and their moral sense of right and wrong (Bringle and 
Antley, 1980). Meeker (1980) has suggested that in the area 
of reproduction the most relevant reference groups are 
probably the family and one's age peers. 
The husband of an expectant woman is undoubtedly the 
most important significant other with whom she will confer 
about acceptance or rejection of amniocentesis. Indicative 
of this, the majority of women sampled by Dixson et al. 
(1981) stated that the decision to have amniocentesis was a 
joint agreement between husband and wife. However more than 
one-third of the women had made the actual decision alone; 
Dixson et al. noted that some of the husbands expressed the 
view in counseling that the women had to undergo the 
procedure and potentially an abortion and therefore they 
felt their wives should make the final decisions. While 
some women concurred with their husbands, others verbalized 
feelings of lack of support and burden of responsibility for 
the test and its outcome. This suggests that a husband's 
assistance in decision-making can greatly influence not only 
the decision outcome, but the difficulty with which the 
choice is made. 
According to Kessler (1979:191), "Families are...bound 
together, usually, by intense and enduring bonds of past 
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experience, social roles, mutual support, and expectations." 
It is not surprising that in stress-inducing genetic 
counseling situations, family ties can be very important. 
Robinson et al. (1975), for example, suggested that women 
who feel ambivalent and/or guilty about having amniocentesis 
and potentially an abortion would be better off discussing 
these concerns with others, particularly if there are 
perceived or real conflicts between the mother's views and 
those of her spouse, relatives, or religion. To explore 
this further, Adler and Kushnick (1982) interviewed twelve 
couples who had elected to terminate their pregnancies once 
the diagnosis of a defective fetus was received. The 
relatives of the couples in each case had played an 
extremely important and supportive role during and following 
the entire period of termination. Not a single family 
member opposed the decision of the couple. 
Ashery (1981) studied communication behaviors between 
72 couples having amniocentesis and their relatives and 
friends. Because amniocentesis is linked with the option of 
having an abortion, Ashery wanted to investigate whether 
couples told others they would be having amniocentesis and, 
among those who did, whom the couples chose to tell. She 
found that 89% of the couples had confided in close friends, 
83% had talked with immediate family members (parents, 
siblings), 47% with acquaintances, 42% with extended family, 
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and 6% had talked with no one. Reasons given for not 
talking to parents included the fear that parents would be 
unduly worried and the belief that their parents were 
opposed to abortion. Many of the couples noted that they 
would have talked to more extended family members or 
acquaintances if they had been asked, but because the issue 
wasn't raised they chose not to. Ashery speculated that the 
higher incidence of telling friends over immediate or 
extended family members had dual explanations. Given the 
mobility of American society, perhaps relatives were not in 
close proximity, or couples may have intuitively turned to 
friends who were perceived to hold similar attitudes 
(normative standards) about prenatal testing and the 
possibility of having a therapeutic abortion. 
Ashery (1981) also asked couples to assess the response 
of the family members and friends they had told. Seventy 
percent of the couples said those they had talked to 
approved, 19% of the couples said some approved and others 
didn't, and 11% had no opinion about the reactions of 
others. Ashery pointed out that while the majority 
perceived others' responses to be positive, the couples 
acknowledged that where they anticipated pressures or 
negative criticisms from family members or friends, the 
decision to undergo amniocentesis was simply not discussed. 
Ashery noted that willingness to discuss amniocentesis 
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compels a subsequent openness in telling others should an 
abortion decision be made. Those who told no one, Ashery 
suggested, would possibly have a more difficult time working 
through the crisis of waiting for the results of 
amniocentesis and possibly receiving a positive diagnosis 
without a network of family and friends upon whom to rely 
for emotional support. Confirming this viewpoint, Robinson 
et al. (1984) reported that women with good family or 
confidant support and/or with a wide range of acquaintances 
demonstrated significantly lower levels of anxiety while 
waiting for results from amniocentesis than did those with 
limited or no support from family, confidants, or 
acquaintances. However, this study did not query as to 
whether the women talked to their family members or friends 
about the amniocentesis itself. 
Lubs (1979) examined the opinions of significant others 
reported by individuals who had been told of their genetic 
risk. She found that 4% of the couples' relatives advised 
them to have more children, 33% said the decision was up to 
the prospective parents themselves, and 19% had suggested 
that the couple not have children. More than 43% of the 
couples, however, stated that they had not discussed their 
at-risk status with anyone. Lubs also asked couples who had 
discussed their situation with others to assess whom they 
felt was most influential in their decisions to reproduce or 
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not. Thirty percent said no one was influential, while 
nearly 18% of the couples said relatives had helped them 
decide the best course of action to adopt. 
Doctor Given the nature of the problems facing 
at-risk couples, it is not surprising to find that the 
referring doctors and/or geneticists can serve as 
significant reference groups for individuals seeking 
information and support. Antley and Seidenfeld (1978) 
suggested that those who enter genetic counseling with a 
basic understanding of their diagnosis do so to confirm 
their knowledge and to gain emotional support for their 
decisions and dilemmas. A study by Dixson et al. (1981) 
showed that one-fifth of the acceptors but none of the 
rejectors of amniocentesis cited their physician or genetic 
counselor as the person who most influenced them to have the 
procedure. 
The role of the doctor in an individual's decision to 
seek prenatal diagnosis appears to be highly significant. 
Lippman-Hand and Piper (1981) noted that one of the primary 
factors influencing the underuse of genetic screening 
services for women at increased risk for Down syndrome was 
lack of referral by physicians. In their study they found 
doctors seldom spontaneously offered prenatal diagnosis; 
even when tests were requested by pregnant women, 
Lippman-Hand and Piper discovered that doctors infrequently 
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referred them to a genetic screening center if the women 
were less than 38 years of age. This is a particularly 
relevant finding in light of a recent study by Crandall et 
al. (1986), who empirically examined the best maternal age 
at which women should be referred for genetic screening. 
Reviewing 10,000 amniocentesis cases and outcomes for 1975, 
1980, and 1984, Crandall et al. stated that genetic 
screening should be advocated for women who would be age 34 
or older at delivery, and that by the turn of the century, 
they recommended a maternal age of 30 or higher for genetic 
diagnosis. They (1986:241) concluded, 
If the maternal age indication is lowered to 30 
years and the utilization rate is about 50%, 27% of 
Down syndrome pregnancies could be identified each 
year by amniocentesis rather than 18% 
achieved with the 35-and-older model. 
There is evidence that some couples expect a doctor to 
take a directive stance and are confused at the idea of 
making their own decisions (Leonard et al., 1972). Lubs 
(1979) examined the influence medical professionals had on 
individuals who were aware of their genetic risk. According 
to the subjects, none of their family doctors advised them 
to have more children, 22% said the doctor felt the decision 
was up to the individual, and 14% reported that the doctor 
had advised against reproduction. Surprisingly, 65% of the 
couples stated that reproductive decisions were not 
discussed with their family doctors. Lubs also asked 
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individuals in her sample to state which medical 
professional had been most influential; 9% chose their 
family doctor, 3%, their obstetrician, and 30%, their 
geneticist. A significant minority (27%) wanted to be 
advised about family planning and 11% were uncertain, 
suggesting that directive counseling from physicians may be 
desired by at least three in ten prospective parents (Lubs, 
1979) . 
Beck et al. (1974) characterized the physician as the 
most powerful potential advocate of testing, but suggested 
that the doctor performs poorly in this role. Finley et al. 
(1977) and lams et al. (1983) pointed out that prospective 
parents place confidence in their physician's judgment when 
there has been a long-standing relationship; thus, the 
doctor is in a position to offer very influential guidance 
regarding prenatal diagnosis. Leonard et al. (1972) viewed 
the physician as the strongest potential motivator both for 
seeking genetic counseling and using it, but noted that 
about one-fifth of those coming into genetic counseling had 
received no information from their family doctors. More 
recently, Lippman-Hand and Cohen (1980) found obstetricians 
to be seriously underrefering their patients for prenatal 
testing. While 82% of the 93 doctors studied had referred 
at least one eligible patient, almost none had used the 
prenatal testing services for all appropriate patients; 
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Lippman-Hand and Cohen concluded that the majority of 
physicians are underreferers. Bernhardt and Bannerman 
(1982) similarly found that 47% of the obstetricians in West 
New York State had never referred a patient for 
amniocentesis. Weitz (1979) offered some insights as to why 
this may be. She found that physicians who were Catholic, 
held religion to be important in their lives, had several 
children, or were older were less supportive of genetic 
counseling, amniocentesis, and abortion. When patients 
firmly requested referral for genetic screening, 56% of the 
doctors did so. However, 23% of the physicians Weitz 
studied claimed they received no requests from their 
patients, and among this group, only 3% had ever referred 
patients for genetic screening. 
Doctors may not be totally at fault, however. 
Volodkevich and Huether (1981) found that physicians claimed 
to have counseled 81% of the women who did not utilize but 
were eligible for amniocentesis about their prenatal risks. 
Yet only 10 of the 71 women who received the counseling 
early enough to have undergone genetic screening remembered 
having discussed their at-risk status with their doctors. 
Religion Religion can be perceived as exerting 
the same normative influence as that of familial or 
friendship reference groups. Lenski (1963:326), for 
instance, posited that "socio-religious group membership is 
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a variable comparable in importance to class." Further, 
when an individual embraces strong religious convictions, 
there are often significant others holding similar religious 
views with whom the person interacts either at church or 
through friendship liaisons. These reference groups 
frequently hold similar normative expectations and can 
reinforce the opinions of the person who must decide whether 
to undergo amniocentesis, which has distinct implications 
for seeking an abortion should there be a positive test 
result. 
In addition to the influence of religious friends, 
religious doctrines provide spiritual norms that may 
influence the perceptions and behaviors of religious 
adherents. Wills (1985) noted that some individuals go to 
church to pray for guidance. The perception that a higher 
being is assisting the individuals achieve a decision can be 
as powerful as earthly reference group norms, and thus may 
exert considerable influence on the choices a person makes. 
Interpretation of meaning; risks and attitudes 
Risks and odds Throughout its various 
paradigmatic shifts, genetic counseling's primary objective 
remained that of education. The effectiveness of counseling 
was usually assessed in terms of clients' learning of their 
diagnoses and their ability to recall their chances of 
producing an affected offspring. The preponderance of 
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literature about genetic counseling thus focused on risk and 
diagnosis recall, and used this both as a benchmark to 
measure genetic counselors' abilities and, more importantly, 
to evaluate the "rationality" of counselees' decisions. To 
the extent that prospective parents' behaviors conformed to 
the interpretation of risk held by the geneticist, 
counseling was viewed as. successful. When their actions 
appeared to be at variance with a "rational" interpretation 
of the situation, researchers lamented the failure of 
genetic education's purposes. 
Examples of this focus on client recollection of risks 
include a study by Emery et al. (1979), which found that 77% 
of the parents recalled their risk estimates immediately 
after counseling, 61% remembered at a three-month follow-up, 
and 53% were able to correctly cite their at-risk odds after 
a two-year period. At the two-year follow-up, about one 
fifth of those initially given a low risk (less than 10%) 
considered it to be high and 20% of those given a high risk 
(greater than 10%) considered it to be low. Emery et al. 
speculated that risk interpretation was influenced by 
outcome burden, as the low risk individuals who thought 
their risk was high had a poor prognosis. Yet others who 
considered a high risk to be low included those with 
diagnoses of Huntington chorea, tuberous sclerosis, and 
cystic fibrosis (all very burdensome and serious diseases). 
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To explain this, Emery et al. (1979:1256) suggested these 
clients revealed an "inability to face realities." 
Hsia and Silverberg (1973) reported that while 70% of 
the counselees recalled that a recurrence risk was given, a 
large proportion of them left blank the question asking what 
their exact risk figures were. Godmilow and Hirschhorn 
(1977) found that high-risk parents tended to underestimate 
their at-risk status vis-a-vis the geneticist's assessment 
of their situation. Ives et al. (1973), on the other hand, 
reported that high-risk groups tended to have more accurate 
risk figure recall than did those at low risk. Sibinga and 
Friedman (1971) reported that less than 20% of their 
patients understood the implications of their genetic 
diagnosis and that only 48% correctly cited their risk 
estimates. Similarly, Spiro et al. (1974) noted that only a 
third of the clients knew their risk odds after one genetic 
counseling session; after two sessions, two-thirds were able 
to correctly state their recurrence odds. Reiss and Menashe 
(1972) reported that only 25% of the counselees could recall 
their risk rates within a few months after counseling. 
Similarly, only 26% of the sample investigated by Pearn and 
Wilson (1973) could state the odds for recurrence of their 
diagnosis. Getting and Steele (1982) found no significant 
differences between counseled and noncounseled couples at 
risk for Down syndrome in their knowledge of recurrence 
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risk. Evers-Kiebooms and van den Berghe's (1979) findings, 
then, were not at all surprising. After reviewing numerous 
published studies from 1970 to 1977, they concluded that 
clients making "informed and responsible" decisions did not 
appear in any way to have been influenced by the risk 
estimates they were given. In other words, the prospective 
parents' behavior had not conformed with the expectation of 
the geneticist who knew their risk ratios. 
While studies examining the effectiveness of counseling 
in terms of client odds recall abilities persist, the 
majority of researchers are now beginning to focus on the 
processes prospective parents use to arrive at their 
decisions. This seems a more practical area to explore, 
given that genetic variation between individuals makes risk 
prediction less than certain even for trained geneticists 
(Fletcher, 1984). Fletcher noted that though disease 
incidence and carrier frequency may be relatively easy to 
ascertain, the developmental course a disease takes for each 
affected child as well as the risks to the mother and fetus 
associated with prenatal testing are less predictable. Even 
those parents who accurately recall their risk estimates 
don't possess fool-proof information on which to base their 
decisions. Little wonder that research has repeatedly 
demonstrated that counselees tend to assess their risks in 
the context of their own definitions of meaning. As Antley 
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(1979a) pointed out, it is impossible to evaluate 
prospective parents' behavior without recognizing the many 
considerations that go into their decision-making processes. 
Hsia (1979:182) artfully characterized this new perspective 
that currently helps guide genetic counseling: 
Rational decision making is not a decision judged 
to be rational by the counselor. Rather, it is a 
decision made by a counselee who has pondered 
genetic facts and reproductive options. Hence the 
final decision may be one that appears unorthodox 
or illogical to an outside observer, but if a 
counselee chooses a reproductive option after 
careful deliberate thought, the decision 
is rational. 
Lippman-Hand and Eraser's (1979a,b) work is 
particularly salient in this respect. They noted that past 
research tended to clarify what people facing different 
risks do, but did not really explain how these family 
planning decisions were made. They noted that when they 
began their research, the process of reproductive 
decision-making under conditions of uncertainty, though 
substantively important, had not received attention in the 
literature. There were no empirical data. After extensive 
qualitative interviews with parents considering whether to 
try to reproduce given their at-risk status, Lippman-Hand 
and Fraser concluded that individuals based their actions on 
their own definitions of the situation, not the geneticist's 
interpretation of their reproductive risks. 
Other researchers have begun to understand that the 
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counselor's view of the gravity of the risks may not always 
correspond to that of the client. Callahan (1979), for 
example, explained the complexity of risk-taking decisions 
potential parents face given some genetic problem. He 
(1979:231) stated; 
Many factors have to be weighed simultaneously: 
known objective probabilities interacting with 
subjective assessments, available family resources, 
available society resources, effects on siblings 
and marital relations, and commitments to values. 
Decisions about undergoing prenatal diagnosis will 
depend only in part on the numerical results of risk 
estimation. The personal and religious views of the couple 
will often play a larger role in determining outcomes 
(Harper, 1983). Levine (1979) concurred. She emphasized 
that all of life involves risk-taking. Some risks are so 
trivial they don't even require conscious decision making. 
People rely on habits, norms, or personal preference to 
determine their behavior, without taking into account the 
"probabilities" of making the right or wrong choice. In 
making highly significant decisions, people more often 
resort to decision-making patterns they previously used, 
patterns that rarely take risk odds and ratios into account. 
Indicative of this, Laurence and Morris (1981) found 
that once information about prenatal diagnostic tests became 
the focus of the genetic counseling encounter, couples 
appeared not to remember risk figures accurately because on 
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the whole they no longer perceived them to be relevant. 
Previous studies by Black (1979), Lubs (1979), Pearn (1979), 
and Lippman-Hand and Fraser (1979a,b) all have noted that 
clients interpret their risk for having an affected child in 
terms of personal and social considerations. Thus, the 
statistical significance of risk does little to alleviate 
counselees' reproductive uncertainty. Wertz et al. (1984) 
found no association between reproductive uncertainty and 
level of risk. They also found client learning of medical 
facts, such as diagnosis and risk, did not appreciably 
reduce clients' conflicts in decision-making. The only 
piece of medical-genetic information that appeared to reduce 
uncertainty was the giving of a risk by a counselor in such 
a way that the client learned that a risk had been given, 
regardless of whether the client learned this risk correctly 
and regardless of the level of risk. Wertz et al. concluded 
that the explanation for counseling*s failure to reduce 
uncertainty is that clients don't base their decisions 
solely on medical facts, such as risks, but on complex, 
deeply personal interpretations of these facts. For some 
clients, a risk of 10% is high, for others, low. 
Contrary to their expectations, Sibinga and Friedman 
(1971) found no correlation between educational achievement 
level and prospective parents' understanding or distortion 
of information relating to genetic disease and its etiology. 
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They believed the incapacity to comprehend might be 
associated with emotional resistance rather than 
intellectual ability. It is the parental thinking process 
rather than intensive efforts of the geneticists that 
determines what parents understand and what they 
reinterpret. 
Leonard et al. (1972) noted that among 61 families 
counseled, 44% denied, misunderstood, distorted, or 
incorrectly interpreted the genetic information. Despite 
lenient interpretations of tests scores by researchers, only 
half of the parents had enough understanding of risks to 
make factually-informed choices. Pearn (1973) pointed out 
that the way individuals perceive risk may in part be a 
function of how the odds are quoted. For example, a 1 in 4 
risk of abnormality might be interpreted differently than a 
3 to 1 chance of having a normal child. He further 
explained difficulties parents have in remembering risks in 
terms of personality factors; passive subjects who feel 
vulnerable to their environment tended to take greater 
risks, perceiving the situation in a deterministic fashion. 
Those who feel in control of their environment were more 
likely to take active measures to deal with their definition 
of the situation and interpreted odds in a more 
conventional, and usually conservative, manner. 
Shaw (1977) reported that parents tend to distort the 
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odds given them when they already have an affected child; 
this stressful situation may make them believe any amount of 
risk is too great. Shaw also suggested that those who enter 
genetic counseling with previous beliefs about risks may be 
less receptive to the odds given them by the geneticist if 
they differ from those they accepted to be true prior to the 
new information. Shaw posited that guilt feelings also may 
modify risk attitudes. 
Meeker (1980:25) understood the dilemmas facing parents 
who are given estimates of their objectives risks, 
explaining that 
decision making under uncertainty (or worse yet, in 
cases where we do not know even what outcomes may 
follow each action) cannot generally be said 
to have a rational solution. 
She pointed out that four items are required to calculate 
the rational decision in a situation of risk: the actions 
available, the possible outcomes associated with each 
action, the probability of each outcome given each action, 
and the utilities for each outcome. Yet even if these four 
factors were available, which is not the case in genetic 
counseling, an individual's interpretation of the situation 
brings the apparent "rational" decision into question. 
Illustrative of personal perceptions that appear to be 
"irrational," Davies and Doran (1982) found that half of he 
women who accepted amniocentesis as compared with 88% of 
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those refusing the test were worried about the procedure. 
Thirty-nine percent expressed concern about the risk of 
spontaneous abortion and 36% were afraid the baby could be 
injured in the process despite fairly consistent findings 
that such risks are less than 2% for amniocentesis. Among 
women eligible for genetic testing, three women in ten 
interviewed by Volodkevich and Huether (1981) stated that 
the reason they didn't seek amniocentesis was because they 
didn't feel at increased risk. 
Rosenstock (1974) believed individuals take preventive 
health action when (a) a threat to health is perceived, 
including the belief that the actor is vulnerable to the 
condition and that its effects could be severe; (b) a path 
of action is likely to reduce the threat; and (c) the 
benefits of acting outweigh the costs. Rosenstock noted, 
however, that these beliefs are entirely subjective. 
Genetic susceptibility is a probability concept, but 
personal views of the meaning of a 1 in 4 chance of a bad 
outcome will vary. Personal belief in susceptibility may in 
no way relate to probabilities for aggregates. Lippman-Hand 
and Fraser (1979b), for example, explored the concept of a 
"binary" risk. Subjects in their study tended not to view 
their vulnerability in terms of odds ratios (e.g., a 1:100 
chance of having a defective child). Rather, at-risk 
individuals tended to define their chances as binary: they 
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either would or would not bear a child with a genetic 
anomaly. Lippman-Hand and Fraser noted that for certain 
individuals given a one in one-hundred risk probability, the 
focus is on the one. They see no reason to believe they 
might not be that one person in one-hundred whose child is 
affected. Statistical probabilities have no meaning in the 
context of this sort of interpretation. 
Rosenstock (1974) stated that the interpretation of 
risk involves a complicated processing of information 
related to perceptions of meaning and definitions of the 
situation. For instance, the cost to a woman's self-image 
of facing the possibility that she can transmit a serious 
health problem to her child may be too much to bear. 
According to Emery et al. (1979), this might explain why 
some high risk individuals elect to become pregnant. They 
speculated that these couples decided to have children both 
because they denied the reality of high risk and because 
they simply did not perceive the problem as serious. Emery 
et al. further noted that the handicapped seldom perceive 
their condition to be as severe as do the able-boded, so 
they are less often deterred by the objective risk estimates 
of transmitting their disorder to their child. 
In the same vein, Antley (1979a) noted that counselees' 
values in arriving at a decision about genetic testing are 
major components that will greatly affect the ultimate 
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choice prospective parents make. Expectant parents 
generally view their children as self-enhancing extensions 
of themselves. Rarely do they imagine that their child 
might have a one-in-twenty risk of being abnormal. To the 
contrary, the expectation is for a normal child and an ideal 
family. He posited that counselees block the learning of 
genetic information because of the meaning the information 
holds for evaluating themselves as people. That is, their 
ideal self is out of balance with their perceived behavioral 
self, causing a great deal of distress in arriving at a 
decision. Antley speculated that women who reject 
amniocentesis are still in a stage of denial or dealing with 
unresolved emotional distress and are therefore unable to 
accept prenatal genetic diagnosis that would not only 
confirm their at-risk status but also would hold the 
potential for making further difficult decisions (to abort 
or not to abort). Kessler (1979:195), too, noted that 
individuals facing a major unanticipated stress event 
frequently experience a "period of denial" in which they 
attempt to avoid any thoughts or ideas that would remind 
them of the event or its implications. This denial and 
avoidance would automatically preclude undergoing genetic 
diagnosis inasmuch as this would confirm the individual's 
"spoiled identity." Goffman (1961) described the emotional 
upheaval and lowered self-concept experienced by those who 
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live with a stigmatized status. When a prospective mother 
whose self-concept includes the assumption that she carries 
normal genes and will produce a healthy, unaffected child 
learns that her unborn child is potentially at risk, the 
self will attempt to reestablish a sense of equilibrium and 
self-worth. Denial of at-risk status may act as a 
protective device and cause women to refuse prenatal 
diagnosis since they do not perceive themselves to be at 
risk of producing an affected child. 
McClelland (1980:146) summarized the process as one in 
which "incorrect information, in the form of inappropriate 
beliefs about the likelihood of various consequences, may be 
an important determinant of fertility-related decisions." 
He noted that with an emphasis on personal beliefs, values, 
and weights as determinants of fertility decisions, people 
can be expected to differ in their judgments about which 
consequences are likely to follow from given behaviors. 
Even when people are in agreement on the probable 
consequences of a given behavior, individuals may have very 
different evaluations of those consequences. 
There may also be major individual differences in the 
decision phase. Some might systematically evaluate many 
alternative behaviors and then choose the one with the 
highest overall benefit, while others may adopt a 
"satisficing" strategy by considering alternative behaviors 
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sequentially until one is found that seem "good enough" if 
not necessarily the best. 
It thus appears that subjective interpretation of risks 
and a definition of the situation, not objective risk 
probabilities, are the most important factors to consider 
when trying to determine why individuals behave as they do 
in situations of reproductive uncertainty. 
Norms and attitudes Decisions regarding 
parenthood and childbearing are personal, normative, and 
value laden. In addition, attitudes towards abortion are 
germane to the acceptability of prenatal diagnosis for fetal 
abnormalities (Hsia, 1977). Under threat of having a 
seriously handicapped child, parents may recognize that an 
abortion would remove the problem, but they may regard such 
an action as morally unacceptable and hence prohibitively 
costly to their self-image and their normative beliefs or 
attitudes. 
Receiving genetic diagnoses influence the way 
counselees evaluate their situations. The couple who 
anticipated having a child as an important and good event 
may, in light of an unsuspected genetic risk, tend to 
reevaluate the situation in binary terms—either a good or a 
bad outcome will be realized (Lippman-Hand and Fraser, 
1979b). Faced with this réévaluation of what childbearing 
means, and with the possibility of undergoing prenatal 
67 
diagnosis, individuals who previously considered abortion 
untenable may shift its place in their value hierarchy to 
being more acceptable than bringing an affected child into 
the world. 
Most prenatal diagnostic centers view the choice to 
undergo amniocentesis and the abortion decision to be 
totally separate, but many prospective clients cannot make 
this distinction (Davies and Doran, 1982). This no doubt 
explains some of the reasons respondents cite for refusing 
to undergo genetic screening. Dixson et al. (1981) found 
that 63% of those rejecting as compared with less than 8% of 
those accepting amniocentesis felt they definitely could not 
terminate a pregnancy in which the fetus was determined to 
be clearly abnormal. Volodkevich and Huether (1981) 
reported that among women eligible for but not accepting 
genetic screening, 21% said the reason they refused was 
opposition to abortion. Nielsen's (1981) study noted a 
significant relationship between feelings about 
amniocentesis and attitudes towards abortion. Most subjects 
expressed the belief that it was a moral, not a religious 
choice since they, not the church, would be raising the 
child. However, Nielsen found that Catholics in the sample 
had significantly higher negative feelings about the 
procedure than did non-Catholics. 
The primary area in which the question of whether to 
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undergo amniocentesis may be influenced by religious 
standards is the perceived link between genetic testing and 
abortion. Research indicates that various denominations 
systematically vary in their acceptance of abortion (Ebaugh 
and Haney, 1980; Tedrow and Mahoney, 1979). However, 
regardless of the denomination, Goettsch (1984) found a 
significant, uniform opposition to abortion among those who 
reported religious involvement. This was especially strong 
for those who regularly attended religious services and who 
held religion to be very important in their lives. 
Applying the importance of religion to research 
specifically studying amniocentesis decisions, Dixson et al. 
(1981) noted that among the significant factors affecting 
those who rejected amniocentesis was the influence of 
religion. Nearly 60% of the rejectors as compared with only 
12% of the acceptors cited their religious beliefs as 
influencing their decisions about amniocentesis. Black 
(1979) also found that among couples rejecting 
amniocentesis, religious teachings against abortion were 
mentioned. Earlier studies had suggested that individuals 
belonging to Catholic denominations were less likely to 
accept amniocentesis, but more recent findings suggest the 
denomination itself is less important than the attitudes, 
norms, or moral judgments individuals derive from their 
religious commitment (Emery et al., 1979; Dixson et al., 
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1981; Luker, 1984). Thus, Seals et al. (1985) found that 
members of small, fundamentalist, or conservative Protestant 
sects more so than Catholic or Lutheran denominations tended 
to oppose abortion and were more likely to refuse genetic 
testing. Among women of the Catholic faith who had 
undergone amniocentesis, reasons given for accepting the 
procedure included the view that moral or personal 
perspectives were more influential than were their 
denominations' proscriptions against abortion (Nielsen, 
1981; Bundey, 1978). Further, Sell et al. (1978) found that 
familiarity with at-risk status, previous knowledge about 
genetic screening tests, and learning that one will very 
likely face the consequences of caring for a seriously 
defective baby all tended to reduce the resistance to tests 
among Catholic women. These studies suggest that individual 
interpretation of religious teachings as applied to their 
own situations, not the denominational membership per se, 
may influence individual opposition to abortion and 
rejection of prenatal screening. 
Fletcher (1972) found that the predominant concern of 
the 25 couples he studied was the dilemma of whether to 
undergo an abortion. He cast the problem in terms of a 
conflict between the individual's desire not to bear a 
genetically-affected child and the fear of being judged 
harshly against personally-relevant reference group norms 
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that oppose abortion. Even though amniocentesis requires no 
prior commitment to abortion, Fletcher noted that 
prospective parents anguished over their decision given 
their moral aversion to electively terminating the 
pregnancy. Finley et al. (1977) and Robinson et al. (1975) 
likewise found abortion to be a major concern of women 
considering having amniocentesis. Levine (1979) suggested 
that an elective abortion for social or psychological 
reasons is perceived as a matter of personal choice; an 
abortion for genetic reasons, however, is often accompanied 
by feelings of guilt, shame, and disappointment that the 
desired child could not be born. 
Focusing on an individual's perceptions is thus very 
useful in prenatal genetic diagnosis since many social and 
ethical values are involved (Davies, 1983). Individuals 
entering genetic counseling may perceive themselves as being 
caught in the struggle between prolife and antiabortion 
norms. Fletcher (1979) adroitly captured the essence of 
these countervailing perspectives regarding abortion: 
The debate in ethics...is polarized between a 
right-to-life argument that tends to equate 
genetically indicated abortion with infanticide and 
a guality-of-life argument that tends towards 
positive arguments for the morality of abortion and 
selective euthanasia of the defective neonate 
(1979:242). ... The strongest feature of the 
right-to-life argument is the clarity that derives 
from the objective reality of the fetus. There is 
human life present...a human life...that deserves 
equal protection with each and every other human 
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life (1979:243). ... The basic strength of the 
quality-of-life argument rests in its link to the 
power of authentic human responsibility. In 
reality, only human beings decide about what is 
truly human, even if they do so in the power of the 
belief that humanhood is derived from God, biology, 
or natural law. If only human beings make these 
decisions, the argument proceeds, we must not shirk 
the implications of the responsibility to 
distinguish personal life from biological life. To 
turn over any part of our responsibility to decide 
to forces outside human control is an abdication of 
the imperative to act in every way to increase the 
realm of human control and its quality (1979:245). 
It appears that individuals deciding their course of 
action regarding genetic screening may potentially have to 
weigh the merits and deficits of adhering to their personal 
reference groups' normative standards. This would entail an 
interpretation of the meaning of these pro- and antiabortion 
norms or values within the context of the individuals• own 
situations. How they mediate their decision given the 
disparity between these conflicting perspectives may play a 
major role in determining the choice they adopt and the 
facility with which they resolve their dilemmas. 
Operationalization of the Theoretical Concepts 
Given its emphasis on taking an individual's social 
positions, reference group interactions, and perceptions 
into account when trying to understand a person's behavior, 
the use of symbolic interactionism as a guiding theoretical 
perspective for studying reproductive decisions under 
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conditions of uncertainty would seem to be quite 
appropriate. Although not perceived as positing a highly 
causal theoretical framework, a general model may be derived 
from the conceptualizations of Mead (1934), Blumer (1969), 
Kuhn (1964), and Rosenberg (1981) that demonstrates the 
interrelatedness of self, reference groups, and 
interpretations of meaning. These processes work together 
in such a way that the individual defines the situation and 
acts in concord with this interpretation (Figure 2). 
Given substantive guidance from the concepts derived 
from a review of the literature, this model posits that 
individuals deciding whether to accept or reject 
amniocentesis will interpret the meaning and definition of 
the situation within the context of their social identity. 
These definitions may not only be influenced by background, 
status identity factors, but are colored as well by their 
interpretation of meaning. This suggests that behaviors 
will frequently be at variance with the perceptions of 
genetic counselors who have assessed the parents' 
probabilities of bearing an affected child. At-risk 
individuals are also influenced by the beliefs, 
expectations, values, and norms of significant others and 
reference groups. Thus, individuals facing decisions 
regarding genetic screening and a potential for undergoing 
an abortion construct and shape their behaviors and thoughts 
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Figure 2. General symbolic interactionism model to predict 
acceptance or rejection of amniocentesis 
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in relation to those with whom they interact. Finally, the 
processes required to arrive at a decision regarding 
acceptance or rejection of amniocentesis are characterized 
by the counselees' subjective, not objective, 
interpretations of the situation. As Turchi (1975:118) 
summarized it, the decision-making process is not the 
product of 
the parents' objective situation with respect to 
income, expenditures on children, membership in 
particular occupational, education, or religious 
groups, but the subiective assessment of this 
situation and their expectations for the future 
which determine fertility behavior (emphasis in 
original). 
Following the relevant findings of previous research 
and adhering to the theoretical guidance offered by a 
symbolic interactionist framework, four general theoretical 
hypotheses that will direct the current study of acceptance 
or rejection of amniocentesis can be proposed: 
G.H.#1 Respondents whose social identity 
characteristics engender positive preventive 
medicine norms, attitudes, and definitions of 
the situation will be more likely to engage in 
behaviors such as accepting amniocentesis than 
will respondents whose social identity 
characteristics do not promote the development 
of such norms, attitudes, and definitions of 
the situation. 
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G.H.#2 Respondents who interact with significant 
others and/or reference groups who provide 
support for and whose normative expectations 
sanction preventive medicine behaviors will be 
more likely to engage in behaviors such as 
accepting amniocentesis than will those who 
don't interact with or gain support from 
significant others and whose reference groups 
are opposed to that behavior. 
G.H.#3 Respondents whose norms influence their 
interpretation of meaning and definition of 
the situation such that they perceive more 
beneficial than costly consequences attendant 
to adopting a preventive medicine behavior 
will be more likely to engage in such 
behaviors as accepting amniocentesis than will 
respondents whose norms influence their 
interpretation of meaning and definition of 
the situation such that they perceive more 
costs than benefits accruing to engaging in a 
preventive medicine behavior. 
G.H.#4 Respondents whose social identity 
characteristics, reference group and 
significant other interactions, and 
interpretations of meaning are all favorably 
related to adopting a preventive medicine 
behavior will be more likely to engage in such 
behaviors as accepting amniocentesis than will 
those whose social identity characteristics, 
reference group and significant other 
interactions, and interpretations of meaning 
influence them to hold a less favorable 
perception of a preventative medicine 
behavior. 
In the following chapter the operationalization of 
concepts and statistical techniques enabling the testing of 
these four theoretical hypotheses will be explained. 
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CHAPTER III; METHODS 
Sample 
The model exploring decision-making processes under 
conditions of uncertainty will be tested using data 
collected from 249 female respondents from July, 1981, 
through June, 1983. During this two-year period, 199 
(30.7%) of 649 women accepting and all 29 women refusing 
amniocentesis who came for genetic counseling to the 
University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics Departments of 
Pediatrics (Genetic Clinic) and Obstetrics/Gynecology for 
evaluation, diagnosis, and counseling about genetic disease 
were recruited for the study. Only five women solicited for 
participation in the project refused. 
Another 21 women who rejected amniocentesis were 
recruited statewide through physicians' offices. These 
practicing obstetricians and gynecologists were generally 
cooperative in referring patients to the study. However, 
there was no way to ascertain the number of women who 
rejected amniocentesis and likewise refused to participate 
in the study. 
Amniocentesis for genetic diagnosis is primarily 
advocated for pregnant women 35 years or age or older and 
for women of any age with family history of risk of having 
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an infant with Down syndrome or other genetic disease that 
can be diagnosed prenatally. The incidence of hereditary, 
familial genetic risk, however, is relatively small, and 
without extensive familiarity with the case history of the 
subject, is not very easy to determine. Thus, since all 
pregnant women age 35 and older are at an increased risk for 
having a child with trisomy 21, an attempt has been made to 
evaluate sampling representativeness by comparing 
respondents of advanced maternal age with older women coming 
to the University of Iowa Genetic Clinic and with women 35 
and older giving birth in the state of Iowa during the 
approximate period of time over which the study was 
conducted. From 1981 through 1983, 133,881 women gave birth 
in the state of Iowa, of whom 5,451 were age 35 and older. 
Comparisons between the study sample and those potentially 
eligible because of advanced maternal age to be participants 
indicate that the study somewhat undersampled women ages 35 
and 36, but slightly oversampled women 37 and older 
(Table 1). 
The criteria used to determine whether women were 
eligible to be recruited for the study included (1) being 
pregnant, (2) having previously given birth to a child with 
Down syndrome or another genetic disease currently 
detectable with prenatal diagnostic procedures, (3) being 35 
years of age or older, and/or (4) having family members or 
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Table 1. Study groups, nonstudy clinic population, and 
state of Iowa age distribution breakdowns of 
women giving birth with presumed genetic risk 
by maternal age 35 and older 
University Hospital 
Clinic Population 
Women Not Women Giving 
Study Nonstudy Accepting Birth in Iowa, 
Group Group Amniocentesis 1981-1983& 
N N° N %b N %b 
Age 
35 29 18.4 77 23.4 4 10.5 1,771 32.5 
36 16 10.1 78 23.7 7 18.4 1,133 20.8 
37 36 22.8 41 12.5 11 29.0 774 14.2 
38 25 15.8 43 13.1 3 7.9 589 10.8 
39 19 12.0 36 10.9 4 10.5 414 7.6 
40 14 8.9 23 7.0 3 7.9 294 5.4 
41 or 
older 19 12.0 31 9.4 6 15.8 476 8.7 
Subtotal, 
35 and 
older 158 79.4 329 78.1 38 76.0 5,451 4.1 
Subtotal, 
34 and 
younger 41 20.6 92 21.9 12 24.0 128,430 95.9 
Total 199 100.0 421 100.0 50 100.0 133,881 100.0 
^Compiled from Iowa Department of Health (1983:60; 
1984:62; 1985:60). 
"Percentages of age distributions based on N of 35-and 
older subgroups. 
^Excludes 29 women for whom age data were unavailable. 
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relatives with a history of genetic disease. Patients 
coining to the hospital for genetic counseling were 
interviewed and categorized by a genetic counselor, who 
determined the eligibility of each patient and recommended 
them for inclusion in the study. These eligible patients 
were then approached by a research assistant who thoroughly 
detailed the study and asked for their consent to become 
participants. To assure that potential respondents would 
not be unduly burdened by participation in the project, 
before the study began it was approved by the appropriate 
university committee for research involving human subjects. 
All the women seen at the University of Iowa Hospital 
received their genetic counseling from the same physicians 
and nurse clinician. The 21 women recruited statewide were 
counseled by their own physicians, and thus there may have 
been some discrepancy in the content of the counseling these 
subjects received. However, all 249 subjects were given an 
extensive information sheet describing the purpose of the 
study and standardized information about their genetic risk. 
After the subjects had consented to be included in the 
study, arrangements were made to conduct a face-to-face 
interview. This was generally scheduled during the clinic 
appointment or soon after the visit in which subjects 
decided to accept or reject amniocentesis but before the 
procedure was performed. This was done to avoid obtaining 
80 
responses that reflected uncertainty about whether 
amniocentesis would be accepted. Generally, the 
questionnaire was administered after the woman had received 
genetic counseling and had been advised of the procedures 
related to amniocentesis. The interview was conducted in a 
special room in the clinic area reserved for the study to 
ensure privacy and confidentiality. Arrangements were made 
to interview women rejecting amniocentesis in their home or 
at a convenient time and place, which would assure that the 
confidentiality of their responses could be maintained. 
Those accepting amniocentesis usually were seen between 
their 15th and 18th week of pregnancy. Rejectors of the 
procedure generally were interviewed between their 18th and 
22nd week of pregnancy, after the time in which 
amniocentesis could be performed had passed. This was done 
for several reasons. First, because of difficulties in 
coordinating schedules of respondents and interviewers 
subsequent to the women's counseling session (among those 
who attended the Genetic Clinic) and their refusal of 
amniocentesis, this time period was often the earliest the 
interview in the respondent's home could be conducted. In 
addition, this timing was necessary to assure that the 
respondents would not alter their decisions about 
amniocentesis subsequent to the interview. And finally, a 
later interviewing period was undertaken in the hope that 
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questions would not again raise anxiety levels and engender 
further uncertainty about whether the diagnostic test should 
have been sought. 
Two research assistants with master's degrees, one in 
sociology and the other in preventive medicine, each with 
three or more years of experience in conducting face-to-face 
interviews, administered.the questionnaire. Subjects were 
given a copy of the research instrument and were asked to 
follow along as the research assistant read each question 
aloud. If the subjects understood the question, they were 
requested to choose the appropriate answer from a response 
card listing all the possible categories from which they 
could choose. If the subjects could not grasp what was 
being asked, the interviewer read the question once again 
without rewording it, thereby avoiding response bias due to 
rephrasing or restructuring of the question. Subjects were 
encouraged to select the response that most closely 
approximated their understanding of the question. 
Participants could refuse to answer any question and were 
informed that they could withdraw from the study at any 
time. 
Before the study began, the ease of administration of 
the instrument, the wording of the questions, and subjects' 
comprehension of the questions were evaluated in a pilot 
study. The research questionnaire was administered to 30 
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female volunteers, age 35 or older, who were recruited from 
patients attending the obstetrics and gynecology clinics for 
nongenetic reasons. They were encouraged to point out any 
difficulties they experienced in understanding the wording 
of the questions; they were also asked to indicate which, if 
any, questions caused embarrassment or distress. The 
research assistants then prompted volunteers to suggest ways 
in which the interview instrument could be improved. 
Difficulties in comprehension or with the content of the 
questionnaire were corrected during this stage. 
Basic demographic information was collected on all 
study participants. These background variables have been 
analyzed to determine whether there was any systematic 
distribution bias introduced due to the sampling procedure. 
Ages ranged from 19 to 47, with a mean of 35.9 years; there 
was no significant difference in the mean age of acceptors 
or rejectors (t=.258, NS) (Table 2). The majority of 
respondents were married (82.0% of the rejectors, 94.0% of 
the acceptors, x2=7.4, p=.01); one woman in each group was 
widowed, five in each divorced, three rejectors and one 
acceptor were separated, and five acceptors were single. 
Acceptors reported significantly higher incomes than did 
rejectors (x2=ll.l, p=.01); 62.3% of the acceptors as 
compared with 42.0% of the rejectors had incomes of $25,000 
or more. About one in five rejectors compared with one in 
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Table 2. Demographics of acceptors/rejectors of amniocentesis 
Acceptors Rejectors Total 
N % N % N % 
199 100.0 50 100.0 249 100.0 
Age 
19-24 4 2.0 2 4.0 6 2.4 
25-29 18 9.0 7 14.0 25 10.0 
30-34 19 9.6 3 6.0 22 8.8 
35-39 125 62.8 29 58.0 154 61.9 
4 0 or older 33 16.6 9 18.0 42 16.9 
Mean 36.0 35.7 35.9 
S.D. 4.5 5.3 4.7 
Marital status 
Married 187 94.0 41 82.0 228 91.6 
Widowed 1 0.5 1 2.0 2 0.8 
Divorced 5 2.5 5 10.0 10 4.0 
Separated 1 0.5 3 6.0 4 1.6 
Single 5 2.5 0 0.0 5 2.0 
Income 
Up to $10,000 11 5.5 9 18.0 20 8.0 
$10,000-$24,000 61 30.7 18 36.0 79 31.7 
$25,000 or More 124 62.3 21 42.0 145 58.3 
No Response 3 1.5 2 4.0 5 2.0 
Religion 
Lutheran 51 25.6 13 26.0 64 25.7 
Catholic 30 15.1 15 30.0 45 18.1 
Methodist 33 16.6 4 8.0 37 14.9 
Baptist 12 6.0 2 4.0 14 5.6 
Presbyterian 9 4.5 1 2.0 10 4.0 
Nondenominational 
Christian 8 4.0 4 8.0 12 4.8 
Small Christian Sects 27 13.6 6 12.0 33 13.3 
Non-Protestant 4 2.0 1 2.0 5 2.0 
Other 2 1.0 0 0.0 2 0.8 
No Religion 22 11.1 4 8.0 26 10.4 
No Response 1 0.5 0 0.0 1 0.4 
Reason for Referral 
Advanced Age 148 74.4 38 76.0 186 74.7 
Family History 23 11.6 8 16.0 31 12.5 
Combination 18 9.0 1 2.0 19 7.6 
Other 10 5.0 3 6.0 13 5.2 
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ten acceptors had incomes of less than $10,000 a year. 
There was a significantly higher proportion of Catholics 
among the rejectors than the acceptors (x2=5.9, p=.05) 
although these represented just 30.0% and 15.1% of their 
respective groups. The majority of subjects gave their 
reason for referral to the genetic counseling clinic as 
advanced maternal age (76.0% of rejectors, 74.3% of 
acceptors, x2=8.3, NS). According to the data (Table 1), 
actually a larger proportion of the acceptors were age 35 or 
older (79.4%), but the referring doctors may have stressed 
another reason when suggesting that they seek genetic 
counseling, or these women may have given answers that 
placed them in the "other" category. 
Measures 
Dependent variable 
Acceptance or rejection of amniocentesis Subjects 
were categorized as to their rejection (reject=0, N=50) or 
acceptance (accept=l, N=199) of the prenatal diagnostic 
procedure. 
Independent variables 
Social identity elements; the self Five measures 
were used to assess each subject's social identity. The 
women's and their husband's highest educational attainment 
levels were ascertained by asking, "How many years of school 
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did you [your husband/child's father] complete and get 
credit for?" (range 7-20 years for the women, mean=14.3, 
s.d.=2.8; range 5-20 years for the husbands/babies' fathers, 
mean=14.5, s.d.=3.0). Parity was assessed by two questions; 
"How many children have you ever had?" and "How many of your 
children are now living?" The actual number of living 
children given was recorded (range=0-7, mean=1.8, s.d.=1.4). 
Previous or current divorce status was measured with the 
question, "Have you ever been divorced or legally 
separated?" (yes, no). Insurance coverage for the 
amniocentesis procedure was measured by asking, "Does your 
policy cover such tests as amniocentesis?" (no, yes). 
Reference groups/significant others To assess the 
influence of and interaction with reference groups and 
significant others, subjects were asked to respond to 
several questions. "Did your husband think you should have 
the amniocentesis test?" (no, up to the woman, yes). "How 
much emotional support are you receiving from your husband 
[child's father] for your decision about the amniocentesis 
test?" "How much emotional support are you receiving from 
your parents for your decision about the amniocentesis 
test?" "How much emotional support are you receiving from 
your friends and neighbors for your decision about the 
amniocentesis test?" (not discussed, no support, very weak, 
moderately weak, moderately strong, very strong support). 
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A subsample of the respondents was asked two questions 
relating to the support the women received from their 
doctors. These questions were added to the questionnaire 
after information volunteered by respondents indicated that 
their doctors' opinions and support might be Important 
factors to consider when attempting the determine why the 
women accepted or rejected amniocentesis. A total of 158 
respondents were asked, "Did your doctor think you should 
have the amniocentesis test?" (no, up to the woman, yes), 
and 148 were asked to respond to the question, "How much 
emotional support are you receiving from your doctor for 
your decision about the amniocentesis test?" (not discussed, 
no support, very weak, moderately weak, moderately strong, 
very strong support). These variables will be entered into 
analyses in addition to those using the entire sample. 
The importance of religion, which might provide 
reference group support and norms in the lives of the 
respondents, was assessed by the question, "How strong a 
[stated denomination preference] are you?" (very strong, 
somewhat strong, no opinion, not very strong, not strong at 
all, no religious preference/no religion). 
Interpretations of meaning To measure respondents• 
definitions of the situation and interpretation of meaning, 
four questions relating to perceptions of risk were asked. 
Respondents' estimations of the probability that 
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amniocentesis would accurately identify all patients who 
have the condition in question if test results were positive 
were assessed by asking, "In your opinion, what are the 
chances of correctly identifying a child with Down syndrome 
by use of amniocentesis?" (very low chance, moderately low 
chance, 50-50 chance, moderately high chance, very high 
chance). To evaluate respondents' subjective 
interpretations of their susceptibility to having a 
genetically-affected child, they were asked, "What would you 
estimate is the chance or risk of your having a child with 
Down syndrome, if you carried this pregnancy to term?" (very 
low chance, moderately low chance, 50-50 chance, moderately 
high chance, very high chance). Respondents' perceptions of 
risks attendant to the procedure itself were measured by 
asking, "What do you think are your chances of developing 
complications from the amniocentesis test?" (very high 
chance, moderately high chance, 50-50 chance, moderately low 
chance, very low chance). Finally, women's perceived 
willingness to accept chances of complications from the test 
were assessed by the question: "How safe a procedure would 
amniocentesis have to be for you to accept it? Give me the 
number of the response below which you would not accept the 
test" (any chance of complications, 1 in 1,000, 1 in 500, 1 
in 100, 5 in 100, 20 in 100, 50 in 100, 70 in 100, 90 in 
100). 
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Three questions were used to measure abortion/ 
antiabortion attitudes. Respondents' feelings about the 
sanctity of life were assessed by asking, "How strongly do 
you agree with the statement that 'Life should be preserved 
under all circumstances all the time'?" (strongly agree, 
agree, no opinion, disagree, strongly disagree). To measure 
subjects' attitudes about their approval of situation-
specific abortion, they were asked, "Would you approve the 
use of abortion as a means of avoiding the birth of children 
with birth defects?" (strongly disapprove, disapprove, no 
opinion, approve, strongly approve). Finally, the impact 
religious teachings exerted on their norms and values 
relating to abortion was ascertained by asking respondents, 
"How strongly based on religious teachings and beliefs are 
your feelings about abortion?" (very strongly, strongly, 
moderately, not at all strongly, my church doesn't take a 
stance on abortion, I have no religious affiliation). 
Operationalization of Hypotheses 
Given concrete measures, a more detailed model can be 
developed (Figure 3) and the theoretical hypotheses can be 
operationalized into empirically researchable predictions. 
accept/reject 
amniocentesis 
BEHAVIOR 
INTERACTIONS WITH 
SIGNIFICANT OTHERS 
husband 
parents 
friends 
doctor 
religious strength 
PERCEPTIONS 
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education 
insurance 
ever divorced 
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INTERPRETATION 
OF MEANING: 
perceptions of risks 
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abortion, 
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religious teachings 
Figure 3. Detailed symbolic interacticnism ûêdêl to 
predict acceptance or rejection of amniocentesis 
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Respondents with fewer children, with higher 
education for wife and spouse, in first 
rather than subsequent marriages, and 
and who are covered by insurance that pays 
for the procedure will more likely accept 
than reject amniocentesis. 
E.H.#2 Respondents whose husbands and doctors think 
they should have the procedure, whose 
husband, parents, friends and neighbors, and 
doctor provide emotional support for their 
decision about the procedure, and whose 
religious strength is not very strong will 
be more likely to accept than reject 
amniocentesis. 
E.H.#3 Respondents who perceive the accuracy of 
amniocentesis and their chances of having a 
Down syndrome child as high; who believe 
their risks of developing complications from 
the test as low, yet are willing to accept 
lower margins of test safety; who do not 
strongly agree that life should be preserved 
under all circumstances; who approve of 
abortions to prevent birth defects; and 
whose religious teachings have not strongly 
influenced them in their attitudes about 
abortion will more likely accept than reject 
amniocentesis. 
E.H.#4 Respondents who have the salient social 
identity elements, who have significant 
others who think they should accept the test 
and whose reference groups lend emotional 
support, who perceive their risks of bearing 
a genetically-affect child as high but the 
risks attendant to the procedure as low, and 
whose religious teachings and attitudes 
allow abortion for genetic defects will be 
more likely to accept than reject 
amniocentesis. 
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Statistical Techniques 
Relationships among the variables in the model will be 
assessed by logistic regression statistical procedures. To 
examine the bivariate relationship between each independent 
variable and the dependent variable, simple logistic 
regression will be performed. Subsequently, multiple 
logistic regressions will be run on independent variables 
grouped in each of the three conceptual categories (social 
identity elements, reference group, and interpretation of 
meaning) to explore their relationships with the dependent 
variable. Independent variables found to be significantly 
related to acceptance or rejection of amniocentesis in 
subgroup analyses then will be entered into a final logistic 
regression run. To facilitate interpretation of the meaning 
of the results, odds ratios of each significant variable 
will be calculated, as will a 55% confidence interval. 
Findings from these statistical analyses will be delineated 
in Chapter Four. 
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CHAPTER IV: RESULTS 
The Variables 
The 249 respondents were a fairly highly educated 
group. More than half the acceptors and nearly four in ten 
of the rejectors had schooling beyond twelfth grade (Table 
3). Their spouses had achieved similar levels of education, 
with acceptors' husbands having a mean of 14.6 years and 
rejectors' husbands, an average of 13.8 years of schooling. 
More than one-third of the respondents had been or 
currently were divorced, although this was true for about 
10.0% more of the rejectors than acceptors (42.0% versus 
32.2%). The number of living children respondents reported 
ranged from none (18.5%) to seven (0.8%), with a mean of 1.7 
children per respondent. Rejectors had larger families, 
with 36.0%, as compared with 21.1% of the acceptors, having 
three or more children. More of the acceptors (74.4%) than 
rejectors (44.0%) had insurance covering the amniocentesis 
procedure. 
The majority of women (83.1%) reported that their 
husbands or the babies' fathers expressed a definite opinion 
about whether they should have amniocentesis, while 15.7% of 
the respondents stated that the husband (child's father) had 
left it up to the woman to decide. Among women accepting 
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Table 3. Coding^ of and responses to questions measuring 
social identity elements, by acceptors and 
rejectors of amniocentesis 
Acceptors Rejectors Total 
N % N % N % 
Years of women's education^ 
7-11 years (0) 9 4.5 8 16.0 17 6.8 
12 years (1) 75 37.7 22 44.0 97 39.0 
13-16 years (2) 61 30.7 11 22.0 72 28.9 
17-20 years (3) 54 27.1 9 18.0 63 25.3 
Mean 14.5 13.4 14.3 
S.D. 2.7 3.1 2.8 
Years of spouses' education^ 
5-11 years (0) 13 6.5 4 8.0 17 6.8 
12 years (1 )  58 29.2 21 42.0 79 31.7 
13-16 years (2) 78 39.2 14 28.0 92 37.0 
17-20 years (3) 49 24.6 10 20.0 59 23.7 
No response 1 0.5 1 2.0 2 0.8 
Mean 14. 6 13.8 14.5 
S.D. 3.0 2.9 3.0 
Ever divorced 
Yes (0) 64 32.2 21 42.0 85 34.1 
No (1) 135 67.8 29 58.0 164 65.9 
^Values were recoded to reflect hypothesized relation-
tionships with the dependent variable, rejectors, (0) and 
and acceptors, (1). 
To facilitate comparisons by somewhat conventional 
groupings of years of education, the range of years reported 
has been collapsed into four categories. 
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Table 3. (continued) 
Acceptors Rei ectors Total 
N % N % N % 
Parity 
No children (3) 39 19 .6 7 14. 0 46 18. 5 
One child (2) 58 29 .1 13 26. 0 71 28. 5 
Two children (1) 60 30 .2 12 24. 0 72 28. 9 
Three children (0) 21 10 .6 10 20. 0 31 12. 5 
Four children (0)*^ 13 6 .5 5 10. 0 18 7. 2 
Five children (0) 4 2 .0 0 0. 0 4 1. 6 
Six children (0) 3 1 .5 2 4. 0 5 2. 0 
Seven children (0) 1 0 .5 1 2. 0 2 0. 8 
Mean 1.7 2.1 1.8 
S.D. 1.4 1.6 1.4 
isurance for amniocentesis 
No (0) 51 25 .6 28 56. 0 79 31. 7 
Yes (1) 148 74 .4 22 44. 0 170 68. 3 
^The same coding number reported for more than one 
category indicates how the values were collapsed for 
logistic regression analysis. 
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amniocentesis, 84.4% said that their husbands thought their 
wives should have amniocentesis; in contrast, only 12.0% of 
the rejectors claimed their husbands thought this (Table 4). 
More than two-thirds of the respondents (67.5%) stated that 
their husbands very strongly supported their decisions 
regarding the test and another 23.7% said that their spouses 
had given them moderately strong support for their 
decisions. There was relatively little difference between 
acceptors and rejectors on this measure. 
Less than one-third of the women reported receiving 
very strong support from their parents for their decisions 
about amniocentesis (31.7% of the acceptors; 30.0% of the 
rejectors). However, 44.0% of the rejectors and 32.7% of 
the acceptors said they hadn't discussed their decision with 
their parents. The women's reticence about discussing their 
decision was even more evident in their response to the 
question about the amount of support they received from 
friends and neighbors; 54.0% of the rejectors and 35.2% of 
the acceptors claimed not to have discussed their decisions 
with these reference groups. One-fourth of the acceptors, 
compared with one-eighth of the rejectors, reported 
receiving very strong support for their decisions from 
friends and neighbors. 
Among the 158 women who were queried about the amount of 
support they were receiving from their doctors for their 
96 
Table 4. Coding of and responses to questions measuring 
influence of and support from reference groups 
and significant others, by acceptors and 
rejectors of amniocentesis 
Acceptors Rejectors Total 
N % N % N % 
Husband [child's father] 
thinks woman should 
have amniocentesis 
No (0) 3 1.5 30 60.0 33 13.2 
Up to the woman (1) 27 13.6 12 24.0 39 15.7 
Yes (2) 168 84.4 6 12.0 174 69.9 
No response 1 0.5 2 4.0 3 1.2 
Amount of support from 
husband [child's father] 
for woman's decision 
about amniocentesis 
Not discussed (0) 1 0.5 0 0.0 1 0.4 
None (0) 1 0.5 2 4.0 3 1.2 
Very weak (0) 3 1.5 3 6.0 6 2.4 
Moderately weak (0) 7 3.5 2 4.0 9 3.6 
Moderately strong (1) 47 23.6 12 24.0 59 23.7 
Very strong (2) 138 69.4 30 60.0 168 67.5 
No response 2 1.0 1 2.0 3 1.2 
Amount of support from 
parents for woman's 
decision about 
amniocentesis 
Not discussed (0) 65 32.7 22 44.0 87 35.0 
None (1) 4 2.0 3 6.0 7 2.8 
Very weak (1) 6 3.0 3 6.0 9 3.6 
Moderately weak (1) 12 6.0 1 2.0 13 5.2 
Moderately strong (2) 49 24.6 5 10.0 54 21.7 
Very strong (3) 63 31.7 15 30.0 78 31.3 
No response 0 0.0 1 2.0 1 0.4 
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Table 4. (continued) 
Acceptors Rei ectors Total 
N % N % N % 
Amount of support from 
friends and neighbors for 
woman's decision about 
amniocentesis 
Not discussed (0) 
None (1) 
Very weak (1) 
Moderately weak (1) 
Moderately strong (2) 
Very strong (3) 
No response 
Amount of support from 
doctor for woman's 
decision about 
amniocentesis 
Not discussed (0) 
None (0) 
Very weak (0) 
Moderately weak (0) 
Moderately strong (0) 
Very strong (1) 
No response/not asked 
Doctor thinks woman should 
have amniocentesis 
No (0) 
Up to the woman (1) 
Yes (2) 
No response/not asked 
Religious strength 
Very strong (0) 
Strong (1) 
Somewhat strong (2) 
Not very strong (3) 
Not strong at all (4) 
No religion (5) 
70 35.2 27 54.0 97 39.0 
6 3.0 2 4.0 8 3.2 
2 1.0 1 2.0 3 1.2 
12 6.0 3 6.0 15 6.0 
58 29.2 11 22.0 69 27.7 
50 25.1 6 12.0 56 22.5 
1 0.5 0 0.0 1 0.4 
2 1.0 4 8.0 6 2.4 
4 2.0 9 18.0 13 5.2 
3 1.5 1 2.0 4 1.6 
5 2.5 2 4.0 7 2.8 
27 13.6 9 18.0 36 14.5 
77 38.7 5 10.7 82 32.9 
81 40.7 20 40.0 101 40.6 
5 2.5 3 6.0 8 3.2 
32 16.1 28 56.0 60 24.1 
85 42.7 5 5.6 90 36.1 
77 38.7 14 28.0 91 36.6 
53 26.6 21 42.0 74 29.7 
70 35.2 14 16.7 84 33.8 
15 7.5 4 21.1 19 7.6 
36 18.1 7 16.3 43 17.3 
5 2.5 0 0.0 5 2.0 
20 10.1 4 8.0 24 9.6 
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decisions about amniocentesis, 65.3% of the acceptors as 
compared with 16.7% of the rejectors reported receiving very 
strong support. Eighty-five of the 122 acceptors as 
compared with five of the 30 rejectors who were asked stated 
that their doctor thought they should have the test. A 
large majority of rejectors (77.8% of the 36 asked) reported 
that their doctors had left the decision up to them; in 
comparison, 26.2% of the acceptors claimed their doctors had 
told them to decide themselves. 
Relatively few respondents reported having religious 
beliefs that were not at all strong (2.0%) or stated no 
religious preference (9.6%). However, the rejectors were 
considerably more likely than were acceptors to view their 
religious preference as very strong; 42.0% of the acceptors 
as compared with 26.6% percent of the rejectors were in this 
category. 
The majority of acceptors (77.4%) as compared with 
46.0% of the rejectors perceived the likelihood that 
amniocentesis would be able to detect a fetus with Down 
syndrome as very high (Table 5). Twenty percent of the 
rejectors but only 3.5% of the acceptors thought the test 
would have a 50-50 or smaller chance of correctly 
identifying a child with Down syndrome. 
Three women (all acceptors) felt the risks of having a 
Down syndrome child were very high. The majority of both 
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Table 5. Coding of and responses to questions measuring 
interpretation of meaning of risks and attitudes 
about abortion, by acceptors and rejectors of 
amniocentesis 
Acceptors Rejectors Total 
N % N % N % 
Women's perceptions of 
test's accuracy in de­
tecting presence of 
Down syndrome fetus 
Very low (0) 0 0.0 2 4.0 2 0.8 
Moderately low (0) 0 0.0 1 2.0 1 0.4 
50-50 chance (0) 7 3.5 7 14.0 14 5.6 
Moderately high (1) 37 18.6 16 32.0 53 21.3 
Very high (2) 154 77.4 23 46.0 177 71.1 
No response 1 0.5 1 2.0 2 0.8 
Women's perceptions of 
odds of having a child 
with Down syndrome 
Very low (0) 76 38.2 27 54.0 103 41.4 
Moderately low (1) 72 36.2 17 34.0 89 35.7 
50-50 chance ( 2 )  32 16.1 5 10.0 37 14.9 
Moderately high (3) 16 8.0 0 0.0 16 6.4 
Very high (3) 3 1.5 0 0.0 3 1.2 
No response 0 0.0 1 2.0 1 0.4 
Women's perceptions of 
risk of complications 
with amniocentesis 
Very low (3) 75 37.7 10 20. 0 85 34.1 
Moderately low (2) 90 45.2 20 40. 0 110 44.2 
50-50 chance (1) 28 14.1 11 22. 0 39 15.7 
Moderately high (0) 4 2.0 6 12. 0 10 4.0 
Very high 0 0.0 0 0. 0 0 0.0 
No response 2 1.0 3 6. 0 5 2.0 
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Table 5. (continued) 
Acceptors Rei ectors Total 
N % N % N % 
Chances of complications 
from amniocentesis woman 
is willing to accept 
Accept no risks (0) 0 0. 0 26 52. 0 26 10. 4 
1 chance in 1000 (1) 17 8. 5 7 14. 0 24 9. 7 
1 chance in 500 (2) 51 25. 6 8 16. 0 59 23. 7 
1 chance in 100 (2) 40 20. 1 4 8. 0 44 17. 7 
5 chances in 100 (3) 41 20. 6 3 6. 0 44 17. 7 
20 chances in 100 (4) 24 12. 1 2 4. 0 26 10. 4 
50 chances in 100 (4) 17 8. 6 0 0. 0 17 6. 8 
70 chances in 100 (4) 4 2. 0 0 0. 0 4 1. 6 
90 chances in 100 (4) 2 1. 0 0 0. 0 2 0. 8 
No response 3 1. 5 0 0. 0 3 1. 2 
Agree that life should be 
preserved at all times 
Strongly Agree (0) 18 9. 1 13 26. 0 31 12.4 
Agree (1) 20 10. 1 16 32. 0 36 14.5 
No opinion (2) 16 8. 0 3 6. 0 19 7.6 
Disagree (3) 92 46. 2 14 28. 0 106 42.6 
Strongly disagree (4) 53 26. 6 4 8. 0 57 22.9 
Approval of abortion to 
avoid birth defects 
Strongly disapprove (0) 5 2. 5 9 18. 0 14 5. 6 
Disapprove (1) 11 5. 5 11 22. 0 22 8. 8 
No opinion (2) 18 9. 1 10 20. 0 28 11. 2 
Approve ( 3) 75 37. 7 15 30. 0 90 36. 2 
Strongly approve (4) 89 44. 7 5 10. 0 94 37. 8 
No response 1 0. 5 0 0. 0 1 0. 4 
Strength to which feelings 
about abortion are based 
on religious teachings 
Very strongly (0) 21 10. 6 16 32.0 37 14.9 
Strongly (1) 22 11. 1 12 24.0 34 13.7 
Moderately strongly (2) 42 21. 1 8 16.0 50 20.1 
Not strongly at all (3) 76 38. 2 8 16.0 84 33.7 
Church takes no 
stance on abortion (3) 16 8. 0 2 4.0 18 7.2 
No religion (3) 20 10. 0 4 8.0 24 9.6 
No response 2 1. 0 0 0.0 2 0.8 
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groups (74.4%, acceptors; 88.0%, rejectors) perceived their 
chances of having a child with Down syndrome as moderately 
or very low. 
None of the respondents believed there would be a very 
high risk of complications associated with amniocentesis, 
although 34.0% of the rejectors as compared with 16.1% of 
the acceptors thought there could be a 50-50 or moderately 
high risk of complications with the procedure. Nearly two 
in five acceptors as opposed to one in five rejectors 
perceived risks associated with the test as being very low. 
The chances of complications the respondents would be 
willing to accept in order to undergo amniocentesis ranged 
widely over nine risk categories. However, more than half 
(52.0%) of the rejectors (but none of the acceptors) stated 
that they would not undergo the procedure unless there were 
no chances of complications. At the other extreme, 17 
acceptors stated that they would be willing to accept a 
50.0% complication risk, 4, a 70.0% risk, and 2, a 90.0% 
risk. None of the rejectors was willing to accept these 
high levels of risk of complications with amniocentesis. 
Fifty-eight percent of the rejectors as compared with 
19.2% of the acceptors agreed or strongly agreed that life 
should be preserved at all times under all circumstances. 
Few respondents (7.6%) expressed no opinion. More than 
seven in ten acceptors and not quite four in ten rejectors 
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disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement used to 
probe their normative beliefs about the sanctity of life. 
A fairly large minority (9.1% of the acceptors, 20.0% 
of the rejectors) expressed no opinion about approval for 
abortion to avoid birth defects. Forty percent of the 
rejectors disapproved or strongly disapproved of abortions 
to avoid birth defects,.while 82.4% of the acceptors 
approved or strongly approved of abortion under such 
circumstances. 
Religious teachings very strongly or strongly 
influenced 56.0% of the rejectors' but only 21.7% of the 
acceptors' feelings about abortion. Nearly two in five 
acceptors as compared with one in six rejectors stated that 
religious teachings did not influence their feelings about 
abortion at all strongly. 
Logistic Regression 
To examine various components of the four hypotheses 
delineated in Chapter 3, the bivariate relationship of each 
of the independent variables (Xi,to the dependent 
variable (Y) will be tested for statistical significance 
using logistic regression. Logistic regression is somewhat 
similar to ordinary regression, where Y's dependence on X is 
typically studied by means of the following equation: 
y = a + beta^Xi (1) 
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The foundation for using the logistic rather than the 
ordinary regression is complex (Hanushek and Jackson, 1977), 
but the most obvious reason deals with the assumption in 
ordinary regression that the dependent variable is 
continuous, which is not the case in the present study. In 
instances where the dependent variable is binary (Y=0 or 
Y=l), equation (1) in essence postulates that the 
probability of observing a particular outcome is a linear 
function of the independent (X) variable. As long as the 
probabilities fall close to 0.50 for all values of each of 
the independent variables, the assumption of linearity may 
be reasonable and results derived from ordinary regression 
would be quite similar to that obtained from logistic 
regression (Goodman, 1976; Fleiss et al., 1986). However, 
when studying relatively rare events (with probabilities of 
less than 0.25) or relatively prevalent occurrences 
(probabilities greater than 0.75), analyses using 
traditional regression would produce inaccurate results, 
such as predicted probabilities less than 0 or greater than 
1. Thus, it is essential to use a procedure that does not 
produce such distortions of the results. The method of 
analysis adopted in this study is logistic regression. 
To achieve a linear relationship between X and Y, the Y 
variable must be converted to a ratio between one outcome 
and the other. Here, instead of considering the original 
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dependent variable Y (0=reject, l=accept) as a linear 
function of the independent variable, the log odds of the 
probabilities of those who accepted (p) and those who 
rejected (1-p) amniocentesis becomes the dependent variable. 
That is, the dependent variable is expressed in terms of log 
odds, or the log of the ratio of probabilities for 
acceptance or rej ection:. 
log[p/(1-p)] 
Given this conceptualization, as long as the dependent 
variable is in a log odds form, the logistic equation 
becomes equivalent to that of an ordinary regression 
equation; 
l°g[P/l"P] = a + beta^Xi (2) 
This formula has the appeal of offering a common-sense 
and somewhat more familiar interpretation of the function of 
logistic regression. However, finding the probability of 
acceptance, or p(Y=l), is the actual objective of the 
present study. To derive this, the dependent variable must 
be expressed in terms of a logistic function of the 
probability of acceptance. Using the exponential (exp) 
equation for a binary model, the regression equation can be 
rewritten to express the dependent variable as the 
probability of acceptance (p): 
p = 1/[1 + exp (-a -beta^Xi)] (3) 
Although the log form as expressed in formula (3) is 
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more complex than ordinary regression, it has at least one 
important advantage over it. The predicted probability will 
remain within legitimate bounds—between 0 and 1 (i.e., zero 
probability or the probability of one), while in ordinary 
regression, the predicted probability could go beyond these 
boundaries. Amounts greater than 1 and less than zero do 
not exist in probabilities. Logistic regression analysis, 
although a variant of ordinary regression, thus allows for 
the study of quantitative as well as categorical independent 
variables without having to contend with the possibility 
that skewed data will produce unreasonable results. 
Given these properties, bivariate logistic regression 
can be employed to test the importance of an independent 
variable in relationship to the dependent variable. The 
regression coefficient beta represents the impact of the 
independent variable on the dependent variable; it is used 
to determine if the influence of an X variable is 
statistically significant and, if so, whether the 
relationship between X and Y is in the posited direction. 
For a positive beta, a unit increase in the X variable 
increases, and for a negative beta, a unit increase in the X 
variable decreases the probability of acceptance. 
Two methods for interpreting the hypothesized 
relationship between each dependent variable and the 
acceptance of amniocentesis have been noted. Formula (2) 
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uses the log odds of acceptance to rejection of 
amniocentesis as the dependent variable; formula (3) is 
based on the probability of acceptance of amniocentesis as 
the dependent variable. Yet because the interpretation of 
the betas based on formulas (2) and (3) is not intuitively 
obvious, another method for evaluating the significance of 
the regression coefficients should be considered. A third 
way to interpret the betas is in the form of the antilog of 
beta, or an odds ratio. This heuristic device is actually a 
ratio of a ratio. In logistic regression, beta is the 
estimated average change in the log odds of accepting 
amniocentesis per unit change in the independent (X) 
variable; taking the exponential (exp) of beta produces the 
odds ratio associating X with the dependent variable. To 
facilitate comprehension and to reduce the formula's 
complexity, explanations and illustrations will assume that 
the independent variable being investigated is dichotomous. 
In instances where X can be only 0 or 1, will signify the 
proportion of respondents who were coded as X=1 when Y=l; Pg 
will represent the proportion of respondents coded as X=0 
when Y=l. The odds ratio (also known as a "cross-products 
ratio") can then be calculated using the following equation: 
exp of beta = [P^. ( I-Pq) ] / [Pq ( l-^i)  ]  (4) 
To illustrate with the current sample, the dichotomous 
variable measuring the presence or absence of insurance 
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coverage for amniocentesis will be employed for calculation 
of the odds ratio. Using SAS to perform a simple logistic 
regression analysis, insurance coverage has a beta of 1.3 in 
relation to the dependent variable. To convert this to an 
odds ratio, the total of 148 respondents who had insurance 
and accepted amniocentesis is divided by the total number of 
respondents who accepted amniocentesis; thus, Pi=148/199, or 
.74. Twenty-two respondents had no insurance but accepted 
amniocentesis; therefore, Po=22/50, or .44. The odds ratio 
associating acceptance of amniocentesis and insurance 
coverage can then be derived by 
exp of beta = [ (.74)(.56)]/[(.44) (.26)] = 3.7 
which is, in fact, the antilog of the beta coefficient (1.3) 
achieved in logistic regression. This can be interpreted as 
meaning that the odds in favor of accepting amniocentesis 
(the ratio of the probability of acceptance to the 
probability of rejection of amniocentesis) is 3.7 times 
greater for those who have insurance covering the procedure 
than for those who do not. To arrive at the original 
regression coefficient that expresses this odds ratio, 
taking the log of 3.7 produces a beta of 1.3. Thus, the 
exponential, or antilog, of beta can be interpreted as an 
odds ratio. 
If there were no relationship between insurance 
coverage and acceptance of amniocentesis, the odds ratio 
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would equal 1.0 and the beta would be zero. Departures in 
either direction from 1.0 suggest association; the greater 
the departure, the stronger the relationship. If the beta 
is positive, the odds ratio will be greater than one; when 
the beta is negative, implying a negative relationship to 
the dependent variable, the odds ratio will be less than 
1.0. To obtain a best estimate of the true odds ratio, a 
95% confidence interval (CI) can be constructed around it 
using this formula: 
95% CI = exp [beta +(1.96) (standard error of beta)] (5) 
Continuing with the example of insurance coverage, a 95% 
confidence interval based on a standard error of beta of .33 
can be computed. The lower limit is exp [1.3 -(1.96)(.33)] 
and the upper limit is exp [1.3 +(1.96)(.33) ], yielding an 
interval between 1.9 and 7.0. This means that in 95% of all 
samples that could have been obtained from the reference 
population, the odds in favor of acceptance of amniocentesis 
would be 1.9 to 7.0 times greater for those who had 
insurance coverage than for those who did not have insurance 
covering the procedure. 
The criteria used to assess the impact of several 
independent variables on the dependent variable in a 
multiple logistic regression are nearly identical to that 
explained for a simple regression model. The advantage of 
using more than one independent variable is that the impact 
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of each independent variable is adjusted for the effects of 
other X variables in the model. This suggests an additional 
method for assessing the relative strength of the variables 
in multiple logistic regression. The beta measures an 
increase in the log odds of acceptance of amniocentesis for 
each unit increase in a X variable. However, when comparing 
a continuous to a dichotomous independent variable, the 
relative impact of each is difficult to ascertain because 
the units of change for dichotomous and continuous variables 
are different. Therefore, a standardization of units of 
change becomes desirable. To achieve this one can 
standardize the coefficients (beta') using the following 
formula; 
beta' = beta (standard deviation of X), (6) 
which allows for a measurement of change in the log of the 
odds in favor of acceptance of amniocentesis resulting from 
a change in one standard deviation of each X variable. 
Evaluating the various standardized betas, one can readily 
determine which independent variable(s) in a multiple 
logistic regression exert(s) the most influence on the 
outcome of the dependent variable (Schlesselman, 1982; 
Truett et al., 1967). 
The manner in which the data were analyzed using 
logistic regression will be briefly explained. 
Distributions of the X variables in relation to the 
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dependent variable were inspected using contingency tables. 
Where there was a wide dispersion of answers causing more 
than one cell to have fewer than five observations, 
categories were collapsed (see Tables 3-5 for receding). 
Each independent variable predicted to exert an influence on 
the dependent binary variable (acceptance or rejection of 
amniocentesis) was examined individually by a logistic 
procedure. Log odds ratios and confidence intervals were 
constructed for each significant variable (p < .05) . Next, 
variables within each of the three subsets (social identity 
elements, reference group/significant others, and 
interpretation of meaning) were examined, using a full model 
to assess the impact of each variable while controlling for 
the effect of the other variables in the model. The 
statistical package used permits the "forcing" in of each 
variable, thus allowing one to evaluate the relative 
importance and significance of each variable in the subset 
analyses. After the first full subset model was run, the 
variable that showed the smallest relationship to the 
dependent variable was deleted and the regression was run 
again. This was repeated until only variables showing 
significant relationships to the dependent variable remained 
in the model. 
A further consideration that guided the deletion of 
variables was a concern for multicollinearity. Pedhauzer 
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(1982) and others have discussed at length the problems that 
arise in interpretation of the betas when independent 
variables are highly intercorrelated. Multicollinearity can 
lead not only to serious distortion of the estimations of 
the betas but can also cause the reversal of their signs. 
Although there are no clear-cut remedies (Farrar and 
Glauber, 1967), a "solution" was adopted in this study. The 
full model of the hypothesized variables is always presented 
to demonstrate the impact of the variables while being 
controlled for by other stimulus variables. Subsequently, 
however, when variables were highly correlated (r > .35), 
the model would be run, alternately including each 
correlated variable to see whether it achieved significance 
when not adversely affected or underestimated due to 
multicollinearity. When a group of correlated variables 
appeared to represent a single underlying construct, an 
attempt was made to develop an index that would combine the 
variables into one unified measure. Cronbach's alpha was 
employed to assess the reliability of the index. When index 
constructs were not reliable, the variable that appeared to 
exert the most direct effect on the dependent variable was 
retained, and the highly correlated but less significant 
factors deleted. 
To assess the goodness of fit of the final full models, 
standardized betas, odds ratios, the index c, R statistic 
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for each independent variable, and statistic for the 
model will be reported and used to determine the extent to 
which each hypothesis was supported. According to Hastings 
(1986), index c is equivalent to the area under a "receiver 
operating characteristic" (ROC) (Hanley and McNeil, 1982) 
and is proportional to the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney statistic 
(Leach, 1979) for determining whether predicted 
probabilities for the group of true positives differ from 
the predicted probabilities for the group of true negatives. 
In this study, the index c measures the probability of 
correctly identifying those who accept versus those who 
reject amniocentesis. The R statistic "measures the 
predictive ability of the model" (Hastings, 1986:271). 
Individual R statistics ("partial Rs") also provide a 
measure of the contribution of each variable, independent of 
the sample size. The R statistic is similar to the multiple 
correlation coefficient, after adjustment is made to 
penalize for the number of parameters estimated. R is 
derived from Akaike's information criterion and is identical 
to the likelihood ratio chi-square for a 2 x 2 contingency 
table (Atkinson, 1980). R takes on the value of 0 if the 
model offers a poor fit to the data and achieves a value of 
1 if the model predicts perfectly. The R^ statistic 
represents the proportion of log likelihood explained by the 
model. 
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To evaluate the final hypothesis, that social identity 
elements, reference groups/significant others, and 
interpretations of meaning will all affect the acceptance or 
rejection of amniocentesis, variables found to be 
significant in the initial subset runs were entered into the 
model and deleted one at a time until only significant 
independent variables remained. 
Because the two questions measuring the influence of 
the respondents' doctors were asked of less than 60.0% of 
the sample, multiple regression runs on this subsample of 
respondents were examined in the same fashion as for the 
full sample. The models derived from these analyses will be 
compared and contrasted with those achieved in full-sample 
analyses. 
Simple logistic regression 
Within the social identity elements group, only two 
variables were significantly related to acceptance or 
rejection of amniocentesis (Table 6). To the extent that 
the four intervals in education (0-11, 12, 13-16, and 17 or 
more years of education) can be assumed to have an 
equivalent distance, an increase in education from one level 
to the next increased the prediction of the log odds of 
having amniocentesis by .4733. Converted to odds ratios, 
the odds in favor of accepting amniocentesis was 1.6 times 
greater among women who were high school graduates than for 
Table 6. Simple logistic regression of social identity elements on acceptance 
or rejection of amniocentesis 
Social 
identity-
elements Beta s. e. X' RS 
Odds^ 
Ratio 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Intercept 
Education 
Intercept 
Spouse's education 
Intercept 
Ever divorced 
Intercept 
Number of children 
Intercept 
Insurance covering 
amniocentesis 
. 6195 .3158 3. 85 
• 
4733 .1817 6. 78 
9359 .3392 7. 61 
• 
2680 .1806 2. 20 
1. 1144 .2515 19. 64 
• 
4236 . 3242 1. 71 
1. 0199 .2496 16. 69 
• 
2727 .1554 3. 08 
• 
5996 .2352 6. 50 
1. 3065 .3279 15. 87 
** 
*** 
.138 
.029 
. 000  
.066  
.236 
1.61 (1.12, 2.29) 
3.69 (1.94, 7.02) 
®The R statistic is similar to a multiple correlation coefficient, after 
corrections are made to penalize for numbers of parameters estimated, measur-
ring the predictive ability of the model; when squared, it is similar to R^ 
and can be intepreted as estimating the proportion of log likelihood explained 
by the model (Atkinson, 1980; Hastings, 1986). 
"Odds ratios are calculated and 95% confidence intervals are constructed 
only for variables that are significant. 
**Significant at .01 level. 
* Significant at .001 level. 
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women with less than high school education; the odds in 
favor of accepting the procedure was 1.6 times greater for 
those with at least some college than for those who are high 
school graduates; and the odds in favor of accepting 
amniocentesis was 1.6 times greater for those with graduate 
level education than for those with at least some college. 
Moreover, the odds in favor of accepting amniocentesis was 
3.7 times greater for those who had insurance for the 
procedure than for those without it. 
Among the seven variables measuring significant other 
and reference group support or influence, four showed a 
significant relationship to the dependent variable (Table 
7). The odds in favor of acceptance was nearly 16 times 
greater for women who reported that their husbands thought 
they should have the procedure than for those whose husbands 
reportedly left the decision about amniocentesis up to them. 
Those whose friends and neighbors gave them support for 
their decisions were significantly more likely to undergo 
amniocentesis than were those who had less support or no 
support, as were respondents whose doctors gave them support 
for their decisions. The odds in favor of acceptance was 
5.7 times greater among women who said their doctors thought 
they should have amniocentesis than for those whose doctors 
left the decision up to them. 
Every one of the seven variables measuring respondents' 
Table 7. Simple logistic regression of significant other and reference group 
variables on acceptance or rejection of amniocentesis 
Reference group 
or significant 
others support Beta s.e. %% 
odds 
Ratio 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Intercept -2.1003 
Husband^ thinks 
woman should have 
amniocentesis 2.7706 
Intercept .7713 
Support from 
husband^ for 
woman's decision .3978 
Intercept 1.1438 
Support from 
parents for 
woman's decision .1829 
,4590 20.94 
3492 62.95*** .501 
3920 3.87 
.2363 2.83 
.2331 24.07 
.1282 2.04 
.058 
.012 
15.97 (8.05, 31.66) 
®0r child's father. 
***Significant at .001 level. 
Table 7. (continued) 
Reference group 
or significant 
others support Beta s.e. X2 R 
Odds 
Ratio 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Intercept 
Support from 
friends for 
woman's decision 
.9327 
.3772 
.2146 
.1399 
18.89 
7.27** .145 1.46 (1.11, 1.92) 
Intercept 
Doctor thinks 
woman should have 
amniocentesis 
-1.1822 
1.7464 
.5132 
.3710 
5.31 
22.16*** .345 5.73 (2.77, 11.86) 
Intercept 
Support from doctor 
for woman•s 
decision 
1904 
1.4189 
.3403 
.2863 
.31 
24.56*** .389 4.13 (2.36, 7.24) 
Intercept 
Religious strength 
1.1330 
.1718 
.2162 
.1107 
27.45 
2.41 .040 
**Signifleant at .01 level. 
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interpretation of risks and norms or attitudes about 
abortion was significantly related to the probability of 
having amniocentesis (Table 8). Using one of the variables 
for illustrative purposes, with each higher level of 
increased chance of complications associated with 
amniocentesis a woman was willing to accept, there was an 
increase of 1.63 in the log odds of having the procedure. 
Translating this into odds ratios, the odds in favor of 
accepting amniocentesis was 5.1 times greater for a woman 
willing to accept a 20.0% or greater chance of test 
complications than for one willing to accept a 5.0% chance 
of test complications. 
Multiple logistic regression; full sample 
Thirteen of the proposed nineteen variables showed a 
significant bivariate relationship to the dependent 
variable. Two of these, however, were measures 
investigating the influence of and support from the women's 
physicians. Because these questions were asked of only 
60.0% of the sample, multiple logistic regression analysis 
of this subsample of 148 women will be undertaken in the 
following section. 
To test hypothesis one, that women and their spouses who 
have higher education, have not been previously divorced, who 
have fewer children, and have insurance covering the 
procedure would be more likely to accept amniocentesis, a 
Table 8. Simple logistic regression of interpretation of meaning variables on 
acceptance or rejection of amniocentesis 
Interpretation 
of 
meaning Beta s. e. R 
Odds 
Ratio 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Intercept -.0374 
Perceived 
accuracy of 
amniocentesis 1.1096 
Intercept .9705 
Perceived odds of 
having fetus with 
Down syndrome .5797 
Intercept .0810 
Perceived risk of 
complications with 
amnioniocentesis .6855 
3884 .63 
.2423 20.96 
.2067 22.04 
.2097 7.64 
.4016 .04 
.1975 12.05 
*** 
** 
*** 
278 3.03 
.151 1.79 
.205 1.98 
(1.88, 4.88) 
(1.18, 2.69) 
(1.35, 2.92) 
**Significant at .01 level. 
***Significant at .001 level. 
Table 8. (continued) 
Interpretation 
of 
meaning Beta s.e. x2 
Odds 
Ratio 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Intercept 
Chances of test 
complication 
woman is willing 
to accept 
-1.5294 .4089 13.99 
1.6320 
.0409 Intercept 
Agree that life 
should be preserved 
at all times .6139 
Intercept 
Approval of abortion 
to avoid birth 
defects 
Intercept 
strength to which 
feelings about 
abortion are based 
on religious 
teachings 
-.8995 
.8693 
1969 
.2322 49.40 
,2871 .02 
.1222 25.23 
.3875 5.39 
.1439 36.49 
.2824 .49 
*** 
* * *  
*** 
.437 5.11 
.305 1.85 
.372 2.39 
(3.24, 8.06) 
(1.45, 2.35) 
(1.80, 3.16) 
6365 .1399 20.70 *** .274 1.89 (1.44, 2.49) 
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multiple logistic regression analysis was performed. In the 
initial run, only insurance coverage showed a significant 
relationship to the probability of accepting amniocentesis 
(Table 9). The variable with the smallest chi-square 
(divorce) was eliminated and the model was run again. This 
was repeated until two variables, education and insurance 
covering amniocentesis, remained (Table 10). Because 
education was significantly correlated with spouse education 
(r=.57, p=.001), education appeared not to be significant in 
the initial full-model run. However, once spouse education 
was deleted/ education proved to be significantly related to 
the probability of accepting amniocentesis, after 
controlling for the effect of insurance coverage. Thus, for 
example, the odds in favor of acceptance was 1.5 times 
greater for a woman with high school education than for a 
woman with 11 or fewer years of schooling, after controlling 
for the effect of having insurance. And the odds in favor 
of acceptance was 3.4 times greater for a respondent with 
insurance covering the procedure than for a respondent 
without such insurance coverage, after controlling for the 
effect of education. When the standardized betas were 
compared, insurance was nearly twice as important as is 
education. Using the multiplicative effect of odds ratios 
(Schlesselman, 1982), the impact of having both insurance 
coverage and higher education can be estimated. Thus, the 
Table 9. Multiple logistic regression of social identity elements on 
acceptance or rejection of amniocentesis (N=247) 
Social 
identity 
elements Beta Beta'& s.e. X' R 
Odds 
Ratio 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Intercept -.1517 
Education .3087 .2824 
Spouse's education -.0539 -.0479 
Ever divorced .3440 .1633 
Number of children .1234 .1288 
Insurance covering 
amniocentesis 1.2700 .5935 
.4596 
.2271 
.2278 
.3508 
.1648 
index 
0.11 
1.85 
0.  06  
0.96 
0.56 
.3424 13.76 ** 
.  000 
. 000 
. 000  
.000 
.219 3.56 (1.82, 6.97) 
. 6 8 8  
for model 4.8% 
^Standardardized beta. 
"The index c is proportional to the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney statistic 
for testing whether predicted probabilities for the group of true positives 
are different from predicted probabilities for the group of true negatives 
(Leach, 1979; Hastings, 1986). 
*Significant at .01 level. 
Table 10. Multiple logistic regression of social identity elements on 
acceptance or rejection of amniocentesis, reduced model (N=249) 
Social 95% 
identity Odds Confidence 
elements Beta Beta' s.e. R Ratio Interval 
Intercept .0519 .3523 0.02 
Education .3739 .3436 .1836 4.15* .093 1.45 (1.01, 2.08) 
Insurance covering 
amniocentesis 1.2106 .5646 .3337 13.16** .211 3.36 (1.74, 6.45) 
index c . 689 
r2 for model 6.6% 
*Significant at .05 level. 
**Signifleant at .01 level. 
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odds in favor of acceptance was 4.9 times greater (1.45 
times 3.36) among respondents who were high school graduates 
and who had insurance coverage for amniocentesis than among 
those with less than high school and who didn't have 
insurance coverage for the test; likewise, the odds in favor 
of acceptance was 4.9 times greater for those with at least 
some college and insurance covering amniocentesis than for 
high school graduates without such insurance; and the odds 
in favor of acceptance was 4.9 times greater for those with 
graduate-level education and insurance covering 
amniocentesis than for those with at least some college and 
no insurance coverage for amniocentesis. 
Although both insurance and education were 
significantly related to the acceptance or rejection of the 
procedure, the model itself shows a poor fit. The more 
important variable, insurance coverage, predicts just 4.5% 
of the probability of acceptance of amniocentesis and the 
model itself contributes only 6.6% to the proportion of log 
likelihood explained. The probability of correctly 
differentiating between acceptors and rejectors is a modest 
0.69. 
In the full model examining the influence of and 
support from reference groups and significant others, upon 
which hypothesis two was based, only one of five variables 
was statistically significant (Table 11). The odds in favor 
Table 11. Multiple logistic regression of significant other and reference 
group variables on acceptance or rejection of amniocentesis, full 
model (N=243) 
Interaction with/support 
from significant others 
reference groups Beta Beta' s.e. R 
Odds 
Ratio 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
•3.3656 .8229 16.73 
2.8105 2.0065 .3752 56.10*** .476 
.2233 .1408 .3525 0.40 .000 
.1772 .2228 .2180 0.66 .000 
.1535 
.3136 
.1857 
.4903 
.2308 
.1756 
0.44 
3.19 
.000 
.071 
Intercept 
Husband thinks 
should have 
amniocentesis 
Husband's support 
for decision 
Parents' support 
for decision 
Friends• support 
for decision 
Religious strength 
index c .931 
r2 for model 48.0% 
***Significant at .001 level, 
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of acceptance among respondents who reported that their 
husbands thought they should have amniocentesis was 16.6 
times greater than for those whose husbands reportedly left 
the decision up to them. After eliminating the other four 
variables sequentially, this variable assessing the wife's 
report of her husband's influence was still the only 
significant predictor variable, and the odds ratio remained 
largely unchanged (Table 12). Although support from friends 
was significant in the bivariate analysis, it was no longer 
significant here when controlled for by the variable 
measuring the respondent's view of her husband's opinion 
about accepting or rejecting the test. An attempt was made 
to construct an index of the three emotional support 
measures inasmuch as support from parents and support from 
friends and neighbors were highly correlated (r=.45, 
p=.001). However, Cronbach's alpha was only .45, suggesting 
an insufficient internal consistency of these items. 
For the model as a whole, the index c is quite high, 
indicating that the area under the receiver operating 
characteristic (ROC) was able to clearly discriminate 
between those who would accept or reject amniocentesis given 
the influence of what the respondent said her husband 
thought. Although it contains only one variable, its 
predictive ability appeared to be good, explaining 49.4% of 
the log likelihood of accepting amniocentesis. 
Table 12. Multiple logistic regression of significant other and reference 
group variables on acceptance or rejection of amniocentesis, final 
model (N=246) 
Interaction with/support 95% 
from significant others Odds Confidence 
reference groups Beta Beta' s.e. R Ratio Interval 
Intercept -2.1003 .4590 20.94 
Husband thinks 
should have 
amniocentesis 2.7706 1.988 .3492 62.95*** .501 15.97 (8.05, 31.66) 
index c .902 
r2 for model 49.4% 
***Significant at .001 level. 
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Although each of the seven variables within the 
interpretation of meaning group used to test hypothesis 
three was significantly related to the dependent variable in 
bivariate analysis, only three proved to be statistically 
significant in the full model. The four measures that 
examined the women's perceptions of risks and odds relating 
to amniocentesis, their estimation of the chances of 
complications from the test they would be willing to accept, 
and their perceived susceptibility to having a Down syndrome 
child were somewhat intercorrelated (a high of r=.17, 
p=.001), but insufficiently so to create a reliable index of 
risk perceptions (Cronbach's alpha=.36). 
The three questions relating to norms and attitudes 
about abortion or the sanctity of life were much more highly 
intercorrelated (.51, .56, and .61, p=.001). Using 
Cronbach's method of assessing the reliability of an index 
composed of these three measures, an alpha of .79 was 
achieved. Therefore, values from the items were summed and, 
to create an average response across items, were divided by 
three. This measure then was re-entered into the model with 
the four odds/risks variables (Table 13). The index of 
norms about abortion, the women's willingness to accept 
higher chances of complications, and their perception of the 
test's ability to accurately identify a fetus with Down 
syndrome all proved to be significantly related to 
Table 13. Multiple logistic regression of interpretation of meaning variables 
on acceptance or rejection of amniocentesis, full model (N=237) 
Interpretation 95% 
of odds Confidence 
meaning Beta Beta' s.e. R Ratio Interval 
Intercept -4.5927 .9754 22.17 
Perceived 
accuracy of 
amniocentesis .8046 .4828 .3491 5.31* .119 2.24 (1.12, 4.43) 
Perceived odds of 
having fetus with 
Down syndrome .3345 .3094 .2928 1.31 .000 
Perceived risk of 
complications with 
amnioniocentesis .4637 .3741 .2796 2.75 .057 
Chances of test 
complication 
woman is willing 
to accept 1.2515 1.4949 .2597 23.22*** .302 3.50 (2.10, 5.82) 
Index of norms and 
attitudes about 
abortion .6081 .6160 .2333 6.80** .143 1.84 (1.16, 2.90) 
index c .898 
^2 for model 39.2% 
*Significant at .05 level. 
**Significant at .01 level. 
***Significant at .001 level. 
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acceptance of the procedure. 
These three variables remained significant during the 
sequential deletion of nonsignificant variables (Table 14). 
After controlling for the effect of the other two variables, 
a woman's willingness to accept chances of complications 
with amniocentesis was by far the most important factor as 
indicated by the standardized betas, while her estimation of 
the test's accuracy was least important, although still 
significant. For each level of increased chance of test 
complications a woman was willing to accept, the odds in 
favor of acceptance was increased by 4.1. To illustrate the 
multiplicative effect of these three variables, the odds in 
favor of acceptance was 17.6 times greater for a respondent 
who perceived the test to have a very high chance of 
detecting a fetus with Down syndrome, who was willing to 
accept a 20.0% or greater chance of complications with 
amniocentesis, and who held very strong proabortion norms or 
attitudes than for a respondent who perceived the test's 
accuracy to be moderately high, who would accept a 5.0% 
chance of test complications, and who held strong 
proabortion norms or attitudes. The final model as a whole 
suggested a reasonably good fit to the data, with an index c 
of 0.89 and an of 40.1%. 
In the final analysis, assessing whether the fourth 
hypothesis could be supported, only two variables were 
Table 14. Multiple logistic regression of interpretation of meaning variables 
on acceptance or rejection of amniocentesis, final model (N=241) 
Interpretation 95% 
of odds Confidence 
meaning Beta Beta' s.e. R Ratio Interval 
Intercept -3.7966 .7798 23.71 
Perceived 
accuracy of 
amniocentesis .8455 .5149 .3314 6.51* .136 2.33 (1.22, 4.46) 
Chances of test 
complication 
woman will accept 1.4219 1.7024 .2499 32.38*** .353 4.14 (2.54, 6.76) 
Index of attitudes 
about abortion .5989 .6050 .2225 7.24** .147 1.82 (1.18, 2.82) 
index c .890 
r2 for model 40.1% 
*Significant at .05 level. 
**significant at .01 level. 
** Significant at .001 level. 
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significant in the full model run (Table 15). Judging from 
an index c of 0.97 and an r2 of 62.9%, the model appeared to 
provide a good fit of the data, and to have theoretical and 
substantive merit. However, in keeping with the attempt to 
discern the most parsimonious model, nonsignificant 
variables were sequentially deleted. In the final model, 
two variables remained significant (Table 16). After 
controlling for the influence of women's willingness to 
accept higher chances of complications with amniocentesis, 
the odds of acceptance was 14.6 times greater among those 
who stated that their husbands thought they should have the 
procedure than among the women whose husbands reportedly 
left the decision about amniocentesis up to them. Moreover, 
after controlling for women's reports of their husbands' 
opinions about accepting amniocentesis, the odds in favor of 
acceptance was 4.2 times greater for those willing to accept 
progressively higher chances of complications with 
amniocentesis. The model's goodness of fit was only 
slightly reduced with the elimination of the four other 
variables, showing an index c of 0.96 and an of 61.9%. 
This would suggest a good fit to the data, since more than 
half of the log likelihood of accepting amniocentesis was 
explained. A diagram representing this parsimonious and, 
apparently, quite statistically significant model is 
presented in Figure 4. However, while parsimonious, the 
Table 15. Multiple logistic regression of significant variables from social 
identity, reference group/significant other, and interpretation of 
meaning variables on acceptance or rejection of amniocentesis, full 
model (N=238) 
Self, significant other, 95% 
and interpretation of odds confidence 
meaning variables Beta Beta' s.e. r Ratio interval 
Intercept -6.1197 1.0307 2232 5.03 
Education - .0116 -.0107 .3644 .00 .000 
Insurance covering 
amniocentesis .1419 .0665 .6774 .04 .000 
Husband thinks 
should have 
amniocentesis 2.6383 1.9136 .4543 33.73*** .366 13.99 (5.74, 34.08) 
Perceived 
accuracy of 
amniocentesis .3801 .2321 .4528 .70 .000 
Chances of test 
complication 
woman will accept 1.3205 1.5684 .3538 13.93*** .225 3.75 (1.87, 7.49) 
Index of norms and 
attitudes about 
abortion .5120 .5123 .3221 2.53 .047 
index c .966 
r2 for model 62.9% 
***Significant at .001 level. 
Table 16. Multiple logistic regression of significant variables from social 
identity, reference group/significant other, and interpretation of 
meaning variables on acceptance or rejection of amniocentesis, 
final model (N=243) 
Self, significant other, 95% 
and interpretation of Odds Confidence 
meaning variables Beta Beta' s.e. R Ratio Interval 
Intercept -4.6660 .8814 28.02 
Husband thinks 
should have 
amniocentesis 2.6817 1.9322 .4120 42.37*** .409 14.61 (6.52, 32.76) 
Chances of test 
complication 
woman will accept 1.4245 1.6898 .3128 20.74*** .279 4.16 (2.25, 7.67) 
index c .955 
for model 61.9% 
***Significant at .001 level. 
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reduced model lacks a substantive, theoretical appeal. 
Therefore, an attempt was made to discern why the four 
factors previously found to be significant were eliminated 
from the final reduced model. 
Figure 5 summarizes the results. Only variables found 
to be significant in subset analyses were included. Causal 
ordering was assumed; hence, social identity elements were 
placed as exogenous variables, attitudes/norms and 
perceptions were intermediate factors, and variables found 
to be directly significant were presented as endogenous 
predictors of acceptance of amniocentesis. Because of the 
assumed causal order, no attempt has been made to present a 
full path diagram. Instead, Figure 5 should be considered a 
heuristic device that demonstrates both statistically 
significant and theoretically relevant factors that 
influence the acceptance or rejection of amniocentesis. 
Using simple logistic regression, education was found 
to be significantly related to both insurance coverage 
(beta=.370, p=.05) and to the respondents' report of whether 
husbands thought they should accept amniocentesis 
(beta=.357, p=.05). Insurance coverage, too, was 
significantly related to the variable measuring the 
husband's perceived influence (beta=1.309, p=.001), 
indicating that social identity elements may exert an 
indirect effect on acceptance of amniocentesis. 
B =.357* 
NORMS 
attitudes 
about 
abortion 
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SOCIAL 
IDENTITY 
ELEMENTS 
education 
SOCIAL 
IDENTITY 
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accept 
amniocentesis 
BEHAVIOR 
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fetus with 
Down syndrome 
INTERACTIONS WITH 
SIGNIFICANT OTHERS 
husband thinks 
woman should have 
amniocentesis 
INTERPRETATION 
OF MEANING: 
willing to accept 
higher chances of 
complications 
Figure 5. Heuristic diagram of direct and indirect relationships of indepen­
dent variables to the acceptance of amniocentesis, full sample 
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Two interpretation of meaning variables also appeared 
to exert significant indirect influence on women's decisions 
regarding amniocentesis. A woman's perception of the test's 
accuracy was significantly related to the variable measuring 
the woman's report of her husband's opinion (beta=.874, 
p=.001) and to the chances of complications from 
amniocentesis a woman was willing to accept (beta=.599, 
p=.001). The index of women's norms or attitudes about 
abortion was likewise related to these two variables 
(beta=.626, p=.001 and beta=.826, p=.001, respectively). 
This heuristic model, then, demonstrates both the direct and 
indirect effects of social identity elements, reference 
groups or significant others, and interpretations of meaning 
on the acceptance of amniocentesis. 
Multiple logistic regression: subsample 
The 148 women who had been asked both questions about 
their doctors' opinion regarding their seeking amniocentesis 
and their doctors' support for their decisions were selected 
out of the full sample and multiple logistic regression 
procedures were performed on this subsample. In examining 
the first subset of variables, social identity elements, 
only insurance coverage appeared to have a significant 
relationship with acceptance or rejection of amniocentesis 
(Table 17). As was true with the larger sample, because of 
problems of multicollinearity of women's education with 
Table 17. Multiple logistic regression of subsample social identity elements 
on acceptance or rejection of amniocentesis (N=146) 
Social 95% 
identity odds Confidence 
elements Beta Beta' s.e. R Ratio Interval 
Intercept .4243 .6193 0. 47 
Education -.1121 -.1006 .2977 0. 14 .000 
Spouse's education .1719 .1593 .2811 0. 37 .000 
Ever divorced -.0015 .0007 .4556 0. 00 . 000 
Number of children .0504 .0534 .2067 0. 06 .000 
Insurance covering 
30** amniocentesis 1.1978 .5318 .4433 7. .191 
index c .679 
r2 for model 0.0% 
**Significant at .01 level. 
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spouses' education (r=.58, p=.001), the betas of these two 
variables were somewhat distorted. Even after 
interchangeably entering the two variables into the model, 
insurance coverage alone was selected as significant. This 
suggested that the subsample had somewhat different 
characteristics than the full sample. However, 
investigation of the range and categories of the education 
variable and a t-test of means (t=l.l, NS) for the full 
sample and subsample showed no statistically significant 
differences. Thus, the lack of significance of education 
may be a reflection of the smaller sample size alone. Even 
in the full model, education was only significant at the .05 
level, whereas most of the other significant variables had 
much higher p-values, suggesting that education, when 
controlled for by other factors in the model, exerted a 
fairly modest influence on decision outcome. 
Within the subsample, then, the odds in favor of 
accepting amniocentesis was 3.3 times greater for women with 
insurance coverage for amniocentesis than for women without 
this kind of insurance (Table 18). As with the full sample, 
however, this single social identity element provided a poor 
fit to the data, explaining only 3.6% of the proportion of 
log likelihood; the index c showed that the model's ability 
to differentiate between acceptors and rejectors was only 
marginal (0.63). 
Table 18. Multiple logistic regression of subsample social identity elements 
on acceptance or rejection of amniocentesis, reduced model (N=146) 
Social 95% 
identity Odds Confidence 
elements Beta Beta' s.e. R Ratio Interval 
Intercept .5798 .3338 3.02 
Insurance covering 
amniocentesis 1.1802 .5217 .4298 7.54** .193 3.26 (1.40, 7.56) 
index c .627 
r2 for model 3.6% 
** Significant at .01 level. 
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Within the full subsample model examining the influence 
of significant others and reference groups, three variables 
achieved statistical significance (Table 19). However, as 
nonsignificant variables were deleted sequentially, the 
variable measuring respondents' religious strength no longer 
remained significant. This model was particularly affected 
by problems of multicollinearity, where the two variables 
assessing the influence of the women's doctors were 
moderately correlated (r=.47, p=.001), the variable 
measuring the husband's reported opinion about whether the 
woman should accept amniocentesis was correlated with the 
woman's report of what her doctor thought (r=.39, p=.001), 
husband's support was correlated with doctor's support 
(r=.31, p=.001), friends' support (r.=17, p=.04), and 
parents' support (r=.27, p=.01), and parents' support and 
friends' support, as with the full sample, were correlated 
(r=.44, p=.001). When Cronbach's alpha was used to assess 
the reliability of an underlying construct measuring 
support, an alpha of .58 was achieved, which is fairly 
substantial, but not sufficient to form an index tapping the 
underlying construct of emotional support for the woman's 
decision. Further, when viewing the items from a 
theoretical standpoint, a woman's perception of support from 
her husband or her doctor each has substantively different 
meanings; neither do these types of support seem 
Table 19. Multiple logistic regression of significant other and reference 
subsainple variables on acceptance or rejection of amniocentesis, 
full model (N=143) 
Interaction with/support 95% 
from significant others Odds Confidence 
reference groups Beta Beta' s.e. R Ratio Interval 
Intercept -3.3078 
Husband thinks 
should have 
amniocentesis 
Doctor thinks 
should have 
amniocentesis 
Husband's support 
for decision 
Doctor's support 
for decision 
Parents' support 
for decision 
Friends• support 
for decision 
Religious strength 
index c .951 
r2 for model 44.5% 
1.1234 8.67 
3.9873 1.8476 .8386 22.61 *** 386 53.91 (10.42, 278.93) 
.7370 .4436 .5396 1.87 .000 
.1020 .0676 .4619 0.05 .000 
2.3343 1.1609 .7765 9.04** .225 10. 32 (2. 25, 47.29) 
.  0641 . 0808 .2767 0.05 . 000 
.0310 
.4571 
.0373 
.7694 
.3096 
.2261 
0.01 
4.09* 
.000 
.123 1. 58 (1. 01, 2.46) 
*Significant at .05 level. 
**Significant at .01 level. 
***Significant at .001 level. 
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conceptually similar to support from parents or friends. 
Each group or significant other would very probably provide 
a different type of support, each of which would hold 
different interpretations of meaning for the respondent. 
Therefore, although it could be argued that these different 
types and perceptions of support nevertheless generated a 
global sense of well-being for the individual, it was 
decided that each item would be entered alternately, thereby 
avoiding problems of multicollinearity while maintaining 
more conceptual clarity. As a result, two measures remained 
in the model (Table 20). While controlling for the effect 
of the doctor's support for her decision, the odds in favor 
of acceptance was 51.5 times greater for a woman who said 
her husband felt she should have the procedure than for a 
respondent whose husband left the decision up to her. 
Further, when controlling for the effect of what the husband 
thought, the odds in favor of acceptance was nearly 12 times 
greater for women whose doctors gave them strong emotional 
support for their decision about amniocentesis than for the 
women who received less strong or no support from their 
doctors for their decision regarding the test. 
Within the subsample exploration of the interpretation 
of meaning variables, Cronbach's alpha of the three abortion 
attitude items suggested a strong underlying construct 
(alpha=.75), so, as with the full sample, the index of norms 
Table 20. Multiple logistic regression of significant other and reference 
subsample variables on acceptance or rejection of amniocentesis, 
final model (N=146) 
Interaction with/support 
from significant others 
reference groups Beta Beta' s.e. x2 R 
odds 
Ratio 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Intercept -1.3370 
Husband thinks 
should have 
amniocentesis 
Doctor's support 
for decision 
index c .929 
r2 for model 47.5% 
,4589 8.49 
3.9416 1.8373 
2.4736 1.2336 
7221 29.80 
,6613 13.99 
*** 
*** 
.437 51.50 (12.51, 212.07) 
.287 11.87 (3.66, 43.37) 
***Significant at .001 level. 
146 
and attitudes about abortions was entered into the model 
along with the four risk items (which did not achieve a 
substantial Cronbach's alpha). Only the woman's 
self-assessed willingness' to accept chances of complications 
with amniocentesis achieved statistical significance in the 
full model (Table 21), again because of problems with 
multicollinearity of the abortion index with some of the 
risk items. However, as variables were alternately entered 
and deleted, the final model consisted of two variables that 
were significantly related to accepting amniocentesis (Table 
22). After controlling for the norms and attitudes abortion 
index, the odds in favor of acceptance was 5.7 times greater 
for a woman willing to accept a 20.0% or higher chance of 
complications associated with amniocentesis than for a woman 
who would accept a 5.0% chance of test complications. The 
odds ratio of the abortion norms and attitudes index, after 
controlling for the women's risk-accepting assessments, was 
relatively small (1.8). Examination of the standardized 
betas showed that the item measuring a woman's willingness 
to accept chances of complications from amniocentesis was 
nearly four times more important than the norms and 
attitudes abortion index in predicting the log odds of a 
respondent's acceptance of amniocentesis. The fit of the 
model is quite good, showing an of 40.3%, and an index c 
of 0.90. 
Table 21. Multiple logistic regression of subsample interpretation of meaning 
variables on acceptance or rejection of amniocentesis, full model 
(N=146) 
Interpretation 95% 
of Odds Confidence 
meaning Beta Beta' s.e. R Ratio Interval 
Intercept -4.5614 1.3947 10.70 
Perceived 
accuracy of 
amniocentesis .2944 .1536 .5371 0.30 .000 
Perceived odds of 
having fetus with 
Down syndrome .0905 .0816 .3778 0.06 .000 
Perceived risk of 
complications with 
amnioniocentesis .6544 .5339 .3826 2.93 .079 
Chances of test 
complication 
woman is willing 
to accept 1.5978 1.8609 .3795 17.72*** .326 4.94 (2.35, 10.40) 
Index of norms and 
attitudes about 
abortion .5661 .5619 .3086 3.37 .096 
index c .898 
r2 for model 38.7% 
***Significant at .001 level. 
Table 22. Multiple logistic regression of subsample interpretation of meaning 
variables on acceptance or rejection of amniocentesis, final model 
(N=146) 
Interpretation 95% 
of Odds Confidence 
meaning Beta Beta' s.e. R Ratio Interval 
Intercept -2.9206 .8276 12.45 
Chances of test 
complication 
woman will accept 1.7348 2.0205 .3567 23.65*** .382 5.67 (2.82, 11.40) 
Index of norms and 
attitudes about 
abortion .5940 .5895 .2944 4.07* .118 1.81 (1.02, 3.23) 
index c .895 
r2 for model 40.3% 
*Significant at .05 level. 
***Significant at .001 level. 
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The final full subsample model (in which significant 
variables from the social identity elements, significant 
other, and interpretation of meaning subset analyses were 
entered) demonstrated a better fit to the data than any 
model previously examined either in the full sample or the 
subsample analyses (Table 23). Here, 66.9% of the log 
likelihood was explained, and the model showed a good 
ability to differentiate between acceptors and rejectors of 
amniocentesis (index c = 0.98). 
In keeping with an attempt to find the most 
parsimonious model, nonsignificant variables were 
sequentially eliminated, leaving a model in which three 
variables achieved statistical significance (Table 24). 
Examining the standardized betas, it appeared that while 
controlling for the effect of other variables in the model, 
both the woman's perceptions of her husband's opinion and 
her willingness to accept chances of test complications were 
the most important measures in predicting the acceptance or 
rejection of amniocentesis, demonstrating nearly twice the 
influence of the doctor's support for the woman's decision. 
This reduced model achieved the highest predictive ability 
of all models examined, explaining 68.9% of the log 
likelihood of acceptance of amniocentesis. Figure 6 
presents a diagram of the relationships of variable in the 
final reduced model. 
Table 23. Multiple logistic regression of significant variables from social 
identity, reference group/significant other, and interpretation of 
meaning variables subsample, on acceptance or rejection of 
amniocentesis, full model (N=144) 
Self, significant other, 
and interpretation of 
meaning variables Beta Beta ' s.e. X2 R 
Odds 
Ratio 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Intercept -8.1801 
Insurance covering 
amniocentesis .4049 
Husband thinks 
should have 
amniocentesis 2.9593 
Doctor's support 
for decision 2.3956 
Chances of test 
complication 
woman will accept 1.7768 
Index of norms and 
attitudes about 
abortion .5658 
index c .977 
r2 for model 66.9% 
2.2787 
.1806 .9034 
2.1239 
1.1945 
.7141 
.9963 
2.0407 .7288 
.5498 .5227 
12.89 
.20 
17.17 
5.78" 
5.94" 
1.17 
*** 
. 000  
.324 19.28 (4.76, 78.17) 
.162 10.97 (1.56, 77.35) 
.165 5.91 (1.42, 24.66) 
. 000  
*Significant at .05 level. 
***Significant at .001 level. 
Table 24. Multiple logistic regression of significant variables from social 
identity, reference group/significant other, and interpretation of 
meaning variables subsample, on acceptance or rejection of 
amniocentesis, final model (N=146) 
Self, significant other, 
and interpretation of 
meaning variables Beta Beta' s.e. X' 
Odds 
Ratio 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
-7.1734 
3.0925 2.2102 .7049 19.25 
2.2474 1.1208 .9439 
Intercept 
Husband thinks 
should have 
amniocentesis 
Doctor's support 
for decision 
Chances of test 
complication 
woman will accept 2.0645 2.3550 .7271 
index c .973 
for model 68.9% 
1.9156 14.02 
*** 
5.67' 
8 . 0 6  ** 
344 22.03 (5.53, 87.72) 
.159 9.46 (1.49, 60.19) 
,204 7.88 (1.90, 32.77) 
*Significant at .05 level. 
**Significant at .01 level. 
***Significant at .001 level. 
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Figure 6. Diagram of direct relationships of independent 
variables to the acceptance of amniocentesis, 
subsample 
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Although the final model achieved considerable 
statistical significance, as with the full sample, this 
parsimonious and highly explanatory model does not fully 
capture the factors that influence decision outcome for 
women at genetic risk. Figure 7 represents a heuristic tool 
to better conceptualize the processes these women went 
through to achieve their decisions regarding amniocentesis. 
Having insurance coverage significantly influenced the 
woman's perception of both her husband's opinion and the 
doctor's support (beta=1.519, p=.001, beta=.937, p=.05, 
respectively). Attitudes about abortion significantly 
affected the woman's perception of her husband's opinion 
(beta=.558, p=.001) as well as the woman's willingness to 
accept chances of complications to undergo amniocentesis 
(beta=.854, p=.001). 
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CHAPTER V; DISCUSSION 
Summary of Findings 
Examination of the data using logistic regression 
showed that none of the four hypotheses were supported 
unqualifiedly. Within each of the subset analyses, a 
majority of the hypothesized variables were eliminated. 
However, significant relationships were found within each of 
the social identity, significant other/reference group, and 
interpretation of meaning variables. In the final models, 
significant others (husbands and/or doctors) and 
interpretations of meaning (women's willingness to accept 
chances of complications from amniocentesis) exerted strong 
direct influence on the women's acceptance of amniocentesis. 
Social identity factors, perceptions, and norms or attitudes 
also affected the women's decisions, albeit indirectly. 
Thus, although the detailed hypotheses achieved only 
marginal support, the underlying conceptual hypotheses were 
confirmed, and the models derived from these theoretical 
predictions offered a good fit to the data. 
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Discussion of Findings 
When controlled for by other significant variables, 
none of the measures of social identity achieved direct 
statistical significance in relation to acceptance of 
amniocentesis in the final models. The lack of direct 
influence by eduction is most surprising, as this measure 
has been a consistent significant predictor in previous 
research. In the current study, the overall high 
educational status of both groups (accepters, mean of 14.5 
years, rejectors, 13.4 years) may be a factor. It also 
could be that this study captures the gradual change in 
consumer behavior in medical settings. Education measures 
in earlier studies seemed to indicate the presence of a 
socioeconomic gradient, which reduced access to treatment 
among lower status groups. More recent health-related 
research has demonstrated that lower education and/or income 
no longer present the barriers they once did to medical 
usage (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 1983). Now, as women 
have to contend with fewer structural constraints and, 
perhaps, are more aware of their genetic risks and these 
services, definitions of the situation, norms, and the 
perceived influence of significant others, particularly 
one's spouse and physician, then may take precedence over 
measures of educational attainment as determinants of 
acceptance or rejection of amniocentesis. Thus, for both 
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acceptors and rejectors, education may affect their 
perceptions and construction of reality, but does not 
directly influence their decisions to accept or reject 
amniocentesis. In future research among fairly highly 
educated respondents, education level should be treated not 
so much as a sociostructural deterrent but as a mechanism 
that affects cognitive processing and reference group 
interactions and interpretations. 
Although the trend was in the hypothesized direction, 
spouses' education exerted no influence either in bivariate 
or multivariate logistic analyses. This measure had been 
significant in studies examining women's correct assessment 
and retention of genetic risks, probabilities, and diagnoses 
(Emery et al., 1979). Inasmuch as "correct" information 
appears to exert minimal influence on actual outcome 
(Antley, 1976) and as this study did not deal with objective 
risk factors, this variable probably should not have been 
included in the model. At most, given its strong 
correlation with wives' education (r=.58), this measure may 
simply reflect a basic social reality: people tend to 
maintain relationships with others of similar socioeconomic 
status (Byrne, 1971; Nahemow and Lawton, 1975). At the same 
time, although no measure was available to assess this, 
higher education among women may be linked to their 
increased assertiveness both in their personal relationships 
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and in health-care settings. Thus, the husband's education 
level may exert somewhat less influence than it formerly did 
over a wife's perceptions and decisions. Certainly, since a 
woman's education was significantly related to her 
perceptions of what her husband and doctor thought, one 
might speculate that a woman could be taking control in 
negotiating reality in the direction she perceived to be in 
keeping with her definition of the situation. Rather than 
adopting a passively compliant stance, women may 
increasingly be, as Menzies (1982:39) paraphrased it, 
"creating their own destinies, though not in circumstances 
of their own choosing." Thus, the impact of the husband's 
education level may be somewhat reduced. 
The number of children respondents had showed no direct 
or indirect relationship to the dependent variable. Given 
the significant trend in the posited direction (rejectors 
had somewhat larger families), it is conceivable that with a 
larger sample size, this measure could have achieved 
statistical significance in logistic analysis. 
Alternatively, it could be that as family size in America 
has dropped overall (Westoff, 1977), number of children may 
no longer be a relevant measure to investigate in genetic 
counseling research. 
The variable assessing previous and/or present divorce 
status was included largely on an exploratory basis. Davies 
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(1983) had suggested this could be an important factor and, 
extrapolating from Stryker's (1959) symbolic interactionist 
account of marital relationships, the variable was posited 
to be a measure worth investigating. Present findings 
suggest, however, that divorce status may be relatively 
unimportant and should be considered in future research on 
an exploratory basis to discern whether its lack of 
significance here was an artifact of non-random sampling 
procedures. 
Although decisions relating to amniocentesis have been 
characterized as highly personal, emotional, and 
individualistic, it appears that a fairly pragmatic economic 
factor may also influence counselees' behavior. While not 
of primary importance, a person's ability to finance this 
medical procedure may subtly affect the final decision. 
This is consistent with Sanders' (1982) discussion in which 
he stated that people may refuse treatment if their 
self-esteem or self-perceptions are threatened by an 
inability to pay for medically-incurred expenses. Such an 
interpretation may be especially salient given the context 
of the situation. At University of Iowa Genetic Clinic, 
anyone who chooses to undergo amniocentesis will be tested, 
irrespective of ability to pay or insurance coverage. If a 
physician recommends it, or even if the woman herself seeks 
amniocentesis to allay her concerns, the procedure will be 
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performed. While this suggests there are no structural 
barriers per se, it is possible that some individuals would 
prefer to forego amniocentesis rather than acknowledge their 
inability to pay. 
There are two additional considerations that may 
explain the strong indirect influence of insurance coverage. 
First, this measure may in fact be capturing socioeconomic 
status, that is, those with fairly extensive insurance 
coverage may have higher incomes and more prestigious jobs. 
If this is the case, insurance coverage represents an 
indirect measure of socioeconomic status. Thus, as 
socioeconomic structural barriers have been somewhat reduced 
in recent years, this measure may no longer directly affect 
decision outcome, but it does, nevertheless, influence 
perceptions, definitions of the situation, and interactions 
with significant others, all of which are directly related 
to the behavior these women chose. 
A second explanation for the significance of insurance 
coverage may simply reflect sampling bias. Inasmuch as 
respondents were selected on a nonrandom basis, it is 
conceivable that the sample included an over-representation 
of individuals with insurance coverage for the procedure who 
also elected to undergo amniocentesis. 
Because the meaning of insurance coverage in relation 
to acceptance of amniocentesis cannot fully be determined. 
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it would be best to err on the side of pragmatism and 
suggest that it be treated as a measure of some 
sociostructural and/or perceptual barrier. Thus, if the 
medical community and society in general set acceptance of 
amniocentesis as a highly desirable goal, economic 
constraints may have to be addressed. 
Overall, given the fairly modest influence of education 
and insurance coverage, variables used to measure the 
respondents' social identity or perceptions of self may have 
been improperly selected. One could readily argue that 
these represent sociostructural, not self-identity, concepts 
and that given the theoretical guidance of symbolic 
interactionism, these measures were not sufficiently 
"sensitized" to the situation. Given Stryker's (1980) and 
Rosenberg's (1981) conceptualizations of "positions" and 
"achieved attributes," these measures were employed with the 
belief that they would indeed contribute significantly to 
the explanation of the women's behavior. In the future, 
however, researchers using symbolic interactionism as a 
guiding framework should perhaps select more 
social-psychological measures of self-perception to 
determine whether self-esteem, locus of control, or 
self-concept variables may prove to be more salient to final 
decisions made by genetically at-risk individuals. 
Quite serious problems with multicollinearity make the 
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influence of reference groups and significant others 
somewhat difficult to assess. Examination of bivariate 
relationships showed that a woman's husband, doctor, and 
friends each exert moderate to considerable impact on her 
final decision. In all the analyses, however, the woman's 
perception of what her husband thinks appears to be by far 
the most significant predictor of her acceptance or 
rejection of amniocentesis. This is not at all surprising 
given the preponderance of literature suggesting that 
husbands exert substantial influence on the decisions 
couples make. As Bernard (1973) has noted, husbands, who 
generally hold more power and control within the family, 
most often make the final decisions in important matters. 
.When interpreting the significance of the husband's 
opinion about amniocentesis, however, two very important 
considerations must be kept in mind. First, and most 
importantly, whether the husband thought his wife should 
have the procedure was assessed from the respondent's point 
of view. A woman who interpreted her husband's opinions 
within the context of her own biases and perceptions would 
undoubtedly have a personal stake in perceiving her spouse 
to hold views consistent with her own. Even women who 
stated that their husbands had left the decision up to them 
may in fact have been characterizing their husbands' 
opinions as sufficiently neutral to allow them to do what 
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they wanted to do. Numerous studies support this 
interpretation. Wilkening and Morrison (1953) found 
husband-wife consistency in decision-making items to be only 
50.0%, with agreement ranging from a low of 36.0% only up to 
77.0% (considerably lower than the reported 84.4% 
consistency of acceptor husband-wife dyads). Others have 
likewise found substantial disparity between husband and 
wife responses and/or ability of any one person to assess 
what the other spouse's decision was (Cromwell and Cromwell, 
1978; Booth and Welch, 1978; Brinkerhoff and Lupri, 1978). 
As Bokemeier and Monroe (1983:646) concluded, 
Findings of husband-wife inconsistency on decision 
making draw into question the reliability of one 
respondent's perceptions of another's attitudes, 
perceptions, or family interaction patterns. 
Realizing this, within the present study it is 
essential to regard the question about the husband's opinion 
as a measure of the woman's perception of her spouse's 
viewpoint, which may or may not reflect his actual opinion. 
When applying such research to real-life genetic counseling 
situations, those who wish to increase the utilization of 
amniocentesis among at-risk women may in fact only have to 
try to influence the woman's perception of her spouse's 
viewpoint; until further definitive research can measure 
disparities or consistencies between husbands' and wives' 
choices regarding amniocentesis, the woman's personal views 
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and her interpretation of her spouse's perspective must be 
considered the most significant predictors of acceptance or 
rejection of the procedure. 
Having delineated constraints placed on the 
interpretation of a measure assessing the husband's opinion 
from the wife's perspective, there is nevertheless some 
indication that even when both husband and wife are 
consulted about matters relating to family planning, the 
woman's perspective is more consistently related to actual 
outcome. Beach et al. (1976), for instance, found that the 
wife's rather than the husband's motives for and 
expectations of family size were more reliable predictors of 
reproductive outcomes. Neal and Groat (1976) and Fried et 
al. (1980) similarly suggested that wives exert more 
influence on couple fertility behavior than do husbands. 
How one interprets these discrepancies, however, is a matter 
of perspective. Some symbolic interactionists have argued 
that wives and husbands construct shared definitions of 
their marriage through their interactions. Bagozzi and Van 
Loo (1980) claimed a couple's perceived utility of children 
is a mutually reinforced construct that emerges through 
husband-wife interactions. Given this interpretation, 
disparities between spouses' reports are characterized as 
"measurement error" of the reality of the marital dyadic 
relationship. Thus, researchers who argue that wives-only 
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models are misspecified because when models are reanalyzed 
including husbands' as well as wives' views, significantly 
more variance in couple fertility behavior could be found 
(Fried et al., 1980; Townes et al., 1980) can be countered 
by those who insist upon a measurement error explanation: 
husbands' reports partially correct the estimated 
correlation coefficient for attenuation due to 
measurement error; the "increase" in explained 
variance simply reflects the addition of a second, 
error-ridden measure of the same true variable 
reflected in wives' responses (Thomson and 
Williams, 1982:1000). 
Based on this premise, it could be that in this study 
wives' reports are largely representative of the couples' 
joint decisions, more indicative of actual behavior, and 
that discrepancies reflect methodological, not substantive, 
errors. This would be consistent with a common sense 
assessment of the situation in which husbands, too, have a 
large investment in the outcome of their wives pregnancies, 
and therefore undoubtedly do exert considerable influence on 
the final decision. 
The highly significant bivariate relationships of a 
doctor's opinion and support for the woman's decision 
regarding amniocentesis is not unexpected in light of 
previous findings from genetic counseling research (Lubs, 
1979; Dixson et al., 1981). Medical practitioners exert 
considerable influence on an individual's definition of the 
situation, not only because they are often perceived as 
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having knowledge and expertise, but because they are 
generally viewed as authority figures as well. Moreover, as 
lams et al. (1983) noted, when interactions with doctors are 
based on a longstanding relationship, patients often trust 
and respect their doctor's views. The meaning that emerges 
from a consultation thus is affected by the medical 
professional's opinion and influence. 
The same caveats apply here as those delineated with 
regard to questions assessing the husband's opinion (i.e., 
reports by the women themselves may or may not accurately 
represent the doctor's actual opinion or support). 
However, the response patterns of acceptors and rejectors 
suggest that the women's reports conceivably reflect the 
actual doctor's behavior. A disproportionate number of 
rejectors (77.8% of the 36 asked) claimed their doctors had 
left the decision up to them; in contrast, just 26.2% of the 
acceptors characterized their physician's opinions as 
neutral. This may signal the impact of medico-legal 
considerations. Doctors holding reservations about or 
biases against amniocentesis could be adopting a stance of 
neutrality since the spectre of malpractice and civil action 
suits (such as "wrongful birth" cases [Donovan, 1984]) 
restricts their ability to express negative views about the 
procedure. Thus, unlike the question measuring husband's 
opinions, where a majority (60.0%) of the rejectors' 
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husbands were reported to hold views consistent with the 
woman's behavior, only 8.3% of the rejector's doctors 
reportedly said they didn't think their patient needed 
amniocentesis. Thus, it appears that a doctor's active 
support for amniocentesis, not passive neutrality, will 
exert a large influence on the woman's final decision. 
These different response patterns may merely reflect women's 
bias in perspective, but more probably they suggest that 
this interpretation captures the essence of what transpired 
in these doctor-patient interactions. Women may tend to go 
to medical practitioners who have somewhat similar 
perspectives and, within small communities, perhaps quite 
similar backgrounds. Thus, women who chose not to undergo 
amniocentesis may have had the implicit approval for their 
decision from doctors who were like-minded. In the end, the 
women's reports of their doctors' support and opinion may in 
fact reflect the actual opinions and practice behaviors of 
the medical professionals who are themselves influenced by 
personal attitudes, norms, and concerns about the legal 
implications of their advice. 
Neither support from parents or friends and neighbors 
was significantly related to decision outcome in 
multivariate analysis (although the latter was found to be 
significant in bivariate logistic regression). Possibly the 
questions were too general and added specificity would alter 
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the measured influence of these significant others and 
reference groups to decisions made under conditions of 
reproductive uncertainty. However, irrespective of 
nonsignificant outcomes in multivariate analyses, these two 
questions revealed important information. A large minority 
of women facing difficult decisions regarding pregnancy 
outcomes do not discuss their concerns with others. More 
than a third of the respondents had not talked about their 
decisions with their parents and four in ten elected not to 
confide in friends or neighbors. Without further 
information, it is impossible to ascertain the underlying 
cause for this behavior. It could reflect the personal 
choices of these women who may feel decisions relating to 
reproduction are totally private matters. Or, their 
reticence may signal respondents• perceptions that these 
reference groups and significant others would express 
negative reactions because amniocentesis is still viewed as 
a potential precursor to abortion (Verp and Gerbie, 1981; 
Davies and Doran, 1982). In the United States, where 
abortion has only been legal subsequent to the Roe v. Wade 
Supreme Court decision in 1973, normative sanctions against 
abortion still hold considerable weight. As Bundey (1978) 
noted, in Sweden, where abortion has been legal for more 
than 4 0 years, few women referred for chromosome analysis 
due to increased risk of congenital disease refuse 
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amniocentesis. Whether in time American normative standards 
will likewise accept amniocentesis and, if necessary, 
abortion, and whether this will in turn influence at-risk 
women to seek support for their decisions from a wider 
network of support groups remains to be seen. What is clear 
is that amniocentesis itself and the potential it holds for 
abortion are both new practices in American society for 
which normative standards have not emerged. Indeed, some 
social scientists have found abortion to be viewed as 
"deviant" behavior (Rosen and Martindale, 1980), which could 
then evoke negative reactions from reference groups and 
significant others. It is possible these women were 
defining the situation such that they felt discussing their 
circumstances with others would not afford them emotional 
support, but would possibly exacerbate their own 
uncertainties. 
Another way of interpreting the reticence reported by a 
large number of respondents can be extrapolated from Schulz 
and Rau's (1985) conceptualization of life course events. 
They suggested a typology in which stress-inducing 
situations may be temporally and statistically normative 
(e.g., marriage), temporally nonnormative and statistically 
normative (e.g., becoming widowed at a young age), 
temporally and statistically nonnormative (losing one's 
job), or temporally normative and statistically 
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nonnormative. It is into this latter category that women at 
genetic risk fall. As Schulz and Ran perceived it, 
temporally normative and statistically nonnormative events 
are those that occur within an expected time frame but are 
experienced by relatively few people. They (1985:133) 
noted, "Because such events occur infrequently, neither the 
victim nor the support network acquires the specific 
knowledge and skills that might be useful in coping with the 
event." Thus, the women at genetic risk may simply feel 
that their parents and/or friends and neighbors would not be 
able to offer support or guidance in relation to a 
nonnormative event for which no standards have evolved. 
Lippman-Hand and Eraser's (1979b) work gives this 
interpretation credence. They reported that one-third of 
the women in their qualitative study appeared to be 
searching for a normative standard or comparison group from 
which they could gain guidance. They (1979b;121) quoted one 
woman as asking. 
Are there others like us? What do people do with 
this risk? Do they take the chance? ... We've 
never had to face this kind of thing before, so 
want to know what others say. 
The measure of religious strength appeared to exert no 
direct influence. Rejectors were considerably more likely 
than were acceptors to characterize the strength of their 
religious preference as "very strong" (42.0% vs. 26.6%). 
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However this question may in fact be too general. Despite 
Goettsch's (1984) findings that religious strength in 
general increases opposition to abortion, it may be that 
this measure was unable to differentiate between those whose 
strong religious preference engendered antiabortion norms 
and those whose strong religious preference fostered a 
situation-ethics approach. The more specific question 
relating the influence of religious teachings to abortion, 
on the other hand, demonstrated a highly significant 
relationship in the bivariate analysis and when part of a 
three-variable index, exerted significant direct and 
indirect influence in the multivariate analyses. In the 
future, assessing the impact of religion with 
situation-specific, rather than general, measures may offer 
a more meaningful approach to determining the influence of 
religious reference group norms. 
Women's interpretation of their genetic-risk status and 
chances for complications associated with the procedure all 
proved to be highly significant predictors in bivariate 
analyses. This underscores the necessity for researchers to 
focus on the individuals' perceptions and definitions of the 
situation rather than trying to ascertain why objective, 
statistical probabilities appear to exert so little 
influence on behavioral outcomes. In multivariate analyses, 
when controlled for by other variables in the model, it 
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appears that a woman's estimation of the chance of 
complications she would be willing to accept to undergo 
amniocentesis is by far the most significant "risk 
assessment" predictor of acceptance of amniocentesis. In 
this sample, a remarkably large percentage (52.0%) of the 
rejectors versus none of the acceptors asserted that 
amniocentesis would be acceptable only if there were no 
chance of complications (i.e., no chance of spontaneous 
abortion). This measure is of major importance, and may be 
interpreted as capturing not only the woman's definition of 
the situation but the strength of her motivation as well, in 
that those willing to accept higher risks are apparently 
more strongly motivated to be aware of and perhaps avert the 
possibility of bearing a child with genetic disorders. 
The two interpretation-of-risk measures that were not 
significant in any multivariate analysis suggest that both 
acceptors and rejectors do, in fact, have a fairly accurate 
definition of the situation. Neither acceptors nor 
rejectors assessed their risks of having a child with Down 
as extremely high. Despite the advanced maternal age of the 
majority (78.7%) of respondents, and though the incidence of 
Down syndrome increases dramatically with age, this is a 
fairly accurate perspective. Using Hook and Chambers' 
(1977) estimated risk rates, even the oldest respondent (age 
47) had a 5.0% chance of carrying a fetus with Down, and the 
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rest of the women 35 and older as a group had risk rates 
ranging from 0.3% to 3.1%. Obviously it is a matter of 
interpretation, but an objective appraisal of risks of 5.0% 
or less would suggest that this is, indeed, only a very low 
to moderately low risk, which is where the majority (77.1%) 
of the respondents placed themselves. Similarly, the 
women's estimation of risks of complications was fairly 
accurate, that is, none of the respondents perceived the 
risks associated with amniocentesis to be very high. In 
multivariate analyses, then, because both groups evidence 
similar trends, when controlled for by other more powerful 
measures in the model, these two questions failed to 
demonstrate significant influence on decision outcome. 
The women's perceptions of the test's accuracy in 
diagnosing a fetus with Down syndrome proved to be highly 
significant in the bivariate analysis, somewhat significant 
in subset full sample multivariate analysis, and indirectly 
significant in the final full model analysis. This could be 
expected in that women who chose amniocentesis 
understandably perceived the test to have very high accuracy 
(7 7.4%); in contrast, only 4 6.0% of the rejectors perceived 
the test's accuracy to be very high. While not as strong as 
the other directly-significant risk variable, this measure 
nevertheless would seem to be a useful predictive variable 
for inclusion in future research designs. 
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Finally, that the abortion norms and attitudes index 
proved to be so significant in multivariate analyses 
confirms the prevailing perception that amniocentesis is 
indeed related in many people's belief systems to abortion 
and, further, that attitudes and norms become highly 
relevant in situations where individuals will have to act 
either in conflict or concordance with their personal 
normative structures. Although eliminated from the final 
parsimonious model due to the strength of the other 
variables, the abortion attitude index nevertheless exerted 
considerable, significant indirect influence through what 
the respondent perceives her husband to think and her 
willingness to accept chances of test complications. This 
has a strong intuitive appeal in that attitudes and norms 
causally influence a woman's perceptions about her husband 
and her willingness to accept chances of complications, 
which in turn will directly affect her behavior. Hill's 
(1981) review of attitude-behavior research noted that 
attitudinal and behavioral measures are often unrelated or 
inconsistent as a function of the lack of specificity of the 
attitude measure. That is, general attitudinal reports may 
have little perceived relevance to women facing a highly 
personal decision. However, the index of abortion norms and 
attitudes used here appears to judiciously tap both global 
and situation specific norms, values and attitudes that are 
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perceived to be relevant and in fact do either directly or 
indirectly influence the behavior the woman adopts. This 
measure, then, would seem to be an important index to 
incorporate into future research. 
Limitations of the Study 
While only selective support was found for the four 
detailed hypotheses investigated in this study, the 
underlying conceptual framework is significant and useful. 
There are, however, certain factors that may have influenced 
the outcome. Inasmuch as subjects were drawn from a 
nonrandom sample and largely from residents of Iowa, 
generalizations to other at-risk individuals may be somewhat 
circumscribed. Moreover, despite efforts to combat it, 
problems with multicollinearity may have artificially 
reduced the models, thereby eliminating important factors 
that could exert significant influence on decision outcome. 
Certainly, given a symbolic interactionist framework 
and interpretation, one must remember that responses were 
elicited to structured, forced choice questions. Findings 
thus reflect a finite part of the respondents' 
interpretations of meaning, norms, attitudes, and values. 
Only information that could be tapped within the confines of 
a 3 0-minute period of interaction is available for analysis. 
Qualitative and/or longer-term assessments would probably 
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reveal more complex relationships among factors leading to 
the women's ultimate behavior. 
Rejectors, who were often interviewed in their homes, 
at a less stressful time, and at a slightly later period in 
their pregnancy, may have responded somewhat differently had 
they been interviewed at the same time and in the same place 
as were the majority of acceptors. Inasmuch as subjects 
generally experience a gradual deterioration of recall 
accuracy (Schlesselman, 1982), rejectors' more so than 
acceptors' responses may reflect an element of recall bias, 
which, given their behavioral outcomes, could be colored as 
much by rationalizations for their actions as by their 
recollections of their actual original perceptions. 
Further, as 42.0% of the rejectors received genetic 
counseling and/or information from different physicians than 
did the rest of the sample, the emergent meaning created in 
these doctor-patient interactions may well have been 
different. 
In short, differences in setting, definitions of the 
situation, and the medical professionals with whom the women 
interacted must be taken into consideration. Responses that 
appear to reflect different interpretations of meaning may 
in fact tap situations that were different, in which case 
one would not expect their answers, behaviors, or 
interpretations to be consistent with those in dissimilar 
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counseling situations. Nevertheless, responses from 
acceptors and rejectors suggest basic underlying differences 
in perceptions and significant other influences should be 
replicated in future studies. 
Implications and Applications 
That education and insurance coverage exert indirect 
influence holds only limited implications for change. 
Higher educational status not only to increases the 
likelihood of having insurance but also may affect 
husband-wife definitions of the situation (or, at least, the 
wife's perception of her husband's opinions). In general, 
education represents underlying socioeconomic status 
factors. Altering basic social structures is not a readily 
achievable goal, but at least part of the structural 
constraints could be mitigated either by the provision of 
Medicaid coverage or sliding-fee scales for amniocentesis or 
by an increased awareness that those who want to undergo the 
test will be able to do so irrespective of their ability to 
pay. This would remove the financial barriers that could be 
deterring more widespread acceptance of the procedure. 
The influence doctors exert suggests that efforts 
should be increased to include more medical genetics courses 
in medical school curricula. This would seem to be 
particularly advisable as the post-World-War II generation, 
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many of whom postpone pregnancy until later in life (Thorton 
and Freedman, 1983), enter the increased risk of advanced 
maternal age. A majority of doctors receive negligible 
training in the field of genetics (Sorenson and Culbert, 
1979; Reilly, 1979). As obstetricians, gynecologists, or 
family practitioners are generally the first medical 
professionals with whom prospective parents interact, these 
physicians need to be aware of the genetic factors that 
could adversely affect pregnancy outcome and should have at 
least a rudimentary ability to convey their concerns in such 
a way that patients recognize genetic counseling and 
amniocentesis as possible preventive measures they could 
consider using. 
Perhaps the most practical implication and application 
of the present study centers on acknowledging the importance 
of the counselees' definition of the situation. 
Objectively, acceptors and rejectors had very similar risk 
rates. All received identical information sheets 
delineating their at-risk status and 228 of the respondents 
interacted with the same geneticist and nurse clinician. 
Clearly, however, acceptors chose a different method of 
coping with this information than did rejectors. These 
findings suggest that a spouse and doctor may exert a great 
deal of influence either in reality or at least 
perceptually. Thus, genetic counselors should maintain good 
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communication linkages with practicing physicians throughout 
the area to be sure appropriate referrals are being made. 
Further, efforts to include husbands in genetic counseling 
sessions could result in their gaining first-hand knowledge 
of genetic risks which, according to Emery et al. (1979), 
would at least increase the likelihood that risk 
probabilities would be retained. The extent to which this 
would affect behavior is somewhat in question, but it is 
reasonable to expect an increase in the factual information 
base couples share. 
Abortion attitudes and norms appear to affect 
intervening variables more so than the acceptance or 
rejection of amniocentesis itself. Attitudes and values are 
often derived from group interactions (Fiske and Taylor, 
1984) ; the norms of significant reference groups, on which 
attitudes and values are usually based, constantly, if 
slowly, undergo transitions. According to adoption and 
diffusion theories, this suggests that increased knowledge 
about and utilization of amniocentesis will make it more 
normatively acceptable. For individuals reluctant to 
undertake a new, nonnormative behavior, this change could 
enable them to accept genetic testing. The medical 
community, as a prestigious and powerful social institution, 
could facilitate and promote normative structure changes 
through more media exposure, advocating the use of 
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amniocentesis via documentaries, circulars, and public 
service announcements. 
Second, as antiabortion attitudes may deter some 
eligible clients from seeking amniocentesis, medical 
practitioners should continue to underscore that 
amniocentesis and abortion need not be linked. Once this 
becomes clearly understood, utilization of genetic testing 
could potentially increase. The advantages of this are 
three-fold. First, those who are carrying an affected fetus 
would have more time to prepare emotionally for the child's 
birth. Steinmarc and Wieting (1983) noted that anticipatory 
psychological preparation can play an adaptive role. 
Foreknowledge could perhaps give parents more time to 
develop the coping skills required in caring for a 
handicapped child. Second, once made aware that they are 
carrying an affected fetus, women who previously opposed 
abortion might alter their perspective. This is not to 
suggest abortion is the right choice; rather, the emphasis 
is on the option of choice while alternatives are still 
available. And third, in the vast majority of cases, 
amniocentesis test results provide assurance that the fetus 
is, in fact, normal with respect to the hereditary or 
genetic defects in question. In the present study, only 5 
abnormal fetuses were detected. Thus, for the other 194 
women, amniocentesis provided a sense of reassurance that 
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the child would not have Down syndrome or another disorder 
that could be diagnosed prenatally. 
Finally, genetic counselors need to be conscious that 
perceptions—of risks, of test sensitivity, of 
susceptibility, and of others' reactions—exert a large 
influence on outcomes. Although there is no clear-cut way 
of altering perceptions, some suggestions can be offered. A 
lack of social comparison groups for nonnormative events may 
distort or alter perceptions. Certainly, the statistical 
infreguency of genetic defects places at-risk parents in a 
sort of isolation, sans norms, experience, or role models. 
By bringing together individuals who must deal with the 
reality of their at-risk status, prospective parents may be 
able to put their risks in perspective. These social 
comparison groups could potentially affect the counselees' 
definition of the situation. Learning how others are coping 
with the uncertainties of pregnancy outcomes or the burdens 
of raising children with genetic disorders could provide 
at-risk couples with real-life information that may assist 
them in reaching a decision. Lippman-Hand and Fraser 
(1979b;61) quoted a counselee as saying, "I'd like to meet 
someone else who is [affected]. Have they had children? 
What problems have they had?" Cues for behavior in an 
unanticipated situation could be derived from the reactions 
and responses of other similarly-affected individuals. 
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These social-comparison groups could also evolve into a 
support system that might alleviate some of the tensions, 
anxieties, and concerns related both to the decision and, if 
this option is selected, to the genetic testing procedure 
itself. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
Data in the present study and their interpretation 
represent the perspectives of the at-risk women involved. 
There is no way to ascertain the actual opinions and 
behaviors of the husbands, doctors, parents, friends, or 
neighbors. The research was undertaken with the full 
understanding that the analysis would focus on the woman's 
own "reality," which is an important area to explore. 
However, future research should also endeavor to investigate 
others' perspectives as well. 
The primary way in which genetic counseling research 
should be modified and improved would be the inclusion of 
husbands' responses. Examining perceptions and definitions 
of the situation of both husband and wife could provide very 
useful information. If it were indeed confirmed that 
women's reports of their husbands' opinion were largely 
reliable, this then would provide a useful way of assessing 
both husband-and-wife views of amniocentesis. On the other 
hand, if a basic discrepancy between husband and wife 
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reports exists, genetic counseling studies should always 
include husbands as well as wives to more accurately assess 
the decision-making processes of couples at genetic risk. 
This suggestion is not without recognized problems. 
The obstacles that most readily come to mind are financial 
and time constraints. Analysis of data from more than one 
family member significantly increases both cost and 
complexity of a study. More time is required to arrange for 
interviews with the husband as well as the wife. If 
interviews are conducted in the home, having two 
interviewers would probably be advisable; thus, personnel 
costs could also escalate. Understandably, many researchers 
elect to interview the most accessible family respondents 
which, despite an increase in female employment, is still 
generally the wife. 
However, a more salient and perhaps less remediable 
problem would need to be addressed. Ever since 
Safilios-Rothschild (1969:290) railed against the 
pervasiveness of "wives' family sociology," researchers 
exploring dyadic marital relationships have attempted to 
solicit information from both husbands and wives. The 
present research was in fact proposed with the intention of 
gathering information from both spouses so analyses of 
husbands' and wives' responses could be explored. It soon 
became apparent, however, that interviewing male subjects 
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was highly problematic. 
The majority of individuals who attended the Genetic 
Clinic during the sampling time frame were the pregnant 
women themselves. Though most were married (in the present 
sample where such information is available, 91.6% were 
married and living with their spouse), women generally came 
in alone for genetic counseling. Most of these women 
undoubtedly relayed the information they received during 
counseling to their husbands. But this creates the 
confounding factor that husbands• opinions evolved based on 
how their wives presented the information, a presentation 
that would inevitably reflect the woman's definition of the 
situation. Thus, had more men been interviewed, 
husband-wife responses may have been "artificially" 
consonant since the meaning that emerged from their joint 
interactions would be predicated only on the wife's 
interpretations of the genetic risk information she had 
received. 
In addition to these methodological and theoretical 
concerns, men's failure to attend genetic counseling simply 
made them less accessible to being interviewed. The 
principal investigator's annual progress reports repeatedly 
noted the difficulties interviewers were experiencing in 
obtaining male respondents. At the end of the two-year 
interview period, only 51 husbands of the 199 acceptors had 
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been solicited for participation. Far more problematic were 
the husbands of rejectors. Only 9 agreed to be interviewed. 
Thus, while one can readily point out the necessity of 
including husbands in reproductive decision studies, 
clearly, this is not so easily implemented in real-life 
situations. 
Another, and probably more feasible, way in which 
future research could be improved revolves around the 
questions themselves. Much of the literature refers to the 
threat to identity people at genetic risk experience when 
confronted with this information (Corgan, 1979). Others 
have mentioned feelings of shame, guilt, and stigmatization 
of a carrier (Kessler et al., 1984; Tishler, 1981; Kenen and 
Schmidt, 1978). In future research, more salient, 
situation-specific questions, including self-perception 
measures, should be incorporated. 
As with most research, it would be ideal to have 
prospective measures of the individual's sense of self 
before at-risk status was known so the measures could 
accurately gauge the extent to which reception of at-risk 
information affected the individual's self-image. Drawing 
upon the "decision tree" specified in Figure 1, it would 
also be useful to ascertain changes is self-perceptions as 
individuals pass through each of the stages where decisions 
and choices can be made. Examination of at-risk individuals 
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over a longer period of time would offer the potential of 
testing Goffman's (1963) concept of a "spoiled identity." 
Research could determine whether at-risk status does, 
indeed, affect self-image and, if so, for how long. For 
instance, would women feel stigmatized just in relation to 
their current pregnancy, during the full scope of their 
reproductive years, or would this carry over into other 
facets of self-image which would in turn have a longstanding 
impact by significantly altering the woman's self identity. 
It might be speculated that the latter would be true. 
Certainly, Kenen and Schmidt (1978) believed this to be the 
case. Female role socialization may exert considerable 
influence in this respect. Rhetoric regarding women's 
changing roles and the reality of increased participation in 
nondomestic spheres of life notwithstanding, the importance 
of childbearing to women's concept of self cannot be 
negated. Research continues to indicate that for many 
women, the ability to have children—and this implies 
healthy, normal children—is still a very strongly-held 
value. Straits (1985), for instance, found that 
middle-class college women believed commitment to motherhood 
should take precedence over career aspirations if the two 
were in conflict. Straits (1985:594) concluded that 
"lifestyle values are much more traditional than one would 
expect based on journalistic accounts of changes in young 
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women's career and reproductive intentions." How at-risk 
status would affect long-term evaluations of self, 
expectations, values, and behavior is an area that needs to 
be examined. 
Conclusions 
In many respects, amniocentesis offers prospective 
parents a means whereby they can exert an element of control 
in planning their families. Placing the importance of 
genetic screening in perspective, Galjaard (1979) noted that 
in modern countries, where improved hygiene, sanitation, 
socioeconomic status, and medical care have eliminated most 
fatal infectious childhood diseases, congenital 
malformations and genetic disease have currently become the 
most common cause of infant mortality and morbidity. This 
is not the only impetus for an increased interest in 
amniocentesis, however. Galjaard (1979:343) explained: 
Other reasons are the decreasing family size, the 
increasing independence of women, the availability 
of new methods of diagnosis and prevention, and the 
increasing costs of optimal medical and social care 
of the handicapped. 
Amniocentesis also has the potential to reduce the 
number of parents facing the enormous emotional and 
financial burden of caring for a seriously disabled child. 
Factors that relate to its utilization among genetically 
at-risk individuals would then seem a worthwhile goal. It 
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is hoped this study will further the exploration and 
application of amniocentesis towards that end. 
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EPILOGUE 
In 1957, Straus suggested that medical sociology had 
become divided into two separate but closely related areas: 
sociology in medicine and sociology of medicine. He 
characterized the differences in terms of the perspectives 
employed by each group. Sociologists in medicine, he noted, 
were motivated by medical rather than sociological problems, 
and used applied, often atheoretical methods and analyses to 
investigate the research question at hand. The origin of 
health disorders, often in relation to sociostructural 
variables, was the focus of the research and the audience or 
clients were usually medical professionals themselves or 
larger governmental agencies such as the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services. Guided by the priorities of the 
health-care perspective and frequently funded by 
nonsociological sources, the medical sociologist's objective 
was to investigate areas that would have direct 
applicability to patient care, public health, and 
governmental policies. 
Sociologists of medicine, in contrast, more often 
relied on a sociological, theory-driven perspective to 
analyze and explain the social processes that take place 
within medical environs. They examined the organization. 
190 
roles, norms, values, and beliefs of medical settings, 
expecting their research to further their discipline's 
understanding of social life in general. 
Cockerham (1986), among others in medical sociology, no 
longer believes these distinctions are useful. He (1986:2) 
noted that 
contemporary medical sociologists are less 
concerned with whether or not a piece of work 
is in the sociology of medicine or sociology in 
medicine, but rather with how much it increases 
our understanding of the complex relationship 
between social factors and health. 
The previous five chapters have taken the latter view, 
attempting to isolate factors that explain facets of 
consumer behavior within a medical setting. However, 
embracing the fusion of the two disciplines as if they were 
one tends to obscure some fundamental differences between 
medical and sociological perspectives. Further, while the 
hybrid has proven to be advantageous to both professional 
communities, periodically it is advisable to assess what is 
happening here (as did Emerson [1970]) from a sociological 
perspective. Rosengren (1980:111) asserted, "...medicine 
and social science differ in profound organizational and 
metatheoretical ways." Within this epilogue, some of these 
differences will be explored. 
The first section will critically appraise the merit of 
the research question of the present dissertation within the 
context of the real world. The impact medical technologies 
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exert on society as a whole and on specific individuals 
exposed to these medical procedures will be examined. 
Within the second section, some of the ways in which the 
practices, methods, and interpretations of research problems 
differ between medical and sociological practitioners will 
be delineated. In the final section, conclusions about the 
future of medical sociology will be discussed. 
The Research Question 
The impact of genetic diagnostic procedures can 
potentially affect not only the individuals involved but 
larger social institutions as well. Although there are 
numerous aspects that could be developed, two major areas 
relating to the social consequences of this new medical 
procedure will be outlined. 
Bioethics 
The necessity for and importance of sociological 
participation in examining the social and ethical 
implications of advanced medical technology cannot be 
underestimated. In an era when surrogate motherhood, 
recombinant DNA genetic engineering, and organ transplants 
are technological realities, it is essential that social 
scientists become involved in delineating the sociological 
consequences these progressive techniques may exert on 
individuals and the society. Yet, as Fox (1979) pointed 
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out, sociologists to date have made only limited 
contributions to the examination of these important issues. 
She (1979:423) noted, "Most sociologists have not chosen to 
concentrate on the kinds of problems with which bioethics is 
concerned and are unaware...of its potential sociocultural 
import." Fox suggested several reasons for this lack of 
sociological input: sociologists may feel these questions 
are best left to cultural anthropologists; they may hold 
ideological convictions that work against defending or 
analyzing supposedly entrenched, conservative values and 
beliefs; or they simply may not have the training or 
expertise required. Speaking to the last concern, Fox 
(1979:424) expressed her belief that 
some ability to handle the relationship between 
sociological variables...and biological, 
biomedical, philosophical, theological, and/or 
legal variables...is requisite. 
This would suggest a broader, more interdisciplinary 
approach to sociological training than is usually practiced 
in colleges and universities. Finally, the field of 
bioethics has not enthusiastically welcomed the few 
sociologists who have tried to become involved. Fox 
(1979:42 4) charged that the gatekeepers of this emerging 
discipline, generally composed of philosophers, theologians, 
biologists, and lawyers, perceive sociologists as too 
"scientific" and "insufficiently humanistic." 
Despite these barriers, sociologists should, and almost 
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inevitably will, become involved in these bioethical 
discussions, if for no other reason because they are 
integrally involved in research centering on medical 
technological applications. As Gibson (1983) noted, at 
least a third of the professionals within health 
associations are sociologists. Thus, sociologists are not 
only observers of but participants in these new medical 
experiments. 
Technological advances often hold dual potentials. 
Amniocentesis is a boon to parents who wish to avoid bearing 
physically or mentally disabled off-spring. When used to 
this end by individuals who want to exert some control over 
their reproductive chances, the development of prenatal 
screening would seem to be a social good. Accordingly, the 
research question examined here—identifying factors that 
relate to acceptance or rejection of amniocentesis—is 
beneficial to the extent that efforts to modify prospective 
parents' access to, knowledge of, social support for, and 
perceptions of risk attendant to amniocentesis could 
increase the utilization of this service. There is evidence 
to suggest this medical tool is also being used for goals 
that may be perceived as socially or ethically questionable, 
however. Jeffery et al. (1984), for example, noted that in 
India, where male rather than female children are highly 
desirable, amniocentesis is being used as a technologically 
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"condoned" form of infanticide; pregnant women who learn 
that their baby is female may abort the child. The 
prevalence with which prenatal screening has been used to 
avoid giving birth to female children has prompted some 
medical practitioners in India to suggest the banning of the 
procedure entirely. Nor is abortion due to sex preference 
confined to a particular culture. To the contrary, Elliott 
(1979) found that while not commonplace, the request for 
amniocentesis to choose the sex of a child has been 
encountered by physicians in every major medical center in 
the United States. Elliott predicted this practice will 
become even more prevalent as population pressures increase 
and the public becomes more aware of this potential service. 
- In addition to the use of amniocentesis to select the 
preferred sex of a child, the procedure has also been 
requested by some parents in an attempt to screen out any 
and all genetic defects. Redmon (1981) noted the value 
conflicts experienced by genetic counselors who interact 
with clients wanting amniocentesis and, if necessary, 
abortions for relatively minor and currently remediable 
conditions. 
Problems relating to these questionable requests for 
abortion and amniocentesis cover three major areas. First, 
the social consequences of sex selection are indeterminate. 
In societies where female status is very low, the use of 
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amniocentesis to abort female fetuses could create major 
sex-ratio imbalances. In the United States, sex selection 
probably would be less likely to produce seriously 
unbalanced male-female ratios, although Coombs (1977) found 
that the majority of women preferred a son to a daughter and 
were more likely to desire one sex than to have an equal 
number of boys and girls. However, Westoff and Rindfuss 
(1974) had noted that most couples preferred having a male 
child first, female second. How the long-range consequences 
of sex-related genetic engineering would affect social 
institutions is a question that requires the exploration of 
sociologists and should be considered before amniocentesis 
is widely advocated and accepted. For example, will the 
status of female children be further jeopardized in society 
and, if usually second-born, will they have less economic 
and emotional support from their parents than that enjoyed 
by a first-born male child. 
Second, sociological investigation into the 
consequences of seeking amniocentesis for sex selection and 
for minor as well as major defects should also be undertaken 
in relation to how these requests affect the medical 
practitioners involved. The dilemma is complicated by the 
fact that genetic counseling and "therapeutic" abortion are 
advocated by geneticists and physicians in situations where 
prospective parents have a high risk for producing children 
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affected with serious life-threatening and/or disabling 
diseases. However, are the known risks associated with 
amniocentesis (0.2% to 1.5% likelihood of miscarriage 
[Cruikshank et al., 1983]) justified in view of parents' 
desire to have the procedure, whether for severe genetic 
risk, mild, correctable anomalies, or preference for a 
certain sex? Further, when trying to assess the social good 
of avoiding the birth of a seriously-affected child, at what 
point can a distinction be made between quality of life 
potentials for genetically-affected individuals? As Emery 
et al. (1979) noted, prospective parents with conditions 
perceived as debilitating by "normal" people may, in fact, 
feel that bearing a child with a similar disease is 
perfectly acceptable. Perceptions of parents who have a 
genetically-affected child are also at variance with popular 
conceptions of what types of diseases are to be avoided. 
Elkins et al. (1986), for example, found that among women 
requesting amniocentesis who already had given birth to a 
Down syndrome child, only 25.0% said they would consider 
undergoing an abortion should the test be positive. This, 
Elkins et al. (1986:183) asserted, is indicative of "a 
failure to recognize the generally positive response of 
women to their children with Down syndrome." Finally, as 
Reynolds et al. (1974) noted, genetic screening is not 
advocated for potentially serious diseases such as diabetes 
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or heart conditions, which suggests that some diseases are 
more socially acceptable than others, and that doctors and 
geneticists counseling prospective patients very often rely 
on personal value judgments and socially-defined norms to 
determine whether a particular genetic malformation would 
warrant the termination of a pregnancy. 
Given these complexities, it becomes imperative for 
sociologists working within genetic counseling situations to 
be aware of the possible consequences attendant to their 
participation in research. If amniocentesis and abortion 
are held to be morally acceptable from a societal 
perspective in some cases and not in others, at what point 
can or should physicians and genetic counselors interject 
their personal values into the procedure? Since Roe v. Wade 
(1973), there are no legal barriers behind which the medical 
community can hide. To the contrary, the increasing numbers 
of "wrongful life" suits point to the necessity for medical 
practitioners to provide "accurate, appropriate genetic 
counseling, diagnosis, and testing" upon request (Hecht, 
1983:98); Donovan (1984:69) underscored this by noting that 
the Supreme Court's decision ensures a person's 
"constitutional right to decide whether or not to have a 
child and that this right includes the right...to terminate 
a pregnancy by abortion." Physicians and medical 
institutions that view a request for amniocentesis as 
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"frivolous" (e.g., avoiding the birth of a girl) are 
potentially faced with lawsuits. How this legal reality 
affects the prevalence of genetic counseling and diagnosis 
and the actions of the medical personnel involved requires 
the investigation of sociological researchers. 
Perhaps most importantly, sociologists need to 
investigate how the availability of this diagnostic 
procedure is dispersed throughout the social structure. 
Preliminary research suggests that amniocentesis is more 
readily used by higher socioeconomic groups. It is 
incumbent upon sociologists to ascertain whether these 
socioeconomic differences are due to financial or 
educational barriers or a lack of medical facilities 
accessible to lower status groups. Inequalities in access 
to genetic screening may, in fact, be yet another indication 
of a society ridden with inequalities of class, race, and 
gender (Burke and Kolker, 1984). Further, sociologists need 
to determine whether the incidence of higher socioeconomic 
groups demanding amniocentesis for sex-selection or to 
reduce maternal anxiety is thereby reducing the availability 
of the services to lower socioeconomic groups that may need 
prenatal diagnosis for detecting major debilitating 
conditions. 
Sociologists can explore the ethics, goals, and 
consequences of this technological intervention (Kelman and 
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Warwick, 1978). By attempting to objectively examine 
empirical evidence, irrespective of their personal values or 
biases (Gouldner, 1968), they can ascertain whether genetic 
testing and abortion are being unduly advocated by genetic 
counselors and legislators for certain groups of clients 
over and above other groups. For instance, due to a lack of 
understanding about the distinction between sickle cell 
carrier status and the disease itself, many states in the 
1970s rushed to pass laws mandating the screening of blacks 
for the disease, using the information to bar affected 
blacks from educational or employment opportunities 
(Fletcher, 1981). Goodman and Goodman (1982:20) suggested 
that Jews are often the target of "overselling of genetic 
anxiety" in which massive genetic screening programs have 
been undertaken to avoid the incidence of Tay-Sachs disease. 
Besides discriminating against certain groups, genetic 
screening also holds the possibility for invading the 
privacy and labeling or stigmatizing individuals who have 
are found to have a potentially damaging genetic trait 
(Goerth, 1983; Murray, 1983). 
In summary, sociologists working in research that 
explores means of increasing the acceptance of genetic 
testing must also be aware that the procedure has a dual 
potential. Amniocentesis can provide concerned parents with 
a relatively safe method for reducing their likelihood of 
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producing a seriously disabled child. At the same time, the 
procedure can be used for altering sex ratios, reducing the 
number of individuals with relatively minor genetic 
diseases, placing some medical practices and practitioners 
into roles they perceive as morally untenable, and 
contributing to inequalities in the present social system. 
Medicalization of pregnancy 
In addition to the emergence of numerous bioethical 
issues related to amniocentesis, there are indications that 
the procedure exerts pressures on individuals in the 
planning of their families as well. Cockerham (1986:11) 
pointed out that "medicine is both a solution and a cause of 
many social and individual problems." There are few areas 
of life not touched by medical practices or opinions. 
According to some medical sociologists (Twaddle, 1969, 1973; 
Freidson, 1970), medicine is actually an institution that is 
concerned with controlling deviance, which within the 
medical community is a synonym for illness. Szasz 
(1974:44-45) noted that over time, more and more functions 
and behaviors were classified as illness by medical 
communities until doctors "...began to call 
'illness "... anything and everything in which they could 
detect any sign of malfunctioning...no matter what the 
norm." 
Applying this perspective within the context of the 
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current study, the prevalence and advocacy of genetic 
diagnosis has the potential for, and in fact has already 
begun, expanding the extent to which medical and 
technological practices control the lives of prospective 
parents. Rothman (1983) suggested that the increased use of 
amniocentesis has culminated in the direct intrusion of 
technology and larger social institutions into the personal, 
individual domains of pregnancy and childbirth. Wertz and 
Wertz (1977) have likewise expressed concern that the 
widespread use of amniocentesis not only holds the potential 
for endangering the health of mothers and babies, but also 
tends to alienate women from their own pregnancy and 
childbirth, making it a medical rather than personal event. 
Feminist sociologists have described the consequence of 
this medical expansion into heretofore private domains (Fox, 
1979). Some of them perceive this intrusion as an attempt 
to take away the mystery and female powers attached to 
procreation with the goal of turning pregnancy into a 
male-dominated arena. Reissman and Nathanson (1986) have 
described the way in which the "management of reproduction" 
has come about by a social construction of risks and 
responsibilities attendant to childbirth. They noted that 
medical science defines pregnancy as a "problem," using such 
terms as "low-risk" and "high risk" to characterize a 
naturally-occurring event, and thereby equating it to 
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disease. Following from this premise that all 
pregnancies in some way include "problems," the medical 
community can then offer the "solution." In the case of 
prenatal diagnosis, the medical answer is the advocacy of 
widespread genetic screening for individuals with 
"high-risk" pregnancies. 
There are two major concerns regarding the 
medicalization of pregnancy. First, the dominant 
perspective of the medical community pervades the lives and 
beliefs of prospective parents. The rhetoric of geneticists 
and physicians suggests that medical progress in the form of 
amniocentesis offers women a choice. Most clinics openly 
express the conviction that amniocentesis should be 
available to anyone who requests it, regardless of whether 
that individual believes she would undergo an abortion in 
the event a defective fetus was detected. In reality, 
however, genetic screening would very shortly cease to exist 
and funding would not be forthcoming for studies if the 
majority of women undergoing amniocentesis did not, in fact, 
use the information to abort genetically-affected babies. 
The genetic counseling paradigm continues to extol the 
virtue of preventive techniques. Terris (1979:95), for 
instance, noted that screening tests should be relatively 
cheap, easy to do, have high specificity and sensitivity, 
and "should be done only if the disease they uncover can be 
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treated effectively." To doctors, given the current state 
of technology, the only "cure" for a genetic disease in an 
abnormal fetus is abortion. The medical community talks 
about a prolife bonus attached to amniocentesis, expressing 
the view that women who might formerly have abandoned the 
hope of bearing a child will now become pregnant with the 
anticipation that prenatal diagnosis will allow them to 
abort a genetically-affected fetus (Roghmann and Doherty, 
1983). The perspective that this represents a "cure," 
however, is diametrically opposed to the perception held by 
individuals who view life as beginning at the moment of 
conception and who believe abortion is morally wrong. The 
prospect of engaging in a procedure that tacitly condones 
abortion is unconscionable to these individuals. Even 
prospective parents who have fewer moral or ethical 
objections nevertheless react to the technological procedure 
with a wide range of generally negative emotional responses. 
How the medicalization of pregnancy affects the women 
involved has been the focus of several studies. Phipps and 
Zinn (1986a,b), Fava et al. (1983), and Antley (1977), for 
instance, demonstrated that women undergoing amniocentesis 
experience anger, hostility, depression, and anxiety. 
Lippraan-Hand and Fraser (1979b:61) revealed the extent to 
which counselees are torn by the conflict between their 
personal desire to have a child and their concern about the 
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information geneticists have imparted to them, quoting a 
patient as saying, 
I don't know how the medical profession expects us 
to react and behave in this situation...! don't 
want to go ahead...and have everyone, the doctors 
basically, shaking their heads and saying, "What a 
fool, doesn't she know this isn't done?" 
Silvestre and Fresco (1980:617) similarly noted that 
women in their study tended to perceive the doctor 
performing the amniocentesis as "holding the power to permit 
or prevent their child's being brought into the world." 
Desperately wanting to have a baby, they feel they have to 
rely on medical professionals who "closely intervene in the 
manufacturing and validating of their child" (Silvestre and 
Fresco, 1980:617). 
Ironically, this sense of loss of control over a 
formerly personal event may be amplified, albeit 
unintentionally, by genetic ciôunselors who stress the 
"chance" nature of the occurrence of genetic defects. The 
motivation of the counselor is largely that of removing a 
sense of guilt from the perceptions of the prospective 
parents involved. The consequence, however, is that the 
counselee experiences this information as a further loss of 
control over the situation (Lippman-Hand and Fraser, 1979b). 
A parallel may be drawn with attribution research exploring 
the beneficial effect of perceived behavioral control on 
individuals' coping abilities. As Bulman and Wortman (1977) 
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and Janoff-Bulman (1979) noted, behavioral self-blame gives 
an individual the impression s/he can exert control over the 
outcome of negative experiences in the future. For 
prospective parents, the explanation of the "chance" 
incidence of genetic defects implies that they cannot affect 
what will happen. Thus, women at genetic risk must, to some 
extent, relinquish control over the outcome of a pregnancy 
to highly skilled medical professionals. At this time, 
prenatal diagnosis, in conjunction with the willingness to 
undergo an abortion if necessary, is the only means 
available to improve their chance of avoiding the birth of a 
genetically-affected child; it in no way guarantees that the 
child will, indeed, be healthy or that future children will 
be normal. 
In addition to forcing prospective parents to submit to 
the control and intervention of medical practitioners, 
amniocentesis places a further emotional burden on the 
individuals involved. First, because the procedure is best 
performed between the 15th and 18th weeks of pregnancy, the 
mother has already experienced the presence of her unborn 
child as a very real entity. Often, the fetus has started 
moving, and the pregnant mother has felt and responded to 
the life growing within her. Moreover, since amniocentesis 
is done in tandem with ultrasounds, prospective parents can 
view the unborn child in the form of sonogram images. 
206 
Although somewhat indistinct, these pictures add to the 
recognition that the unborn fetus is a living being. The 
"bonding" that takes place between mother and child due to 
these procedures makes the prospect of abortion even more 
difficult (Brewster, 1984). Finally, the anxiety of the 
whole process is further exacerbated by the waiting period, 
which can extend from two-and-one-half weeks up to six 
weeks, adding to the difficulty women encounter when 
contemplating the abortion of their unborn child should the 
tests come back positive (Burke and Kolker, 1984). 
These findings suggest that while genetic screening has 
the potential for relieving the concerns of prospective 
parents, there is at the same time a strong possibility that 
pregnant mothers will feel powerless, experience high levels 
of stress, and will respond with feelings of deep resentment 
toward the intrusion of technological and medical < > 
practitioners into the normatively anticipated "natural" 
progression of conception into pregnancy, and to the 
delivery of a child who is expected to be normal. In 
effect, this medical advance has permitted the consolidation 
of control the medical establishment exercises over areas 
that were formerly personal, private domains. 
The ways in which amniocentesis can undermine the 
emotional security and sense of control among the 
prospective parents has begun to be the focus of medical 
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sociology research. What is less well understood is the 
long-range impact this procedure will exert on social norms 
and expectations. Rothman (1983:8) stated that "prenatal 
diagnosis presents an...example of the phenomenon of 
cultural lag; the technological progress of the past ten 
years has not been matched by social research." 
Specifically, social scientists need to examine the effect 
increasing advocacy and utilization of genetic diagnostic 
tests may have on social norms. Amniocentesis could 
conceivably become incorporated into the social structure as 
a socially-desirable practice. Promoters of the procedure 
have noted the huge financial savings that would accrue from 
the widespread use of amniocentesis. Saul et al. (1980) 
calculated that expenses related to performing 100 
amniocenteses, in which three abnormal results were 
obtained, would come to $65,000, whereas the cost of 
lifetime care for one seriously-disabled individual could 
average $500,000. It is important to note that in their 
calculations of costs for performing 100 amniocenteses with 
three abnormal results they included the expense of three 
abortions. Cost analyses of this nature clearly represent 
the deterrence of bearing a genetically-affected child as 
unquestionably desirable from an economic standpoint, 
thereby removing the focus from the personal to the social 
good realm (Kessler, 1980). Lorenz et al. (1985:935) 
208 
similarly concluded that "the most cost-effective model for 
pregnancies in women over 35 is 100% utilization of genetic 
amniocentesis and termination of all affected pregnancies." 
They acknowledged, however, that the prospective client of 
amniocentesis may view the whole process in less 
financially-pragmatic terms. 
Meanwhile, Crandall et al. (1986) and others have 
suggested that the procedure should not be relegated to 
women 35 and older, but should be advocated for younger 
pregnant women as well. If amniocentesis increasingly 
becomes the norm and is viewed as socially desirable, what 
will be the social consequences for an individual who, 
because of strong personal moral objections to abortion or 
an overriding desire to have a child, refuses to undergo the 
test? Will the parent then been held accountable for the 
care of the child should it have mental or physical 
disabilities that could have been detected and "eliminated" 
before birth? Will parents of genetically-affected children 
become bereft of social comforts and aid, or suffer the 
curtailment of financial assistance because they didn't take 
the "appropriate" preventive action? Will they be further 
stigmatized because fewer parents will be facing the same 
difficulty of coping with the burden of a physically or 
mentally handicapped child? 
If social pressures prevail and most at-risk couples 
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undergo genetic screening and abort an affected fetus, this 
further reduces the chance that they will be able to produce 
"normal" offspring. With each subsequent attempt, the 
parents will be older (which means at higher genetic risk) 
and may be less able to conceive, since fecundity has been 
shown to decrease with advanced maternal age (Menken et al., 
1986). In addition, because they have already conceived a 
genetically-affected child, risk rates are recalculated 
accordingly. For example, a couple may initially be 
assessed as having a 1.0% risk; after the birth or abortion 
of an affected child, their known risk increases to 
3.0-5.0%; after the birth or abortion of a third 
genetically-affected child, the couple's risk is calculated 
at 10.0-12.0% (Carter and Roberts, 1967). 
At what point, then, will society "allow" parents to 
risk continuing a pregnancy in which an affected fetus has 
been diagnosed, given the couple's hope that the 
manifestation of the disease in their child will be 
manageable and perhaps, eventually, correctable when further 
technological developments occur? Just because an advanced 
technology exists, does it mean people are obliged to use 
it? The question becomes even more salient in light of the 
fact that approximately 45.0% of the Down syndrome fetuses 
detected prenatally would, in fact, have never been born; 
Hook (1978) estimated that nearly half of these pregnancies 
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end in spontaneous miscarriage—an event prospective parents 
find difficult, but which doesn't entail the anxiety, guilt, 
or shame associated with the intentional termination of a 
pregnancy due to results obtained from amniocentesis. 
Sociologists need to be in the forefront of assessing 
the social consequences of increased medicalization of 
pregnancy. They should attempt to forecast the extent to 
which social control exerted by medical technology will be 
incorporated into the normative mainstream—and, in so 
doing, address the possible consequences these normative 
pressures and sanctions may exert on the at-risk parents 
involved. 
Freeman (1983) noted that many sociologists working 
within applied sectors are motivated by the hope that they 
could contribute to the good of society. He (1983:25) 
cautioned, however, that 
[w]e cannot expect that the sheer brilliance of 
our ideas, the scientific weight of our data, or 
the charisma of our personalities will overcome 
social forces moving in a direction contrary to 
our values. On the other hand, if we understand 
social trends and diagnose needs and 
opportunities arising out of changing conditions, 
we can make small but significant contributions 
to human welfare. 
Insofar as medical sociologists are in a position to 
examine the social forces surrounding the advent of prenatal 
diagnosis, it is important that they contribute their 
perspective and knowledge to the growing body of bioethical 
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literature. Further, as social scientists are accustomed to 
exploring the impact of social institutions and social norms 
on individuals, it is essential that they begin to analyze 
both beneficial and negative consequences attendant to the 
proliferation of amniocentesis for prenatal diagnosis. 
Practices, Methods, and Perspectives 
Although sociologists and medical practitioners have 
been able to collaborate on fairly extensive research, this 
does not imply that the two disciplines have mutually 
interchangeable perspectives, practices, and theories. The 
current dissertation was undertaken with the cooperation of 
a physician who is also an epidemiologist. As Cockerham 
(1986:14) defined it, epidemiology currently is "concerned 
with exploring human ecology as it relates to the health of 
human beings and their environment." To the extent that 
epidemiologists are somewhat more closely related to social 
scientists in their methods and perspectives than are many 
medical practitioners, the disparity between the two 
disciplines was considerably reduced. Had this research 
been implemented by one of the more "traditional" divisions 
of medicine, this dissertation may have consisted of trying 
to extrapolate generalizations from the findings of 
laboratories, petri dishes, or experimental designs in an 
attempt to apply these results to real-world situations. 
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Fortunately, given the emphasis of an epidemiologist's 
training, the current study was employed with the objective 
of examining a variety of social-psychological as well as 
demographic factors as they affect individuals seeking or 
rejecting amniocentesis. Despite this mutually-advantageous 
collaboration between sociological and epidemiological 
perspectives, there are certain trends that prevail in 
medical research that do not obtain as frequently in 
sociological studies. 
Data collection/sampling 
Perhaps the most tangible difference between 
sociological and medical research techniques can be seen in 
the selection of participants or respondents for 
investigation. Epidemiological research tends to sample 
from available populations. Particularly when researching a 
certain disease or a fairly rare health condition, it is 
difficult to employ random sampling techniques. It would 
generally require a massive number of contacts to find a 
reasonable number of respondents who evidenced the medical 
problem being studied. In the United States today, three of 
every 100 babies are born with serious genetic defects 
(Adler, 1987b). The incidence of Down syndrome in the 
general population is one in 121. In the current study, had 
a random sample been undertaken, it would have required 
contacting at least 8,300 females to obtain a sample size of 
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249 genetically at-risk women. To study Down syndrome 
exclusively, independent of age, 30,129 women would have to 
be interviewed before a sample size comparable to the one in 
the present study could have been identified. When medical 
or epidemiological studies investigate more prevalent 
diseases or behaviors, such as cancer or smoking, a 
potential exists for conducting a random sample in which 
sufficient numbers of people at risk for the problem being 
studied might be identified. However, medical researchers 
largely rely on the already diagnosed population at hand. 
In this study, 228 women were fairly easily identified 
and solicited for participation in the study because of 
their referral to the genetic clinic at the University of 
Iowa Hospitals and Clinics. However, recruiting the 
additional 21 women who refused to undergo amniocentesis 
required considerably more effort. Letters were twice sent 
to all practicing obstetricians and gynecologists in the 
state of Iowa. This reliance on the cooperation of medical 
practitioners not involved in the study presented problems 
of bias over which the researchers could exert no control. 
There was no way to assess the extent to which eligible 
patients were told about the study but refused to 
participate. Nor was there any concrete method for 
determining the extent to which the cooperating 
obstetricians and gynecologists selectively asked their 
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patients if they would be willing to participate in the 
study. Thus, this study, as with much medical research, 
relied on accessibility and availability rather than random 
samples. The lack of a truly random sample must then be 
taken into account when making generalizations about the 
findings. This is not to suggest that sociologists base 
their predictions and estimations solely on information 
gained from random samples. However, in general, medical 
researchers are more often forced to rely on nonrandom 
samples than are social scientists. 
The manner in which participants are solicited for 
inclusion in a study also suggests a distinction between 
sociological and medical research. The foci of medical 
studies are health and disease as they are manifested in the 
general population. Again, however, because of financial 
and time constraints, medical researchers tend to approach 
"captive" patients who are already experiencing the 
condition in question to conduct their research. How 
respondents react to being asked deeply personal and probing 
questions that are presented to them during very stressful 
periods in their life cannot be fully measured. However, 
Hawkins (1958) suggested that ill people and especially 
those who are hospitalized tend to give socially desirable 
or incomplete answers and are often too irritable or unable 
to respond with truly reliable answers. While not captives 
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to the extent that inpatient respondents are, respondents in 
this study were nevertheless interviewed at a time when they 
were dealing with considerable anxiety or stress relating to 
the outcome of their pregnancy. 
Sociologists have similarly studied people during very 
personal, private, or painful times in their lives (e.g., 
Lopata, 1973). However, research exploring grief attached 
to the death of a loved one, asking questions about intimate 
sexual practices, or probing to learn more about the burdens 
associated with caring for a disabled child is far from the 
norm. 
The acquiescence of potential subjects solicited for 
participation as they keep medical appointments or are 
hospitalized points to yet another difference between 
medical and sociological research. Patients who are asked 
to cooperate with a medical researcher are always expressly 
informed of their rights; they have the right to refuse to 
be a respondent, the right to decline to answer any question 
they object to, and the right to withdraw at anytime. They 
are also assured that their answers will be treated in 
strictest confidence and that their participation or refusal 
to participate will in no way affect their medical care or 
treatment. On the surface, this would appear to afford 
ample opportunity for individuals to refuse; in reality, 
subjects who are physically and/or emotionally distressed 
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have less ability to decline. Those who still require 
medical services may feel pressured into participating for 
fear of negative reactions from health professionals for 
their refusal to cooperate with the researcher. Finally, 
because contacts are frequently made in face-to-face 
situations, patients will often comply with the request to 
participate despite their inherent reluctance to do so. 
There is, then, a subtle coercive force at work in many 
medical research projects. 
In contrast, sociological researchers frequently rely 
on telephone or mail surveys. In the former, persons asked 
for their cooperation have fewer compunctions about turning 
down the request of an unknown, invisible researcher with 
whom they will probably never have interpersonal contact. 
Far more so, mail questionnaires can be summarily ignored. 
Even in face-to-face contacts, potential respondents would 
not be concerned that the researcher could somehow create 
problems for the individual who needed assistance in 
health-related matters. Those approached for participation 
in sociological studies are thus freer both physically and 
psychologically to refuse to comply with the researcher's 
requests. 
Another reason medical researchers may have more 
opportunity to solicit the participation of potential 
subjects hinges on the credibility and legitimacy with which 
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their research is perceived, not only by patients but often 
by the general populace as well. Despite recent social 
trends evidencing the reduction of prestige and authority 
accorded them, medical practitioners are still viewed with a 
considerable amount of respect. Research that purports to 
find new treatments or improve health conditions is 
generally regarded as worthwhile and potentially useful to 
the patient involved. In comparison, sociological research 
is not usually viewed in this light. At best, the popular 
perception of the sociological enterprise is one that 
confuses sociologists with social workers. More often, 
sociologists are characterized as individuals who go about 
investigating what "everyone knows anyway." Accordingly, 
potential respondents asked to volunteer their time and 
opinions may feel little obligation to do so. For example, 
as an interviewer, I often encounter more resistance from 
patients when they are asked basic demographic questions, 
which seem to be perceived as intrusive and unnecessary, 
than when they are probed for extensive information about 
their pregnancies, delivery traumas, or their use of alcohol 
and drugs. 
In light of the previous two distinctions, it is 
perhaps understandable that medical researchers often 
solicit cooperation from and therefore come to expect a 
90.0-95.0% response rate, even in ongoing longitudinal 
218 
studies. Voluntary drop-out rates are severely constrained, 
as patients, who must return to the medical facility, are 
often reluctant to withdraw from a study for fear that their 
treatment or interactions with the doctor may in some way be 
adversely affected. In contrast, sociological research is 
often undertaken with the expectation that achieving a 
70.0-80.0% rate of participation is both adequate and quite 
acceptable as representing the population as a whole. 
Finally, there is a distinct difference in the way 
information is gathered from respondents. Few sociologists 
could conceive of having the time and money to wait for 
eligible subjects to materialize. The amniocentesis study 
was conducted over a two-year period during which only 249 
interviews with eligible female respondents were completed. 
The research assistants involved in the interviewing process 
would wait for indeterminate amounts of time for patients 
whose appointments with the geneticist were prolonged. They 
also had to travel to the homes of many of the respondents 
who refused amniocentesis. In addition, because some 
accepting respondents didn't want anyone to know of their 
amniocentesis, interviewers had to arrange for clandestine 
meetings in hotel rooms to assure respondents that the 
confidentiality and privacy of their participation and 
responses would be safeguarded. Face-to-face interviews are 
always costly and time consuming. They are even more so 
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when one has no control over the rate at which potential 
participants will enter into the sampling frame or the time 
at which interviews can be scheduled and completed. Yet the 
amniocentesis study was not the exception but rather the 
rule for epidemiological investigations. 
Sociological researchers also have used face-to-face 
techniques and have had to wait for eligible subjects. 
However, this type of research has been fairly infrequent 
and, given financial constraints, is even more rare today. 
Methods 
While not mutually-exclusive, the methods employed by 
medical researchers and by sociologists are generally 
somewhat different. The design of choice among most medical 
researchers is a case-control study, in which subjects with 
a particular condition or disease (cases) are matched (often 
on the basis of age, sex, race, and/or income) with 
individuals in whom the condition or disease is absent 
(controls). Also known as a retrospective study design, 
this method attempts to compare cases' and controls' 
existing or past attributes or exposures thought to be 
related to the condition being studied. Ideally, 
case-control epidemiological studies are conducted by 
sampling from within a large, geographically-defined 
population. However, the majority of studies rely on 
hospital-based case-control sampling frames because of 
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convenience, accessibility, and financial concerns. The 
advantages of case-control studies, as outlined by 
Schlesselman (1982), include the following factors: they 
can be implemented fairly quickly and inexpensively, require 
relatively few subjects, allow for the study of multiple 
potential causes of the disease, are well-suited for the 
study of rare disease or those with long latency periods, 
and can benefit from additional information derived from 
patient charts, which may cover a fairly extensive period of 
the patient's medical history. Schlesselman also noted, 
however, that there are distinct disadvantages to 
case-control designs. Such studies rely on subjects' 
ability to accurately recall past experiences or exposures, 
little control can be exerted over extraneous factors, 
finding healthy individuals to match the cases may be 
difficult, and validation of information is difficult if not 
impossible. Also, when such studies are undertaken on a 
long-range basis, medical practice, usage of technologies, 
or exposure of subjects to the factors being investigated 
may change, making findings irrelevant by the time the 
project is completed. 
In many respects, although they often employ different 
research designs, sociologists are faced with the same 
dilemmas, particularly with regard to the reliability of 
respondents' answers in retrospective inquiries and the 
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inability to control extraneous factors in the environment 
of the persons being studied. However, sociological studies 
are generally undertaken acknowledging that, at best, 
independent variables relating to the dependent variable 
will be isolated. Unlike medical research, which strives 
(and often purports) to identify direct, causative agents 
that result in a disease, sociological research generally 
reports associations, correlations, and trends rather than 
claiming to have identified strict cause-and-effect 
relationships. Sociological research, then, is more often 
predicated on the concept that the study of human groups 
involves a wide variety of factors over which the researcher 
can exert little control. It is generally accepted that by 
explaining 35.0% or more of the variance, the researcher has 
identified some fairly powerful predictive variables. In 
dealing with the lives and health of patients, medical 
researchers generally require a much larger proportion of 
explained variance to undertake a new treatment regimen or 
procedure that also has a potential for adverse side 
effects. 
The analytical or statistical techniques or training of 
medical researchers is also somewhat different from that of 
sociologists. Williams (1987), for instance, noted that 
more than half the residents in her program have no interest 
in research and know little about statistics or computer 
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data analysis packages. At one time, few physicians were 
expected to become involved in research activities; in such 
instances, the lack of training in methods and statistics 
would seldom be noticed. Today, however, many medical 
practitioners are expected to participate in and generate 
research projects. In many instances, their position with a 
medical complex may depend on it. If for no other reason, 
their understanding of the analyses and findings of research 
published in medical professional journals would be required 
to keep up with rapidly changing medical technologies. Yet 
sophisticated "hard science" research methodology is only 
beginning to be acquired in medical schools. Many medical 
papers still make predictions based on fairly simplistic 
t-test analyses between case and control groups. 
Sociology has similarly gone through this transitional 
phase, from being somewhat more qualitative to becoming 
increasingly quantitative. However, because sociological 
curricula in most universities enlarged the emphasis on 
competent study design, computer abilities, and knowledge of 
statistical techniques before medical facilities did, 
sociologists are often better prepared than are medical 
practitioners to organize and conduct applied research. 
The conflict created by these different backgrounds in 
training and expectation has a potential for eliciting 
tension between the medical practitioner and the 
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sociologist. Findings that seem fairly significant to a 
social scientist are considered of dubious merit by a 
physician. Yet at the same time, medical researchers who 
draw conclusions from t-test comparisons of case and control 
groups appear to be naive and excessively reductionist to a 
sociological researcher. Thus, when collaboration in 
research is expected to culminate in the publication of 
several professional articles, different definitions of what 
is important and what is significant can result in 
considerable dissent between sociological and medical 
practitioners coming from different professional 
disciplines. 
Theories and perspectives 
Closely related to different methodological training 
and expectations, disparity between the theories and 
.Perspectives of medical professionals and sociologists can 
be a source of contention. Explanations for these 
differences can be found in the ways in which members of 
each discipline were trained for and were socialized into 
their respective roles. 
Medical practitioners function within a close-knit 
community, which has more stringent, rigid constraints 
attached to its membership than are often experienced by 
students aspiring to become sociologists. Rosengren (1980) 
described it, using Goffman's (1961) terminology, as a 
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"moral" community, which emphasizes rationality and 
objectivity. Fox (1979) noted, too, that doctors in 
training are encouraged to adopt a role of detachment. 
While becoming involved in some of the most personal, 
intimate aspects of human behavior and experience, doctors 
are trained to focus on a specific aspect of their patient; 
when a patient becomes ill with a disease, many medical 
practitioners attend just to the body part that is affected 
by the disorder. This helps them to concentrate on trying 
to find a cure and also keeps them from becoming too 
emotionally involved in the day-to-day difficulties the 
patient is enduring due to the onset of illness. 
In contrast, sociologists are trained to use a 
wholistic perspective. Rather than "dissecting" an 
individual into parts that can be individually scrutinized, 
sociologists tend to look at the whole person as well as the 
environmental influences that are affecting the person. 
Exposure to theories such as symbolic interactionism, 
ethnomethodology, and phenomenology prepares sociologists to 
deal with seemingly "irrational" behavior, because such 
perspectives recognize that the individual not only acts, 
but is acted upon, within a complex social ecology; these 
perspectives also acknowledge that an individual's 
perception and construction of reality determine the 
behavior s/he will adopt in a given situation. 
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In the context of research into acceptance or rejection 
of amniocentesis, the outcome of these differing 
perspectives and theoretical biases is readily apparent. 
Medical researchers conducted extensive research on patient 
learning of odds ratios and risk probabilities, assuming 
that if they could divine a way of forcing patients to 
remember the odds correctly, the prospective parents would 
make appropriate and rational decisions consistent with the 
geneticists' perception of reality. Doctors trained to rely 
on treatments and behaviors that have the best prognosis 
probabilities are ill prepared to deal with patients not 
similarly guided in their decision-making processes. Thus, 
after more than a decade of research on client retention of 
odds ratios, as well as their subsequent behaviors, 
published papers were still trying to determine ways in 
which counselees could be educated to remember and act upon 
their given risk probabilities. 
Only after researchers emanating from more 
sociological, anthropological, and psychological traditions 
entered the field did the emphasis shift from objective, 
rational decision-making models to more subjective 
interpretations. One could speculate (perhaps 
optimistically) that had sociologists and social 
psychologists earlier been involved in these studies, 
researchers would have more quickly arrived at this 
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conclusion, and would have modified the research impetus to 
focus on counselees' definition of the situation and 
interpretation of meaning within the context of their own 
lives, expectations, and normative influences. 
In addition to attempting to identify the "sensitizing 
concepts" that would enable them to gain a better 
understanding of counselees' behaviors, sociological 
researchers have tended to examine at-risk patients within a 
larger framework. For medical researchers, the end goal is 
the "cure," which in the instance of amniocentesis involves 
avoidance of pregnancy or prenatal diagnosis with the 
judicious use of abortion to avoid the birth of seriously 
affected children. A patient's visit to the doctor or 
hospital is thus often used as the exogenous, independent 
variable that is expected to be related to the cure of the 
disease. Sociologists, in contrast, generally perceive 
health-care visits as the dependent variable, which is 
affected by a host of independent factors such as 
socioeconomic status, attitudes, norms, accessibility, 
availability, doctors' reciprocity, and patient 
satisfaction. Moreover, social scientists are concerned not 
just with the diagnosis or the cure, but with the long-term 
consequences of genetic at-risk status. This would involve 
following the counseled parents over a longer period of time 
to determine the extent to which the diagnosis results in a 
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feeling of stigmatization. In the instance of parents who 
declined amniocentesis, sociologists would undoubtedly be 
interested in following them through the pregnancy to 
delivery and, in the event of the birth of a genetically-
disabled child, examining the ways in which the parents cope 
with this burden. 
Finally, the training and socialization of medical 
practitioners encourages them to deal with uncertainty in 
such a way that they convey the impression—and in so doing 
often convince themselves as well—that they are able to 
arrive at a "correct" solution. In the absence of a 
clear-cut diagnosis or a foolproof diagnostic procedure, 
physicians tend to search through their previous experiences 
for similar situations and then arrive at a conclusion, 
which is presented as factual and accurate. Sociologists 
have called this "diagnostic typification" (Rosengren, 
1980:102) and recognize that a treatment regimen is not 
based on hard, scientific, irrefutable evidence, but on 
doctors' abilities to recall appropriate information, on 
where they received their medical training, and on their 
personal biases or judgments. Sociologists have, in a 
sense, been trained for uncertainty. Within their field, 
they have learned to accept and expect the unknown and the 
unfathomable, realizing that research findings are just one 
of many ways to characterize reality. When professionals ' 
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from two different disciplines must mutually arrive at a 
"conclusion," these discrepancies in perceptions of reality 
can collide. The physician may believe the results from a 
research project present incontrovertible evidence that can 
be generalized, while the sociologist may view the findings 
as preliminary or insufficiently global in their 
application. How these differences in interpretations and 
perspectives can be resolved will depend, in part, on the 
flexibility and adaptability of the people involved. 
Conclusions 
Comparisons between medical and sociological research 
and researchers are not meant to suggest the two communities 
are polarized. To the contrary, there are probably more 
similarities than contrasts. Most of the theories, 
perspectives, methods, and practices of medical 
professionals have at one time or another been used by 
sociologists, and social psychological theories and 
positivistic methods are gaining credence within the medical 
community. Rosengren (1980) even goes so far as to suggest 
that the social model is gaining ascendancy, and attributes 
the gradual demedicalization of society to the increasing 
influence of the sociological perspective. 
The extent to which this is true remains uncertain. 
What is clear, however, is that medicine and sociology still 
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have major disparities emanating from metatheoretical and 
organizational underpinnings that will not disappear. It 
would be naive to anticipate that cross-fertilization 
between techniques, strategies, and theories between the two 
fields would culminate in a multifaceted but unified 
discipline. 
Though each has gained from the exchange, sociology and 
medicine will continue to experience tensions and conflicts. 
For sociologists working closely with medical professionals, 
this means they must learn to deal with dissension and 
discord. They must also guard against cooptation (Etzioni, 
1961), no easy task when employed by the medical community, 
which is trained to perceive its social construction of 
reality as truth. 
Ultimately, because each discipline can and does gain 
from one another, the best hope is that their cooperation 
will result in a healthful, ongoing dialogue and 
interstimulation of ideas. Fox (1986:29) offered a glimpse 
of the fruition joint collaboration of medicine and 
sociology could produce; she suggested that the issues the 
two disciplines confront help us not only to find logical 
answers and technical solutions, but encourage us to deal 
with the "larger questions about who we are, what we stand 
for, and where we are going as a total society." This would 
seem an admirable goal for medical sociologists to pursue. 
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